Central Hub M&A Advisors

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Yawson ◽  
Huizhong Zhang

Abstract We examine how an M&A advisor’s position in the network of investment banks affects its ability to create value for acquirers in takeover transactions. We show that acquirers enlisting the services of more centrally positioned M&A advisors enjoy higher announcement abnormal returns and pay lower takeover premiums. Consistent with the idea that central network positions convey an information advantage, we find that the effects are stronger for acquirers facing greater target information asymmetry and for M&A advisors depending more on networks for target-specific information. The information advantage primarily comes from network contacts that had previously assisted the targets in equity issuance. Centrally positioned advisors charge premium fees; network banks appear to enjoy a significant advantage in the competition for future co-advisory appointments.

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bong Soo Lee ◽  
Nathan Mauck

This paper relates informed repurchases to firm information asymmetry. We propose a new measure of informed repurchases, which is based on causality tests relating repurchase information to firm returns. Our results indicate that informed repurchases show larger abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of an open market share repurchase, which suggests the market at least partially recognizes informed repurchases. This holds after controlling for conventional information asymmetry proxies, such as firm size, number of analysts following, and analyst forecast dispersion, indicating that the market is aware of repurchase specific information not captured by traditional information asymmetry proxies. Informed repurchases demonstrate larger long-term abnormal returns at one, two, and three-year windows than high traditional information asymmetry repurchases.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyan Jiang ◽  
Donghua Zhou ◽  
Joseph H. Zhang

SYNOPSIS Against the backdrop of the Chinese Directive 40 (China's Reg FD) issued in 2007 as an attempt to curb insider trading and to level the information playing field, this study investigates whether analysts' private information acquisition influences the extent to which firm-specific information is impounded into stock prices, i.e., stock price synchronicity, and how the restrictions on selective disclosures imposed by Directive 40 have shaped the relationship between analyst information acquisition and synchronicity. Using a pre-Directive 40 sample, we show that synchronicity is negatively related to analysts' private information acquisition, which provides support for the “information advantage” argument of analysts' information production. However, the ability of analysts' private information acquisition in improving firm-specific information incorporated into stock price is mitigated post-Directive 40 due to a restriction on selective disclosures and/or private communication. Moreover, we find that this regulatory impact varies for firms being followed by affiliated analysts versus non-affiliated analysts. JEL Classifications: G14; G15; G17; G18.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ningning Pan ◽  
Hongquan Zhu

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate how block trading and asymmetric information contribute to the firm-specific information measured by the stock return synchronicity. Based on China stock market which is dominated by individual investors, this study focus on whether traders of block trading, which are usually institutional investors, are “information trader.” Design/methodology/approach – Based on the high frequency data, the paper constructs two measures of information asymmetry, intraday measure and inter-day measure. Then the paper constructs a multiple regression model and examine how block trading and information asymmetry contribute to the firm-specific information measured by the stock return synchronicity. Findings – The results show that: on the one hand, block trading transmits more firm-specific information, and can reduce the synchronicity; on the other hand, when the degree of information asymmetry is higher, block trading contains more firm-specific information and has a stronger effect on synchronicity. The effect of information asymmetry specifically displays as: block trading during the first half-hour of the trading day has a stronger effect on synchronicity; and block trading occurred in the days with publicly announced trading information has greater impact on synchronicity. Practical implications – The conclusions have important practical implications: for market regulators, monitoring for block trading can improve the recognition and prevention of insider trading; for individual investors, especially the risk aversion investors, recognition of intraday and inter-day information asymmetry is beneficial for them to avoid the risk of asymmetric information. Originality/value – First, the domestic and foreign research mostly concentrated impact of block trading on stock prices. However, reasons of stock price changes include the information effect and non-information effect, this paper selects stock return synchronicity as firm-specific information measure, and mainly focus on the information effect of block trading. Second, based on the high frequency data, the paper constructs two measures of information asymmetry, intraday measure and inter-day measure. Compared with general measure of information asymmetry, such as firm size, earnings quality, the two measures based on high frequency data are more precisely.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Danso ◽  
Margarita Kaprielyan ◽  
Md Miran Hossain

