scholarly journals A preference to learn from successful rather than common behaviours in human social dilemmas

2021 ◽  
Vol 288 (1965) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew ◽  
Victoire D'Amico
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Common ◽  
Social Behaviours ◽  
Social Level

Human cooperation is often claimed to be special and requiring explanations based on gene–culture coevolution favouring a desire to copy common social behaviours. If this is true, then individuals should be motivated to both observe and copy common social behaviours. Previous economic experiments, using the public goods game, have suggested individuals' desire to sacrifice for the common good and to copy common social behaviours. However, previous experiments have often not shown examples of success. Here we test, on 489 participants, whether individuals are more motivated to learn about, and more likely to copy, either common or successful behaviours. Using the same social dilemma and standard instructions, we find that individuals were primarily motivated to learn from successful rather than common behaviours. Consequently, social learning disfavoured costly cooperation, even when individuals could observe a stable, pro-social level of cooperation. Our results call into question explanations for human cooperation based on cultural evolution and/or a desire to conform with common social behaviours. Instead, our results indicate that participants were motivated by personal gain, but initially confused, despite receiving standard instructions. When individuals could learn from success, they learned to cooperate less, suggesting that human cooperation is maybe not so special after all.

Personality, Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin E. Hilbig ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
Timo Heydasch
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Longitudinal Design ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Openness To Experience ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders

Contributions in the public goods game—a classical social dilemma situation—have been shown to depend strongly on the presence versus absence of punishment or sanctions for free riders. Also, there appear to be noteworthy individual differences in the degree to which decision makers cooperate. Herein, we aimed to bring these two lines of research together. Firstly, we predicted that both presence of punishment and high dispositional Honesty–Humility (as conceptualized in the Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience model of personality) should yield higher contributions. Secondly, and more importantly, we expected an interaction, such that only those low in Honesty–Humility would condition their behaviour on the presence versus absence of punishment, thus employing cooperation strategically. In line with the hypothesis, the results of two experiments (one of which comprised a longitudinal design) corroborated that the degree to which decision makers shift towards higher contributions when punishment is introduced depends on their dispositional level of Honesty–Humility. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

scholarly journals Belief Heterogeneity and the Restart Effect in a Public Goods Game

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ananish Chaudhuri
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Heterogeneous Beliefs ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
The Public ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Belief Heterogeneity ◽  
Social Dilemma Games ◽  
Partner Matching

We explore how subjects with heterogeneous beliefs respond to a surprise restart in a linear public goods game played for 20 rounds using either a “partners” or a “strangers” protocol. There are two restarts: one prior to Round 11 and another prior to Round 16. We elicit subject beliefs at the outset and classify subjects into three groups—Top, Middle, and Bottom—depending on their prior beliefs about their peers’ contributions to the public good. Then, we look at how these three groups respond, in terms of their beliefs and contributions, before and after the restart. We replicate the restart effect, but find that (i) it is much more pronounced for partner matching than for stranger matching and (ii) it is less pronounced in treatments with belief elicitation compared to control treatments where beliefs are not elicited. We also find that the restart has the effect of regenerating a sense of optimism among the subjects, which is reflected in increased contributions subsequently. This increase in contribution is driven mostly by those subjects who started the game with relatively more optimistic beliefs. Our results have implications for sustaining cooperation in social dilemma games.

scholarly journals Humans prefer to copy success rather than the social norm in a cooperative game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell Burton-Chellew ◽  
Victoire D'Amico
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanisms ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Personal Success

It is often claimed that human cooperation is special, and can only be explained by gene-culture co-evolution favouring a desire to follow pro-social norms. If this is true then individuals should be motivated to both observe, and copy, common social behaviours (social norms). Previous economic experiments, using the public goods game, have suggested individuals are motivated to follow social norms. However, natural selection should favour individuals whom prefer to discover and copy successful behaviours, and previous experiments have often not shown examples of success. Here we test, on 489 participants, if individuals are more motivated to learn about, and more likely to copy, either common or successful behaviours. Using the same cooperative game and instructions, we find that individuals are primarily motivated to copy successful rather than common behaviours. Consequently, social learning disfavours costly cooperation, even when individuals can observe a stable, pro-social, norm. Our results suggest that human social learning mechanisms have evolved to maximize personal success, and call into question explanations for human cooperation based on cultural evolution and/or a desire to follow social norms.

