Moral Realism

Author(s):  
Kevin Carnahan

Reinhold Niebuhr’s moral realism can be confusing, as he draws upon multiple categories that are often in tension in contemporary discussions of moral reality. This chapter lays out three frameworks Niebuhr used to discuss moral reality: naturalism, moral ideals, and divine nature and command. It argues that these frameworks are mutually supportive in Niebuhr’s thought and locates each in the context of contemporary discussions in moral philosophy. In relation to naturalism, Niebuhr’s thought is compared with the neo-Aristotelian thought of Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. Concerning ideals, Niebuhr is put in dialogue with philosophers such as W. D. Ross, Martha Nussbaum, and Isaiah Berlin. Niebuhr’s treatment of divine command and nature is compared with the work of Robert M. Adams.

1995 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 273-337
Author(s):  
Jocelyne Couture ◽  
Kai Nielsen

Most of the essays collected here are essays in metaethics seeking in exacting and interesting ways to resolve problems raised by the familiar options in metaethics we outlined in our Introduction. Richard Brandt, for example, forcefully argues, going much against the at least modestly holistic grain of our time, for a foundationalism (noncognitivist though it be) which would be foundational in both metaethics and normative ethics. R.M. Hare makes a brief but systematic defense, which is both spirited and clear, of his prescriptivism (a species of what we, following tradition, have called ‘noncognitivism,’ but which he argues should instead be called ‘nondescriptivism’). His arguments here for his position - call it nondescriptivism or noncognitivism- are directed forcefully against ethical naturalism (descriptivism) and specifically against the naturalism of Philippa Foot. Nicholas Sturgeon and David Copp contribute elaborate and rigorously argued defenses of ethical naturalism, or, as they might prefer to call it, ‘moral realism.’


Author(s):  
Jaco W. Gericke

Philosophical approaches to ancient Israelite religion are rare, as is metaethical reflection on the Hebrew Bible. Nevertheless, many biblical scholars and philosophers of religion tend to take it for granted that the biblical metaethical assumptions about the relation between divinity and morality involve a pre-philosophical version of Divine Command Theory by default. In this paper the author challenges the popular consensus with several arguments demonstrating the presence of moral realism in the text. It is furthermore suggested that the popular consensus came about as a result of prima facie assessments informed by anachronistic metatheistic assumptions about what the Hebrew Bible assumed to be essential in the deity–morality relation. The study concludes with the observation that in the texts where Divine Command Theory is absent from the underlying moral epistemology the Euthyphro Dilemma disappears as a false dichotomy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 80 (316) ◽  
pp. 456
Author(s):  
Nadir Antonio Pichler ◽  
Talia Castilhos de Oliveira

The purpose of the text is to describe and analyze the contemplative life as an ideal of beatitude in the moral philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. By assimilating, remodeling and criticizing the ancient and medieval philosophical-theological tradition, Thomas structures an original and complex synthesis, immersing itself in the essence of the divine nature through knowledge and in the human soul through the contemplative life, and from there to erect the pillars of an ontology theocentric, where God is the supreme good and promoter of human happiness, the first principle of all reality. From him comes the world, man and all creatures, and everything tends to return to its essence, in a special the man. For this reason, God is the alpha and omega, propitiator of the deepest beatitude. The text is organized into four items: the context of beatitude, the excellence of the intellectual soul by the activity of the contemplative life, the reasons for the contemplative life and the comparison between the active and the contemplative life. Síntese: O objetivo do texto é descrever e analisar a vida contemplativa como ideal de beatitude na filosofia moral de Tomás de Aquino. Assimilando, remodelando e criticando a tradição filosófico-teológica antiga a medieval, Tomás estrutura uma síntese original e complexa, mergulhando na essencia da natureza divina pelo conhecimento e na alma humana pela vida contemplativa, para, a partir daí, erigir os pilares de uma ontologia teocentrica, onde Deus é o bem supremo e promotor da felicidade humana, o primeiro princípio de toda a realidade. Dele procede o mundo, o homem e todas as criaturas, e tudo tende a retornar a sua essencia, de modo especial, o homem. Por isso, Deus é o alfa e o ômega, propiciador da mais profunda beatitude. O texto está organizado em quatro itens: Contexto da beatitude, a excelência da alma intelectiva pela atividade da vida contemplativa, as razoes da vida contemplativa e a comparaçao entre a vida ativa e a contemplativa.Palavras-chave: Beatitude; Vida contemplativa; Filosofia moral; Tomás de Aquino; Deus.


2021 ◽  
pp. 295-319
Author(s):  
Patrick Kain

While several scholars have suggested that Kant’s early engagement with Leibniz’s philosophical theology led Kant to a conception of the divine will that helped to motivate many of the distinctive features of Kant’s mature moral psychology and moral philosophy, commentators have nevertheless neglected and failed to understand Kant’s account of divine freedom and how it functions in his rejection of substance monism, fatalism, and threats to divine self-sufficiency. This chapter examines the development of Kant’s position in a variety of his early and later published works and in his drafts, Reflexionen, and lecture notes. God is conceived of as the ens realissimum, possessing or exemplifying all fundamental realities or perfections, and it is God’s cognition of his own goodness that gives rise to his volition to create the most perfect world. Divine freedom is understood as a rational and autonomous expression of the divine nature itself, without requiring alternative possibilities.


