Women, Morality, and Fiction

Hypatia ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-90
Author(s):  
Jenefer Robinson ◽  
Stephanie Ross
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Moral Concern

We apply Carol Gilligaris distinction between a “male” mode of moral reasoning, focussed on justice, and a “female” mode, focussed on caring, to the reading of literature. Martha Nussbaum suggests that certain novels are works of moral philosophy. We argue that what Nussbaum sees as the special ethical contribution of such novels is in fact training in the stereotypically female mode of moral concern. We show this kind of training is appropriate to all readers of these novels, not just to women. Finally, we explore what else is involved in distinctively feminist readings of traditional novels.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subramanian Rangan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Economic Paradigm ◽  
Modern Economic ◽  
Great Output

Our quest for prosperity has produced great output (i.e. performance) but not always great outcomes (i.e. progress). Despite mounting regulation when it comes to fairness, well-being, and the scope of our humanity, the modern economic system still leaves much to be desired. If practice is to evolve substantively and systematically, then we must help evolve an economic paradigm where mutuality is more systematically complemented by morality. The bases of this morality must rest, beyond the sympathetic sentiments envisaged by Adam Smith, on an expanded and intentional moral reasoning. Moral philosophy has a natural role in informing and influencing such a turn in our thinking, especially when education is the preferred vehicle of transformation. Indeed, rather than just regulate market power we must also better educate market power.

scholarly journals A Deeper Look at Autonomous Vehicle Ethics: An Integrative Ethical Decision-Making Framework to Explain Moral Pluralism

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jimin Rhim ◽  
Ji-Hyun Lee ◽  
Mo Chen ◽  
Angelica Lim
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Decision ◽  
Ethical Decision Making ◽  
Autonomous Vehicle ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Individual Factors ◽  
Ethical Decisions ◽  
Ethical Behavioral Intentions

The autonomous vehicle (AV) is one of the first commercialized AI-embedded robots to make autonomous decisions. Despite technological advancements, unavoidable AV accidents that result in life-and-death consequences cannot be completely eliminated. The emerging social concern of how an AV should make ethical decisions during unavoidable accidents is referred to as the moral dilemma of AV, which has promoted heated discussions among various stakeholders. However, there are research gaps in explainable AV ethical decision-making processes that predict how AVs’ moral behaviors are made that are acceptable from the AV users’ perspectives. This study addresses the key question: What factors affect ethical behavioral intentions in the AV moral dilemma? To answer this question, this study draws theories from multidisciplinary research fields to propose the “Integrative ethical decision-making framework for the AV moral dilemma.” The framework includes four interdependent ethical decision-making stages: AV moral dilemma issue framing, intuitive moral reasoning, rational moral reasoning, and ethical behavioral intention making. Further, the framework includes variables (e.g., perceived moral intensity, individual factors, and personal moral philosophies) that influence the ethical decision-making process. For instance, the framework explains that AV users from Eastern cultures will tend to endorse a situationist ethics position (high idealism and high relativism), which views that ethical decisions are relative to context, compared to AV users from Western cultures. This proposition is derived from the link between individual factors and personal moral philosophy. Moreover, the framework proposes a dual-process theory, which explains that both intuitive and rational moral reasoning are integral processes of ethical decision-making during the AV moral dilemma. Further, this framework describes that ethical behavioral intentions that lead to decisions in the AV moral dilemma are not fixed, but are based on how an individual perceives the seriousness of the situation, which is shaped by their personal moral philosophy. This framework provides a step-by-step explanation of how pluralistic ethical decision-making occurs, reducing the abstractness of AV moral reasoning processes.

