scholarly journals Time Is Money: The Decision Making of Smartphone High Users in Gain and Loss Intertemporal Choice

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zixuan Tang ◽  
Huijun Zhang ◽  
An Yan ◽  
Chen Qu
Science ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 318 (5850) ◽  
pp. 602-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin P. Paulus

Decision-making consists of selecting an action from a set of available options. This results in an outcome that changes the state of the decision-maker. Therefore, decision-making is part of a homeostatic process. Individuals with psychiatric disorders show altered decision-making. They select options that are either non-optimal or nonhomeostatic. These dysfunctional patterns of decision-making in individuals with psychiatric disorders may fundamentally relate to problems with homeostatic regulation. These may manifest themselves in (i) how the length of time between decisions and their outcomes influences subsequent decision-making, (ii) how gain and loss feedback are integrated to determine the optimal decision, (iii) how individuals adapt their decision strategies to match the specific context, or (iv) how seemingly maladaptive responses result from an attempt to establish an unstable homeostatic balance.


1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 181-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Loewenstein ◽  
Richard H Thaler

We examine a number of situations in which people do not appear to discount money flows at the market rate of interest or any other single discount rate. Discount rates observed in both laboratory and field decision-making environments are shown to depend on the magnitude and sign of what is being discounted, on the time delay, on whether the choice is cast in terms of speed-up or delay, on the way in which a choice is framed, and on whether future benefits or costs induce savoring or dread.


2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leandro S. Carvalho ◽  
Stephan Meier ◽  
Stephanie W. Wang

We study the effect of financial resources on decision-making. Low-income US households are randomly assigned to receive an online survey before or after payday. The survey collects measures of cognitive function and administers risk and intertemporal choice tasks. The study design generates variation in cash, checking and savings balances, and expenditures. Before-payday participants behave as if they are more present-biased when making intertemporal choices about monetary rewards but not when making intertemporal choices about nonmonetary real-effort tasks. Nor do we find before-after differences in risk-taking, the quality of decision-making, the performance in cognitive function tasks, or in heuristic judgments. (JEL C83, D14, D81, D91, I32)


2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn Macapagal ◽  
Erick Janssen ◽  
Margaret Matson ◽  
Peter R. Finn ◽  
Julia R. Heiman

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Bulley ◽  
Karolina Maria Lempert ◽  
Colin Conwell ◽  
Muireann Irish

Intertemporal decision-making has long been assumed to measure self-control, with prominent theories treating choices of smaller, sooner rewards as failed attempts to override immediate temptation. If this view is correct, people should be more confident in their intertemporal decisions when they “successfully” delay gratification than when they do not. In two pre- registered experiments with built-in replication, adult participants (n=117) made monetary intertemporal choices and rated their confidence in having made the right decisions. Contrary to assumptions of the self-control account, confidence was not higher when participants chose delayed rewards. Rather, participants were more confident in their decisions when possible rewards were further apart in time-discounted subjective value, closer to the present, and larger in magnitude. Demonstrating metacognitive insight, participants were more confident in decisions that better aligned with their independent valuation of possible rewards. Decisions made with less confidence were more prone to changes-of-mind and more susceptible to a patience-enhancing manipulation. Together, our results establish that confidence in intertemporal choice tracks uncertainty in estimating and comparing the value of possible rewards – just as it does in decisions unrelated to self-control. Our findings challenge self- control views and instead cast intertemporal choice as a form of value-based decision-making about future possibilities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 254-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiuqing Cheng

A growing body of research has indicated a relationship between numeracy and decision making and that lower numerate people display more disadvantageous decisions. In the domain of intertemporal choice, researchers have long been using impulsivity to address choice preference. To further illuminate the psychological mechanisms of making intertemporal choices, the present study examined the role of impulsivity and numeracy in intertemporal choice, in the presence of each other. The study adopted both subjective and numeracy scales. These scales correlated with each other and with intertemporal choice preference. Moreover, it was found that after controlling for impulsivity, the object numeracy was significantly associated with choice preference, with higher numerate participants showing a stronger preference toward the later larger gains over the sooner smaller gains. Thus, the study indicated that intertemporal choice preference could be attributed to both impulsivity and numeracy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Ward Elston ◽  
Ian Grant Mackenzie ◽  
Victor Mittelstädt

Subjective inferences of probability play a critical role in decision-making. How we learn about choice options, through description or experience, influences how we perceive their likelihoods, an effect known as the description–experience (DE) gap. Classically, the DE gap details how low probability described options are perceptually inflated as compared to equiprobable experience ones. However, these studies assessed probability perception relative to a ‘sure-bet’ option, and it remained unclear whether the DE gap occurs when humans directly trade-off equiprobable description and experience options and whether choice patterns are influenced by the prospects of gain and loss. We addressed these questions through two experiments where humans chose between description and experience options with equal probabilities of either winning or losing points. Contrary to early studies, we found that gain-seeking participants preferred experience options across all probability levels and, by contrast, loss-mitigating participants avoided the experience options across all probability levels, with a maximal effect at 50%. Our results suggest that the experience options were perceived as riskier than descriptive options due to the greater uncertainty associated with their outcomes. We conclude by outlining a novel theory of probabilistic inference where outcome uncertainty modulates probability perception and risk attitudes.


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