scholarly journals Repeated Games and Networks

Author(s):  
Francesco Nava

The chapter provides an overview of recent results on infinitely repeated games in which monitoring and interactions are local. The chapter surveys Folk Theorems for games with local monitoring, and results characterizing optimal punishments in separable local public goods games. The relationship between the monitoring structure and the equilibrium correspondence is a key topic of enquiry. Results clarify the roles played by contagion, ostracism, and communication in shaping equilibrium outcomes. Understanding how network measures of social cohesion and of information diffusion can affect trust in communities is the main applied aim of the literature.

REGION ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Marco Bellandi

Recent results on the relationship between external economies and local public goods may be summarised as follows. Marshallian external economies are at the core of paths of development in vital local productive systems, such as Marshallian industrial districts or similar forms. They are partly external to the resources organized by single specialised firms and largely dependent on the embeddedness of the firm in the system and its various forms of division of labour. Exchanges need to integrate the contributions of the specialised producers, but all sorts of difficulties hinder them if a joint access to ‘local’ public goods does not help producers. Markets do not provide for them easily, nor top-down State planning does. Mechanisms and processes of local governance and place leadership, possibly combined with social customs and conventions, are an important support to local integration. The paper comes back to this kernel in the theories of local development, proposing an extended framework of relevant local public goods, qualified as specific public goods, club goods, and place-based common-pool resources, all sharing “commons”-like features. Factors hindering virtuous circles between external economies and specific commons are considered as well, in particular those related to different structures of interests


ORDO ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Pickhardt

SummaryIn this paper I examine the relationship between Pareto-optimality and group size in linear public goods games or experiments. In particular, I use the standard setting of homogeneous linear public goods experiments and apply a recently developed tool to identify all Pareto-optimal allocations in such settings. It turns out that under any conceivable circumstances, ceteris paribus, small groups have a higher Pareto-ratio (Pareto-optimal allocations over total allocations) than large groups. Hence, if Pareto-optimality of an allocation is a property that makes such allocations acceptable and maintainable, small groups will find is easier to provide Pareto-optimal amounts of a public good than large groups. This is a novel reasoning for Mancur Olson′s claim, in particular, with respect to what he has termed inclusive goods and inclusive groups.


2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (30) ◽  
pp. 17516-17521
Author(s):  
Lei Shi ◽  
Ivan Romić ◽  
Yongjuan Ma ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Boris Podobnik ◽  
...  

Public goods, ranging from judiciary to sanitation to parkland, permeate daily life. They have been a subject of intense interdisciplinary study, with a traditional focus being on participation levels in isolated public goods games (PGGs) as opposed to a more recent focus on participation in PGGs embedded into complex social networks. We merged the two perspectives by arranging voluntary participants into one of three network configurations, upon which volunteers played a number of iterated PGGs within their network neighborhood. The purpose was to test whether the topology of social networks or a freedom to express preferences for some local public goods over others affect participation. The results show that changes in social networks are of little consequence, yet volunteers significantly increase participation when they freely express preferences. Surprisingly, the increase in participation happens from the very beginning of the game experiment, before any information about how others play can be gathered. Such information does get used later in the game as volunteers seek to correlate contributions with higher returns, thus adding significant value to public goods overall. These results are ascribable to a small number of behavioral phenotypes, and suggest that societies may be better off with bottom-up schemes for public goods provision.


Think India ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 186-192
Author(s):  
Dr. Oinam Ranjit Singh ◽  
Dr. Nushar Bargayary

The Bodo of the North Eastern region of India have their own kinship system to maintain social relationship since ancient periods. Kinship is the expression of social relationship. Kinship may be defined as connection or relationships between persons based on marriage or blood. In each and every society of the world, social relationship is considered to be the more important than the biological bond. The relationship is not socially recognized, it fall outside the realm of kinship. Since kinship is considered as universal, it plays a vital role in the socialization of individuals and the maintenance of social cohesion of the group. Thus, kinship is considered to be the study of the sum total of these relations. The kinship of the Bodo is bilateral. The kin related through the father is known as Bahagi in Bodo whereas the kin to the mother is called Kurma. The nature of social relationships, the kinship terms, kinship behaviours and prescriptive and proscriptive rules are the important themes of the present study.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrej Angelovski ◽  
Daniela Di Cagno ◽  
Werner GGth ◽  
Francesca Marazzi ◽  
Luca Panaccione

2021 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 513-537
Author(s):  
Adriana Alventosa ◽  
Alberto Antonioni ◽  
Penélope Hernández

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