scholarly journals Evolution in group-structured populations can resolve the tragedy of the commons

2006 ◽  
Vol 273 (1593) ◽  
pp. 1477-1481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Killingback ◽  
Jonas Bieri ◽  
Thomas Flatt
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Animal Societies ◽  
Trait Group

Public goods are the key features of all human societies and are also important in many animal societies. Collaborative hunting and collective defence are but two examples of public goods that have played a crucial role in the development of human societies and still play an important role in many animal societies. Public goods allow societies composed largely of cooperators to outperform societies composed mainly of non-cooperators. However, public goods also provide an incentive for individuals to be selfish by benefiting from the public good without contributing to it. This is the essential paradox of cooperation—known variously as the Tragedy of the Commons, Multi-person Prisoner's Dilemma or Social Dilemma. Here, we show that a new model for evolution in group-structured populations provides a simple and effective mechanism for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in such a social dilemma. This model does not depend on kin selection, direct or indirect reciprocity, punishment, optional participation or trait-group selection. Since this mechanism depends only on population dynamics and requires no cognitive abilities on the part of the agents concerned, it potentially applies to organisms at all levels of complexity.

scholarly journals Shame and honour drive cooperation

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 899-901 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Jacquet ◽  
Christoph Hauert ◽  
Arne Traulsen ◽  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Experimental Paradigm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Common Resources ◽  
Public Goods Experiments ◽  
The Commons

Can the threat of being shamed or the prospect of being honoured lead to greater cooperation? We test this hypothesis with anonymous six-player public goods experiments, an experimental paradigm used to investigate problems related to overusing common resources. We instructed the players that the two individuals who were least generous after 10 rounds would be exposed to the group. As the natural antithesis, we also test the effects of honour by revealing the identities of the two players who were most generous. The non-monetary, reputational effects induced by shame and honour each led to approximately 50 per cent higher donations to the public good when compared with the control, demonstrating that both shame and honour can drive cooperation and can help alleviate the tragedy of the commons.

scholarly journals INSTRUMEN EKONOMI ATAU PRIVATISASI PENGELOLAAN LINGKUNGAN? KOMENTAR ATAS RUU JASA LINGKUNGAN

2008 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 602
Author(s):  
Andri Gunawan Wibisana
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Tragedy Of The Commons ◽  
Environmental Services ◽  
Charge System ◽  
User Charge ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Funds Management

AbstrakIndonesia 's Regional Representatives Board is planning to submit a Bill onenvironmental services. The Bill proposes the establishment of a newinstitution in managing environmental service fund, which is collectedthrough a user-charge system. This new institution is expected to be anindependent Commission of Environmental Funds Management, of whichcommissioners are responsible only to the President. The author finds thatthe spirit of the Bill has nothing to do with the needs to implement economicinstruments in terms of user charge. Instead, the Bill stems from the needs toprivatize public goods such as environmental services. The spirit can be seenin the forms of reference to Hardin's "the Tragedy of the Commons ", inwhich public goods are considered a form of inefficiency in the allocation ofresources that will eventually lead to the overexploitation of the goods. Inaddition, the spirit of privatization can also be seen in the Bill's proposal tohand over the tasks of the Commission, which include planning, execution,and monitoring, to private entities. The author argues that, with such spiritof privatization in the management of natural resources, the Bill is actuallyinconstitutional, and hence, should be rejected.

scholarly journals Staphylococcus aureuscoagulases are exploitable yet stable public goods in clinically relevant conditions

2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (50) ◽  
pp. E11771-E11779 ◽  
Author(s):  
Urvish Trivedi ◽  
Jonas S. Madsen ◽  
Jake Everett ◽  
Cody Fell ◽  
Jakob Russel ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Evolution ◽  
Defense Mechanism ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Local Population ◽  
Coagulation Cascade ◽  
The Public ◽  
Innate Defense ◽  
The Commons