scholarly journals Humans prefer to copy success rather than the social norm in a cooperative game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell Burton-Chellew ◽  
Victoire D'Amico
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanisms ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Personal Success

It is often claimed that human cooperation is special, and can only be explained by gene-culture co-evolution favouring a desire to follow pro-social norms. If this is true then individuals should be motivated to both observe, and copy, common social behaviours (social norms). Previous economic experiments, using the public goods game, have suggested individuals are motivated to follow social norms. However, natural selection should favour individuals whom prefer to discover and copy successful behaviours, and previous experiments have often not shown examples of success. Here we test, on 489 participants, if individuals are more motivated to learn about, and more likely to copy, either common or successful behaviours. Using the same cooperative game and instructions, we find that individuals are primarily motivated to copy successful rather than common behaviours. Consequently, social learning disfavours costly cooperation, even when individuals can observe a stable, pro-social, norm. Our results suggest that human social learning mechanisms have evolved to maximize personal success, and call into question explanations for human cooperation based on cultural evolution and/or a desire to follow social norms.

Harnessing Reciprocity to Promote Cooperation and the Provisioning of Public Goods

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
David G. Rand ◽  
Erez Yoeli ◽  
Moshe Hoffman
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Policy Design ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Large Body ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Greater Good ◽  
The Common

How can we maximize the common good? This is a central organizing question of public policy design, across political parties and ideologies. The answer typically involves the provisioning of public goods such as fresh air, national defense, and knowledge. Public goods are costly to produce but benefit everyone, thus creating a social dilemma: Individual and collective interests are in tension. Although individuals may want a public good to be produced, they typically would prefer not to be the ones who have to pay for it. Understanding how to motivate individuals to pay these costs is therefore of great importance for policy makers. Research provides advice on how to promote this type of “cooperative” behavior. Synthesizing a large body of research demonstrates the power of “reciprocity” for inducing cooperation: When others know that you have helped them, or acted to benefit the greater good, they are often more likely to reciprocate and help you in turn. Several conclusions stem from this line of thinking: People will be more likely to do their part when their actions are observable by others; people will pay more attention to how effective those actions are when efficacy is also observable; people will try to avoid situations where they could help, but often will help if asked directly; people are more likely to cooperate if they think others are also cooperating; and people can develop habits of cooperation that shape their default inclinations.

Public Service, Public Goods, and the Common Good

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerardo Sanchis Muñoz
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
International Agencies ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common ◽  
Appointed Officials

The proper provision of public goods by a well-functioning, impartial government is not the only thing necessary for attaining the common good, but it is essential. The economic view of the human person as a rational, self-interested maximizer has become pervasive in analyzing government dysfunction and is employed by international agencies to generate proposals to realign the economic incentives of government officials. But this mindset assumes and encourages self-interest and undermines idoneidad (suitability)—which includes integrity, motivation, and competence—as the most fundamental characteristic that must be demanded of both elected and appointed officials at all levels of government. The failure of public institutions in Argentina is employed as a telling example of such problems.

What Can Economists Contribute to the Common Good Tradition?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew M. Yuengert
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Common Pool Resources ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Insight Into

Although most economists are skeptical of or puzzled by the Catholic concept of the common good, a rejection of the economic approach as inimical to the common good would be hasty and counterproductive. Economic analysis can enrich the common good tradition in four ways. First, economics embodies a deep respect for economic agency and for the effects of policy and institutions on individual agents. Second, economics offers a rich literature on the nature of unplanned order and how it might be shaped by policy. Third, economics offers insight into the public and private provision of various kinds of goods (private, public, common pool resources). Fourth, recent work on the development and logic of institutions and norms emphasizes sustainability rooted in the good of the individual.

Translating for the Commonwealth

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Nation Building ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Bible Translation ◽  
The Common ◽  
Modern Europe

This chapter begins by presenting translation as an aspect of the Erasmian legacy in England, and it argues that translation helps to heal the division discussed in Chapter 3 by enabling Protestantism and humanism to work together. Translation was part of a Protestant programme of nation-building and spreading the word for the common good, but it was also the means through which the literature of antiquity and of modern Europe was communicated to the public at large. Erasmus’ Paraphrases, Grimald's Cicero, and Hoby's Courtier are discussed in these two contexts. Translation points towards the Renaissance, as an insular purism based on Protestant fears of contamination and adulteration was superseded by a hospitality towards the foreign. The chapter ends by arguing that by the 1580s it is Protestant Bible translation that it is accused by Catholics of being literary.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

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