Moral Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 328-346
Author(s):  
Kevin Carnahan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Divine Nature ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Moral Reality ◽  
Moral Ideals ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
Multiple Categories

Reinhold Niebuhr’s moral realism can be confusing, as he draws upon multiple categories that are often in tension in contemporary discussions of moral reality. This chapter lays out three frameworks Niebuhr used to discuss moral reality: naturalism, moral ideals, and divine nature and command. It argues that these frameworks are mutually supportive in Niebuhr’s thought and locates each in the context of contemporary discussions in moral philosophy. In relation to naturalism, Niebuhr’s thought is compared with the neo-Aristotelian thought of Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse. Concerning ideals, Niebuhr is put in dialogue with philosophers such as W. D. Ross, Martha Nussbaum, and Isaiah Berlin. Niebuhr’s treatment of divine command and nature is compared with the work of Robert M. Adams.

How to Argue for Law’s Full-Blooded Normativity

2019 ◽  
pp. 165-186
Author(s):  
George Letsas
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Specific Practice ◽  
Open Question ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter aims to make space for the view that law possesses full-blooded normativity in a top-down way. Here is the dialectic of the inquiry: What would have to be true of morality for the claim that some specific practice is full-bloodedly normative to be plausible? The chapter assumes that the practice of morality as a whole has full-blooded normativity in the sense that its requirements give one genuine reasons to act, irrespective of one’s subjective wants, desires, and beliefs. The focus is on what it means to say of a specific practice that it partakes of morality’s normativity. The reason is simple: it should be an open question whether this or that practice has full-blooded normativity. For if it is not possible for any particular practice to have full-blooded normativity, then the question of whether law has full-blooded normativity would make no sense from the get-go. The account put forward builds on the idea of obligations of role. A practice, has full-blooded normativity when it instantiates a distinct set of obligations, one that pertains to people in a particular capacity, such as friends, parents, doctors, or teachers. The proposition that there are distinct moral practices, which are not reducible to a single moral concern, is of course disputed territory in moral philosophy. But if this proposition is accepted, one can ask, by analogy, whether legal practice instantiates an obligation of role and, as a result, bears the attributes of full-blooded normativity. This way of proceeding perceives the relationship between law and metaethics differently: it shows that law’s claim to full-blooded normativity ultimately depends on contestable assumptions about the nature of morality as a whole.

The Trolley Method of Moral Philosophy

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
James O’Connor ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Trolley Problems ◽  
Trolley Cases

The hypothetical scenarios generally known as trolley problems have become widespread in recent moral philosophy. They invariably require an agent to choose one of a strictly limited number of options, all of them bad. Although they don’t always involve trolleys / trams, and are used to make a wide variety of points, what makes it justified to speak of a distinctive “trolley method” is the characteristic assumption that the intuitive reactions that all these artificial situations elicit constitute an appropriate guide to real-life moral reasoning. I dispute this assumption by arguing that trolley cases inevitably constrain the supposed rescuers into behaving in ways that clearly deviate from psychologically healthy, and morally defensible, human behavior. Through this focus on a generally overlooked aspect of trolley theorizing – namely, the highly impoverished role invariably allotted to the would-be rescuer in these scenarios – I aim to challenge the complacent twin assumptions of advocates of the trolley method that this approach to moral reasoning has practical value, and is in any case innocuous. Neither assumption is true.

Beyond Caring: The De-Moralization of Gender

1987 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 87-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilyn Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Carol Gilligan

Carol Gilligan heard a ‘distinct moral language’ in the voices of women who were subjects in her studies of moral reasoning. Though herself a developmental psychologist, Gilligan has put her mark on contemporary feminist moral philosophy by daring to claim the competence of this voice and the worth of its message. Her book, In a Different Voice, which one theorist has aptly described as a best-seller, explored the concern with care and relationships which Gilligan discerned in the moral reasoning of women and contrasted it with the orientation toward justice and rights which she found to typify the moral reasoning of men.