Coagulation is an innate defense mechanism intended to limit blood loss and trap invading pathogens during infection. However,Staphylococcus aureushas the ability to hijack the coagulation cascade and generate clots via secretion of coagulases. Although manyS. aureushave this characteristic, some do not. The population dynamics regarding this defining trait have yet to be explored. We report here that coagulases are public goods that confer protection against antimicrobials and immune factors within a local population or community, thus promoting growth and virulence. By utilizing variants of a methicillin-resistantS. aureuswe infer that the secretion of coagulases is a cooperative trait, which is subject to exploitation by invading mutants that do not produce the public goods themselves. However, overexploitation, “tragedy of the commons,” does not occur at clinically relevant conditions. Our micrographs indicate this is due to spatial segregation and population viscosity. These findings emphasize the critical role of coagulases in a social evolution context and provide a possible explanation as to why the secretion of these public goods is maintained in mixedS. aureuscommunities.

Gossip and Reputation in Social Dilemmas

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-213
Author(s):  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Interaction Partner ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Trust Games ◽  
The Individual

In a social dilemma the interest of the individual is in conflict with that of the group. However, individuals will help their group, if they gain in reputation that pays off later. Future partners can observe cooperative or defective behavior or, more likely, hear about it through gossip. In Indirect Reciprocity games, Public Goods games, and Trust games gossip may be the only information a participant can use to decide whether she can trust her interaction partner and give away her holdings hoping for reciprocation. Even the mere potential for gossip can increase trust and trustworthiness thus promoting cooperation. Gossip is a cheap mechanism for disciplining free riders, potentially even extortioners. The temptation for manipulative gossip defines the gossiper’s dilemma. Psychological adaptations for assessing gossip veracity help to avoid being manipulated. The danger of false gossip is reduced when multiple gossips exist.

scholarly journals The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games

2015 ◽  
Vol 282 (1798) ◽  
pp. 20141994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miguel dos Santos
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Additional Condition ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Second Order ◽  
The Public ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Social Trap

Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.

Coevolutionary resolution of the public goods dilemma in interdependent structured populations

2018 ◽  
Vol 124 (4) ◽  
pp. 48003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Shen ◽  
Chen Chu ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
Marko Jusup ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
The Public

scholarly journals A preference to learn from successful rather than common behaviours in human social dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Vol 288 (1965) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew ◽  
Victoire D'Amico
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Common ◽  
Social Behaviours ◽  
Social Level

Human cooperation is often claimed to be special and requiring explanations based on gene–culture coevolution favouring a desire to copy common social behaviours. If this is true, then individuals should be motivated to both observe and copy common social behaviours. Previous economic experiments, using the public goods game, have suggested individuals' desire to sacrifice for the common good and to copy common social behaviours. However, previous experiments have often not shown examples of success. Here we test, on 489 participants, whether individuals are more motivated to learn about, and more likely to copy, either common or successful behaviours. Using the same social dilemma and standard instructions, we find that individuals were primarily motivated to learn from successful rather than common behaviours. Consequently, social learning disfavoured costly cooperation, even when individuals could observe a stable, pro-social level of cooperation. Our results call into question explanations for human cooperation based on cultural evolution and/or a desire to conform with common social behaviours. Instead, our results indicate that participants were motivated by personal gain, but initially confused, despite receiving standard instructions. When individuals could learn from success, they learned to cooperate less, suggesting that human cooperation is maybe not so special after all.

Personality, Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin E. Hilbig ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Timo Heydasch
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Longitudinal Design ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Openness To Experience ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders

Contributions in the public goods game—a classical social dilemma situation—have been shown to depend strongly on the presence versus absence of punishment or sanctions for free riders. Also, there appear to be noteworthy individual differences in the degree to which decision makers cooperate. Herein, we aimed to bring these two lines of research together. Firstly, we predicted that both presence of punishment and high dispositional Honesty–Humility (as conceptualized in the Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience model of personality) should yield higher contributions. Secondly, and more importantly, we expected an interaction, such that only those low in Honesty–Humility would condition their behaviour on the presence versus absence of punishment, thus employing cooperation strategically. In line with the hypothesis, the results of two experiments (one of which comprised a longitudinal design) corroborated that the degree to which decision makers shift towards higher contributions when punishment is introduced depends on their dispositional level of Honesty–Humility. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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