scholarly journals Outcome uncertainty influences probability perception and risk attitudes

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Ward Elston ◽  
Ian Grant Mackenzie ◽  
Victor Mittelstädt

Subjective inferences of probability play a critical role in decision-making. How we learn about choice options, through description or experience, influences how we perceive their likelihoods, an effect known as the description–experience (DE) gap. Classically, the DE gap details how low probability described options are perceptually inflated as compared to equiprobable experience ones. However, these studies assessed probability perception relative to a ‘sure-bet’ option, and it remained unclear whether the DE gap occurs when humans directly trade-off equiprobable description and experience options and whether choice patterns are influenced by the prospects of gain and loss. We addressed these questions through two experiments where humans chose between description and experience options with equal probabilities of either winning or losing points. Contrary to early studies, we found that gain-seeking participants preferred experience options across all probability levels and, by contrast, loss-mitigating participants avoided the experience options across all probability levels, with a maximal effect at 50%. Our results suggest that the experience options were perceived as riskier than descriptive options due to the greater uncertainty associated with their outcomes. We conclude by outlining a novel theory of probabilistic inference where outcome uncertainty modulates probability perception and risk attitudes.

2012 ◽  
Vol 6-7 ◽  
pp. 267-272
Author(s):  
Ming Shan You ◽  
Wei Zeng ◽  
Hong Tao Zhou

One-switch utility function is used to describe how the risk attitude of a decision maker changes with his wealth level. In this paper additive decision rule is used for the aggregation of decision member’s utility which is represented by one-switch utility function. Based on Markov decision processes (MDP) and group utility, a dynamic, multi-stages and risk sensitive group decision model is proposed. The proposed model augments the state of MDP with wealth level, so the policy of the model is defined as an action executed in a state and a wealth level interval. A backward-induction algorithm is given to solve the optimal policy for the model. Numerical examples show that personal risk attitude has a great influence on group decision-making when personal risk attitudes of members are different, while the weights of members play a critical role when personal risk attitudes of members are similar.


2009 ◽  
Vol 276 (1676) ◽  
pp. 4181-4188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Songfa Zhong ◽  
Salomon Israel ◽  
Hong Xue ◽  
Pak C. Sham ◽  
Richard P. Ebstein ◽  
...  

Prospect theory proposes the hypothesis that people have diminishing sensitivity in valuing increases in the size of monetary outcomes, for both gains and losses. For decision-making under risk, this implies a tendency to be risk-tolerant over losses while being generally risk averse over gains. We offer a neurochemistry-based model of the diminishing valuation sensitivity hypothesis. Specifically, we propose that dopamine tone modulates the sensitivity towards valuation of gains while serotonin tone modulates the sensitivity towards valuation of losses. Consequently, higher dopamine tone would yield a more concave valuation function over gains while higher serotonin tone would yield a more convex valuation function over losses. Using a neurogenetics strategy to test our neurochemical model, we find that subjects with the 9-repeat allele of DAT1 (lower DA tone) are more risk-tolerant over gains than subjects with the 10-repeat allele, and that subjects with the 10-repeat allele of STin2 (higher 5HT tone) are more risk-tolerant over losses than subjects with the 12-repeat allele. Overall, our results support the implications of our model and provide the first neurogenetics evidence that risk attitudes are partially hard-wired in differentiating between gain- and loss-oriented risks.


Author(s):  
Bahador Bahrami

Evidence for and against the idea that “two heads are better than one” is abundant. This chapter considers the contextual conditions and social norms that predict madness or wisdom of crowds to identify the adaptive value of collective decision-making beyond increased accuracy. Similarity of competence among members of a collective impacts collective accuracy, but interacting individuals often seem to operate under the assumption that they are equally competent even when direct evidence suggest the opposite and dyadic performance suffers. Cross-cultural data from Iran, China, and Denmark support this assumption of similarity (i.e., equality bias) as a sensible heuristic that works most of the time and simplifies social interaction. Crowds often trade off accuracy for other collective benefits such as diffusion of responsibility and reduction of regret. Consequently, two heads are sometimes better than one, but no-one holds the collective accountable, not even for the most disastrous of outcomes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 414-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Tadei ◽  
Pekka Santtila ◽  
Jan Antfolk

Abstract When statistically related to child sexual abuse (CSA), background information can assist decision-making in investigations of CSA allegations. Here, we studied the use of such background information among Finnish police officers. We analyzed their ability to identify and interpret CSA-related and CSA-unrelated background information both when placed in mock scenarios and when presented as separate, individual variables. We also measured the ability to correctly estimate the probability of CSA based on such background information. In the context of mock scenarios, officers were better in discarding CSA-unrelated variables than in identifying CSA-related ones. Within-subject performance across different scenarios was, however, not consistent. When information was presented as separate variables, officers tended to incorrectly consider many CSA-unrelated variables as CSA-related. Officers performed better in recognizing whether actual CSA-related variables increase or decrease the probability of CSA. Finally, officers were inaccurate in identifying variables that are CSA-related only for boys or only for girls. When asked to estimate the CSA probability of mock scenarios, participants were accurate only in assessing low-probability cases, and this was not associated with the ability to identify CSA-related and CSA-unrelated variables. We conclude that police officers would benefit from more training in using background information and from using available decision-making support tools in the context of investigating CSA allegations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 5833-5847 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Abou Iltaf Hussain ◽  
Binayak Sen ◽  
Archisman Das Gupta ◽  
Uttam Kumar Mandal

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document