Hypatia ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-90
Author(s):  
Jenefer Robinson ◽  
Stephanie Ross

We apply Carol Gilligaris distinction between a “male” mode of moral reasoning, focussed on justice, and a “female” mode, focussed on caring, to the reading of literature. Martha Nussbaum suggests that certain novels are works of moral philosophy. We argue that what Nussbaum sees as the special ethical contribution of such novels is in fact training in the stereotypically female mode of moral concern. We show this kind of training is appropriate to all readers of these novels, not just to women. Finally, we explore what else is involved in distinctively feminist readings of traditional novels.


2007 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 149-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sobel

My own conclusion is that “One ought to be moral” makes no sense at all unless the “ought” has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. I am, therefore putting forward quite seriously a theory that disallows the possibility of saying that a man ought (free unsubscripted “ought“) to have ends other than those he does have.- Philippa FootH.A. Prichard's “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, like Descartes Meditations, is remembered better for the skeptical moment in the author's thinking than for its unskeptical conclusions. Prichard's paper is complicated, but the lore about its message is simple. The lore is that Prichard pointed out that in trying to vindicate the reason-giving power of morality we might do so by appealing to moral norms or to non-moral norms. If we appeal to moral norms, then we are only justifying a standard in terms of that standard and just about any old standard could survive such a test.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-64
Author(s):  
Andrew D. Bowyer

There are broad commonalities between the projects of Donald MacKinnon (1913–1994) and Stanley Cavell (1926–) sufficient to make the claim that they struck an analogous pose in their respective contexts. This is not to discount their manifest differences. In the milieu of 1960s and 1970s Cambridge, MacKinnon argued in support of a qualified language of metaphysics in the service of a renewed catholic humanism and Christian socialism. At Harvard, Cavell articulated commitments that made him more at home in the world of North American secular political liberalism. Where Nietzsche, Hume, Freud, Heidegger, Emerson and Thoreau were Cavell’s inspirations, Butler, Kant, G. E. Moore, Collingwood and the New Testament were MacKinnon’s. For all the stark differences, commonalities abound and the reason for this can be traced to a shared appreciation of Austin’s contribution to the ‘lingusitic turn’ together with Wittgenstein’s later work. They both developed projects obsessed with the problem of scepticism together with a commitment to a creative re-animation of moral discourse in light of it, with MacKinnon defending a qualified ‘moral realism’, and Cavell, ‘moral perfectionism’. Seen together, a distinctive post-Kantian and post-Wittgensteinian therapeutic moral philosophy is in evidence.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
Erik J. Wielenberg

I argue that William Craig’s defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why such connections hold. Another component of Craig’s defence of the moral argument is an endorsement of a particular version of the divine command theory (DCT). Craig’s version of DCT posits certain logically necessary connections but Craig fails to provide an adequate account of why these connections hold. Thus, Craig’s critique of non-theistic moral realism is at odds with his DCT. Since the critique and DCT are both essential elements of his defence of the moral argument, that defence is internally inconsistent.


Author(s):  
Derek Alan Woodard-Lehman

This chapter argues against the familiar consensus that Barth’s relationship to modern moral philosophy is oppositional. It demonstrates that Barth appropriates the central insights of his philosophical predecessors and incorporates them into his ethics, even as he anticipates one of the most fruitful developments in contemporary moral philosophy: Stephen Darwall’s ‘second-personal ethics’. Rather than casting autonomy as sin, he recasts obedience to the Word of God as a form of autonomy. Barth incorporates the rational form of Kantian self-legislation and the social form of Hegelian mutual recognition into his account of subjective reception of revelation. Because Barth does not separate the sovereignty of revelation from the sociality of the church’s interpretation of Scripture and confession of faith, we—Barth’s readers—must not separate his account of hearing the Word of God from his account of hearing the divine command. In fact, we should take his account of the subjective reception of revelation as his most fulsome and winsome account of practical reason.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (188) ◽  
pp. 389-410
Author(s):  
Alex Demirović

Political parties and social movements activists refere to the notion of justice as founding principle of critism. Demirovi? argues that the norm of justice is not able to motivate criticism and action. The norm of justice plays an important role in professional moral philosophy as is the case in the approaches of Martha Nussbaum or John Rawls. The offer arguments for their claims to give people and states a moral perspective. But the claim of universality that is inherent in moral discourses, always fail. The implication is that people who expect moral philosophy to be an advising knowledge become disappointed and perplexed. This is confirmed by the outcome of empirical research on justice among workers. To explain the dilemma of justice – claiming for universality and being particularistic and part of historical state form – the article takes up arguments developed by Marx and Horkheimer on justice as an ideological form.


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