scholarly journals Rationalizing (Vernünfteln)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Sticker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Philosophical Methodology ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Moral Transgressions

Kant was a keen psychological observer and theorist of the forms, mechanisms and sources of self-deception. In this Element, the author discusses the role of rationalizing/Vernünfteln for Kant's moral psychology, normative ethics and philosophical methodology. By drawing on the full breadth of examples of rationalizing Kant discusses, the author shows how rationalizing can extend to general features of morality and corrupt rational agents thoroughly (albeit not completely and not irreversibly). Furthermore, the author explains the often-overlooked roles common human reason, empirical practical reason and even pure practical reason play for rationalizing. Kant is aware that rationality is a double-edged sword; reason is the source of morality and of our dignity, but it also enables us to seemingly justify moral transgressions to ourselves, and it creates an interest in this justification in the first place. Finally, this Element discusses whether Kant's ethical theory itself can be criticised as a product of rationalizing.

Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Critical Assessment ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Normative Authority ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Principal Parts

Nietzsche is one of the most subversive ethical thinkers of the Western canon. This book offers a critical assessment of his ethical thought and its significance for contemporary moral philosophy. It develops a charitable but critical reading of his thought, pushing some claims and arguments as far as seems fruitful while rejecting others. But it also uses Nietzsche in dialogue with, so to contribute to, a range of long-standing issues within normative ethics, metaethics, value theory, practical reason, and moral psychology. The book is divided into three principal parts. Part I examines Nietzsche’s critique of morality, arguing that it raises well-motivated challenges to morality’s normative authority and value: his error theory about morality’s categoricity is in a better position than many contemporary versions; and his critique of moral values has bite even against undemanding moral theories, with significant implications not just for rarefied excellent types but also us. Part II turns to moral psychology, attributing to Nietzsche and defending a sentimentalist explanation of action and motivation. Part III considers his non-moral perfectionism, developing models of value and practical normativity that avoid difficulties facing many contemporary accounts and that may therefore be of wider interest. The discussion concludes by considering Nietzsche’s broader significance: as well as calling into question many of moral philosophy’s deepest assumptions, he challenges our usual views of what ethics itself is—and what it, and we, should be doing.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Simon Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Ethical Project

This opening chapter explains the book’s overarching aims, themes, structure, and approach. The book’s aim is to critically assess Nietzsche’s ethical thought and its significance for contemporary (broadly analytic) moral philosophy. It does this in two main ways: by developing a charitable but critical reconstruction of his ethics; and by using Nietzsche to contribute to a range of longstanding issues within normative ethics, metaethics, value theory, practical reason, and moral psychology. The chapter locates Nietzsche’s ethical project in his ‘revaluation of all values’, outlining a variety of interpretive and philosophical puzzles this raises. It then gives a chapter-by-chapter overview of the book’s topics and direction, and addresses some methodological matters bearing on its interpretive and philosophical ambitions.

The Moral Psychology of AI and the Ethical Opt-Out Problem

2020 ◽  
pp. 109-126
Author(s):  
Jean-François Bonnefon ◽  
Azim Shariff ◽  
Iyad Rahwan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Public Perception ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Psychological Science ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
Self Driving Cars

This chapter discusses the limits of normative ethics in new moral domains linked to the development of AI. In these new domains, people have the possibility to opt out of using a machine if they do not approve of the ethics that the machine is programmed to follow. In other words, even if normative ethics could determine the best moral programs, these programs would not be adopted (and thus have no positive impact) if they clashed with users’ preferences—a phenomenon that can be called “ethical opt-out.” The chapter then explores various ways in which the field of moral psychology can illuminate public perception of moral AI and inform the regulations of such AI. The chapter’s main focus is on self-driving cars, but it also explores the role of psychological science for the study of other moral algorithms.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
New Work ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Evaluative Beliefs ◽  
Moral Advice ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in the field of normative ethical theory. This eighth volume features chapters which collectively address the following topics: the irreplaceable value of human beings, interpersonal morality and conceptions of welfare, what it is for something to be good for an animal (including humans), the relation between good will and right action, moral advice and joint agency, moral responsibility and wrongdoing, the basis of equality, the role of needs claims in ethical theory, threshold conceptions of deontology, prudential reasons, the significance of evaluative beliefs, and Stoic conceptions of insults....

From Psychology to Morality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Deigh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Social Philosophy ◽  
Natural Phenomena ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Human Psychology ◽  
Modern Thought

The essays in this collection belong to the tradition of naturalism in ethics. Its program is to explain moral thought and action as wholly natural phenomena, that is, to explain such thought and action without recourse to either a reality separate from that of the natural world or volitional powers that operate independently of natural forces. Naturalism’s greatest exponent in ancient thought was Aristotle. In modern thought Hume and Freud stand out as the most influential contributors to the tradition. All three thinkers made the study of human psychology fundamental to their work in ethics. All three built their theories on studies of human desires and emotions and assigned to reason the role of guiding the actions that spring from our desires and emotions toward ends that promise self-fulfillment and away from ends that are self-destructive. The collection’s essays draw inspiration from their ideas and are arranged to follow the lead of Aristotle’s and Hume’s ethics. The first three survey and examine general theories of emotion and motivation. The next two focus on emotions that are central to human sociability. Turning to distinctively cognitive powers necessary for moral thought and action, the sixth and seventh essays discuss the role of empathy in moral judgment and defend Bernard Williams’s controversial account of practical reason. The final five essays use the studies in moral psychology of the previous essays to treat questions in ethics and social philosophy. The treatment of these questions exemplifies the implementation of a naturalist program in these disciplines.

Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy E. Snow
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Viable Alternative ◽  
Ethical Naturalism ◽  
Natural Goodness ◽  
External Goods ◽  
Philippa Foot ◽  
Virtuous Life

Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics takes inspiration from Aristotle’s ethical theory. Central to this approach is that virtues, enduring dispositions of character and intellect, are essential, along with external goods, for us to live flourishing lives in accordance with our nature as rational beings. Aristotle’s theory is teleological, for the virtues direct us toward the end or telos of flourishing and enable us to attain it. The theory is naturalistic in the sense that to live a virtuous life is to live a life of natural goodness. This chapter explains these and other ideas by reviewing Rosalind Hursthouse’s view that virtue ethics is a viable alternative to deontology and consequentialism, followed by a discussion of two major themes of Daniel C. Russell’s account of the role of practical reason in virtue ethics. Finally, it turns to ethical naturalism as articulated by Hursthouse, Philippa Foot, and Michael Thompson, with mention of McDowell’s approach.

scholarly journals The Archangel Delusion. Descriptive Ethics and Its Role in the Education of Ethicists

2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-49
Author(s):  
Jarosław Kucharski
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Descriptive Ethics ◽  
Moral Theories

The role of ethicists is to provide a genuine ethical theory to help non-ethicists interpret and solve moral dilemmas, to define what is right or wrong, and, finally, to clarify moral values. Therefore, ethicists are taught to address morality with rational procedures, to set aside their moral intuitions and emotions. Sometimes, professional ethicists are prone to falling into the archangel delusion – the belief that they are beyond the influence of their own emotions. This can lead to ousting moral intuitions from the space of ethical reflection, thus making ethicists unaware of them. They may treat intuitive beliefs about morality as an expression of primal moral feelings. The main question pursued in this article, is how those feelings may influence moral theories, which should be developed by professional ethicists. Ethicists may provide an ethical theory which is merely a rationalisation and justification for their own suppressed moral emotions, rather than the effect of genuine, rational moral reasoning. To help ethicists cope with this delusion, a model of cooperation between descriptive and normative ethics is proposed. Ethicists should therefore use the research tools of descriptive ethics to determine their own intuitions, and the moral emotions in which these intuitions are grounded. --------------- Received: 09/06/2021. Reviewed: 23/07/2021. Accepted: 13/08/2021.

Moral Psychology, Neuroscience, and Non-Combatant Immunity

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 203-226
Author(s):  
Richard Price
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Normative Practice ◽  
Shed Light

Abstract Some have argued for the relevance for normative ethics of empirical research in international relations on the origins and role of moral norms. Building on such arguments, the paper considers the relevance of contemporary research in moral psychology and neuroscience for the ethics of war. Research in those fields has implications for our understanding of the sources and nature of moral beliefs and judgement, and thus may shed light on efforts to morally bound violence. In this chapter I consider how such research helps us understand the norm of non-combatant immunity, and explore the implications for understanding the effectiveness of such norms and for normative practice.

Simplicity and Authority: Reflections on Theory and Practice in Kant's Moral Philosophy

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
The Voice ◽  
Ethical Systems

AbstractWhat is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge.

A Common Subject for Ethics

Mind ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
History Of ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Common ◽  
Moral Twin Earth ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize and explore what I shall call the Common Subject Problem for ethics. The problem is that there seems to be no good answer to what property everyone who makes moral claims could be talking and thinking about. The Common Subject Problem is not a new problem; on the contrary, I will argue that it is one of the central animating concerns in the history of both metaethics and normative theory. But despite its importance, the Common Subject Problem is essentially invisible on many contemporary ways of carving up the problems of metaethics and normative ethical theory. My aim, therefore, is to make progress – in part by naming the problem, but also by beginning to sketch out the contours of what gives the problem its force, by distinguishing between different paths of response to the problem and assessing some of their chief merits, and finally, by distinguishing the Common Subject Problem from another problem with which it has come to be conflated. This nearby problem is the Moral Twin Earth Problem. Whereas the Common Subject Problem is a problem about what property ‘wrong’ could refer to, the Moral Twin Earth Problem is a problem about how ‘wrong’ could refer to it. The upshot of the paper, therefore, is to rescue one of the historically significant problems in normative ethics and metaethics – a problem that is essentially about normative semantics – from the illusion that has persisted over the last twenty years that it is really, somehow, a problem about metasemantics. Once we have reclaimed this problem, we can see that it could still be a problem even if there are no distinctively metasemantic problems in metaethics at all, that it is a problem faced by a wider variety of views, and that the space of possible solutions is much wider and more interesting for normative theory, moral psychology, and moral epistemology.

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