Gesellschaftskritik und Gerechtigkeit

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (188) ◽  
pp. 389-410
Author(s):  
Alex Demirović
Keyword(s):  
Social Movements ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Moral Perspective ◽  
Founding Principle ◽  
Moral Discourses ◽  
State Form

Political parties and social movements activists refere to the notion of justice as founding principle of critism. Demirovi? argues that the norm of justice is not able to motivate criticism and action. The norm of justice plays an important role in professional moral philosophy as is the case in the approaches of Martha Nussbaum or John Rawls. The offer arguments for their claims to give people and states a moral perspective. But the claim of universality that is inherent in moral discourses, always fail. The implication is that people who expect moral philosophy to be an advising knowledge become disappointed and perplexed. This is confirmed by the outcome of empirical research on justice among workers. To explain the dilemma of justice – claiming for universality and being particularistic and part of historical state form – the article takes up arguments developed by Marx and Horkheimer on justice as an ideological form.

SCIENCE CANNOT DETERMINE HUMAN VALUES

Think ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (43) ◽  
pp. 17-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian D. Earp
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Human Values ◽  
Empirical Information ◽  
Moral Landscape ◽  
A Chain

Sam Harris, in his book The Moral Landscape, argues that ‘science can determine human values.’ Against this view, I argue that while secular moral philosophy can certainly help us to determine our values, science – at least as that word is commonly understood – must play a subservient role. To the extent that science can ‘determine’ what we ought to do, it is only by providing us with empirical information, which can then be slotted into a chain of deductive (moral) reasoning. The premises of such reasoning, however, can in no way be derived from the scientific method: they come, instead, from philosophy – and common sense.

Repression and Moral Reasoning: An Outline of a New Approach in Ethical Understanding

SATS ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannes Nykänen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Related Phenomenon ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Essential Aspect

AbstractThe aim of the paper is to show that moral reasoning is not really reasoning in the sense usually assumed in moral philosophy. Instead, moral reasoning is one aspect of repressing conscience. The formal dimensions of moral reasoning function as a repressive depersonalisation of our sense of being an I who stands in a relationship to a you. For instance, “moral principle” invokes a formal and hence impersonal understanding of a moral problem. The thinking person loses her sense of being a particular person related to another particular person and focuses instead on the moral principles with their inherent, systematic implications. However, and as I will show in connection to so-called moral dilemmas, the thinking person does not actually act in the rational manner that is presupposed by reasoning. Instead, moral reasoning will reveal itself as a discourse for repressing conscience. Part of the aim of the paper is to show that, contrary to what is generally assumed, repression is a morally related phenomenon that arises as a result of a person’s difficulties with acknowledging the character of a moral difficulty; an acknowledgement that is an essential aspect of moral understanding.

Can Fiction be Philosophy?

1998 ◽  
pp. 23-30
Author(s):  
Margaret G. Holland
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Iris Murdoch ◽  
Writing Style ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Religious Texts ◽  
Philosophy And Literature ◽  
Moral Claims

This paper examines the relation between philosophy and literature through an analysis of claims made by Martha Nussbaum regarding the contribution novels can make to moral philosophy. Perhaps her most controversial assertion is that some novels are themselves works of moral philosophy. I contrast Nussbaum’s view with that of Iris Murdoch. I discuss three claims which are fundamental to Nussbaum’s position: the relation between writing style and content; philosophy’s inadequacy in preparing agents for moral life because of its reliance on rules; and the usefulness of the moral work engaged in by readers of novels. The evaluation of these claims requires a discussion of the nature of philosophy. I find that Murdoch and Nussbaum agree on the ability of literature to contribute to moral understanding, but disagree on the issue of what philosophy is. Therefore, they disagree on the question of whether certain works of fiction are also works of philosophy. I argue that the task Nussbaum assigns philosophy is too broad. Through the use of critical and reflective methods, philosophy should examine and sort moral claims. Literary, philosophical and religious texts contribute to moral eduction; keeping them separate helps us appreciate their distinct contributions, as well as respect their distinct aims and methods. Therefore, I conclude that Nussbaum’s inclusion of certain novels in philosophy cannot be sustained.

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