PurposeRecent studies explore how chief executive officer (CEO) social capital affects corporate decision-making. Well-connected CEOs can have greater access to information, which can lead to better corporate decisions or permit them to amass power from hierarchy status and make self-serving decisions. This study examines whether investors perceive CEO social capital as a signal of good decision-making (assuming information asymmetry) surrounding asset sell-off events.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use multivariate regression analysis to examine the effect of CEO social capital on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the asset buyers and sellers. CARs are estimated using a market model in the period proximate to asset sell-off announcements.FindingsThe authors find that CEO social capital is positively associated with announcement returns of the asset sellers. Moreover, the positive effect of CEO social capital on announcement returns is more pronounced for sellers facing greater information asymmetry. An analysis of post-announcement stock performance reveals that the seller CEO social capital is associated with additional value generated for the shareholders of the seller after a month from the announcement date, especially if the transaction price is disclosed. Overall, findings are consistent with the argument that CEO social capital provides value in high information asymmetry environment.Originality/valueTo the authors' knowledge this is the first study to examine the effect of CEO social capital on the shareholders' wealth created by divestitures.


2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 1095-1116
Author(s):  
Matthew D. Cain ◽  
Stephen B. McKeon ◽  
Steven Davidoff Solomon

Intermediation in private equity involves illiquid investments, professional investors, and high information asymmetry. We use this unique setting to empirically evaluate theoretical predictions regarding intermediation. Using placement agents has become nearly ubiquitous, but agents are associated with significantly lower abnormal returns in venture and real estate funds, consistent with investor capture and influence peddling. However, returns are higher for buyout funds employing a top-tier agent and for first-time real estate and venture funds employing an agent, and are less volatile for agent-affiliated funds, consistent with a certification role. Our results suggest heterogeneous motives for intermediation in the private equity industry.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 220-233
Author(s):  
Samie Ahmed Sayed ◽  
Latha Sreeram

Executive Summary Over the last decade, efforts have been made to improve the quality of financial reporting and corporate governance standards prevailing in emerging markets. Even after 20 years of globalization, emerging markets continue to trade as a separate class ( Bekaert & Harvey, 2014 ). On account of a weak regulatory environment, firm-specific information asymmetry is expected to be on the higher side as compared to developed markets. In such an environment, any factors which mitigate information asymmetry may help improve efficiency of information providers such as equity research analysts. The role of equity research analysts is to process financial information and provide estimates which may be used by investors to make informed investment decisions. This study investigates whether the factors which mitigate firm-specific information asymmetry improve analyst target price accuracy in India. We expect sophisticated financial intermediaries such as equity research analysts to produce more accurate target price forecasts for firms with higher frequency of corporate announcements, higher analyst coverage, and higher foreign institutional holdings. Past research suggests that these three factors reduce information asymmetry and this reduction could possibly help analysts produce superior results. Our results show that higher frequency of corporate announcements creates short-term noise which reduces target price accuracy at the end of one-year forecast horizon. Our findings reveal that higher analyst coverage leads to better flow of firm-specific private information and improves target price accuracy anytime during or at the end of one year. We report that higher foreign institutional holding possibly improves stock liquidity, attracting more traders, which eventually leads to better target price accuracy at the end of forecast horizon. Our key finding is that there is a reduction in firm-specific information asymmetry due to the presence of more number of analysts and higher percentage of institutional holding.


2004 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 1119-1151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph D. Piotroski ◽  
Darren T. Roulstone

We investigate the extent to which the trading and trade-generating activities of three informed market participants—financial analysts, institutional investors, and insiders—influence the relative amount of firm-specific, industry-level, and market-level information impounded into stock prices, as measured by stock return synchronicity. We find that stock return synchronicity is positively associated with analyst forecasting activities, consistent with analysts increasing the amount of industry-level information in prices through intra-industry information transfers. In contrast, stock return synchronicity is inversely related to insider trades, consistent with these transactions conveying firm-specific information. Supplemental tests show that insider and institutional trading accelerate the incorporation of the firm-specific component of future earnings news into prices alone, while analyst forecasting activity accelerates both the industry and firm-specific component of future earnings news. Our results suggest that all three parties influence the firm's information environment, but the type of price-relevant information conveyed by their activities depends on each party's relative information advantage.


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