scholarly journals Comparing the phenomenological qualities of stimulus-independent thought, stimulus-dependent thought and dreams using experience sampling

2020 ◽  
Vol 376 (1817) ◽  
pp. 20190694 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. E. Gross ◽  
A. P. Smith ◽  
Y. M. Graveline ◽  
R. E. Beaty ◽  
J. W. Schooler ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
External Environment ◽  
Experience Sampling ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Sampling Procedure ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Measured Variable ◽  
External Stimulation ◽  
Considerable Portion ◽  
Independent Thought

Humans spend a considerable portion of their lives engaged in ‘stimulus-independent thoughts' (SIT), or mental activity that occurs independently of input from the immediate external environment. Although such SITs are, by definition, different from thoughts that are driven by stimuli in one's external environment (i.e. stimulus-dependent thoughts; SDTs), at times, the phenomenology of these two types of thought appears to be deceptively similar. But how similar are they? We address this question by comparing the content of two types of SIT (dreaming and waking SITs) with the content of SDTs. In this 7 day, smartphone-based experience-sampling procedure, participants were intermittently probed during the day and night to indicate whether their current thoughts were stimulus dependent or stimulus independent. They then responded to content-based items indexing the qualitative aspects of their experience (e.g. My thoughts were jumping from topic to topic). Results indicate substantial distinctiveness between these three types of thought: significant differences between at least two of the three mental states were found across every measured variable. Implications are discussed. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.

scholarly journals Comparing the phenomenological qualities of stimulus-independent thought, stimulusdependent thought, and dreams using experience sampling

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madeleine Gross ◽  
Anna P. Smith ◽  
Yvette Graveline ◽  
Roger Beaty ◽  
Jonathan Schooler ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
External Environment ◽  
Experience Sampling ◽  
Sampling Procedure ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Measured Variable ◽  
Considerable Portion ◽  
Independent Thought

Humans spend a considerable portion of their lives engaged in “stimulus-independent thoughts”(SIT), or mental activity that occurs independently of input from the immediate externalenvironment. Although such SITs are, by definition, different from thoughts that are driven bystimuli in one’s external environment (i.e., stimulus-dependent thoughts; SDTs), at times, thephenomenology of these two types of thought appears to be deceptively similar. But how similarare they? We address this question by comparing the content of two types of SIT (dreaming andwaking stimulus-independent thoughts) with the content of SDTs. In this seven-day, smartphonebasedexperience-sampling procedure, participants were intermittently probed during the day andnight to indicate whether their current thoughts were stimulus dependent or stimulus independent.They then responded to content-based items indexing the qualitative aspects of their experience(e.g., My thoughts were jumping from topic to topic). Results indicate substantial distinctivenessbetween these three types of thought: significant differences between at least two of the three traitswere found across every measured variable.

scholarly journals Out of the blue: understanding abrupt and wayward transitions in thought using probability and predictive processing

2020 ◽  
Vol 376 (1817) ◽  
pp. 20190692
Author(s):  
Caitlin Mills ◽  
Andre Zamani ◽  
Rebecca White ◽  
Kalina Christoff
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Probability Metrics ◽  
External Stimulation ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Mental Experience ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Different Types ◽  
To Come

Thoughts that appear to come to us ‘out of the blue’ or ‘out of nowhere’ are a familiar aspect of mental experience. Such thoughts tend to elicit feelings of surprise and spontaneity. Although we are beginning to understand the neural processes that underlie the arising of such thoughts, little is known about what accounts for their peculiar phenomenology. Here, we focus on one central aspect of this phenomenology—the experience of surprise at their occurrence, as it relates to internal probabilistic predictions regarding mental states. We introduce a distinction between two phenomenologically different types of transitions in thought content: (i) abrupt transitions , which occur at surprising times but lead to unsurprising thought content, and (ii) wayward transitions , which occur at surprising times and also lead to surprising thought content. We examine these two types of transitions using a novel approach that combines probabilistic and predictive processing concepts and principles. We employ two different probability metrics—transition and occurrence probability—to characterize and differentiate between abrupt and wayward transitions. We close by discussing some potentially beneficial ways in which these two kinds of transitions in thought content may contribute to mental function, and how they may be implemented at the neural level. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.

scholarly journals By Choice or By Chance? Intentional Reverie is Real but Rare

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin Corwin Westgate
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
Experience Sampling ◽  
Well Being ◽  
External World ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
External Stimulation

Up to half our lives consists of private internally-focused thought, yet little research has focused on the content and consequences of such thought. The ability to occupy oneself solely by thinking could even reduce stress and increase well-being. However, lab studies suggest that many people do not enjoy intentional thinking and may prefer even negative external stimulation to being alone with their thoughts. Do people deliberately entertain themselves with their thoughts in everyday life and if so, do they enjoy it? Or do people prefer it when such thoughts occur spontaneously? In an experience sampling study, 170 undergraduates responded to texts four times a day for one week, reporting on their thoughts. Overall, people were focused almost equally on the external world around them (48.8% of the time) and on their own inner thoughts (49.3%). On average people chose to entertain themselves with their thoughts approximately 18.48% of the time and reported positive moods while doing so. However, people were in even better moods when desired thoughts occurred spontaneously rather than intentionally. Although people do intentionally engage in enjoyable thinking in everyday life, such thought may make up only a minority of conscious mental activity, and be less enjoyable than spontaneous desired thoughts.

Recognition of true and false states of the brain by means of the electroencephalogram wavelet analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.S. Pertsov ◽  
E.A. Yumatov ◽  
N.A. Karatygin ◽  
E.N. Dudnik ◽  
A.E. Khramov ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Wavelet Transform ◽  
Experimental Model ◽  
Continuous Wavelet Transform ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Continuous Wavelet ◽  
Wavelet Energy ◽  
True State ◽  
The Brain

It is a well-known fact that mental activity of the brain can be presented by two different states, i.e., the true state and the false state. A promising method of the electroencephalogram (EEG) wavelet transform has been developed over recent years. Using this method, we evaluated the principle possibility for direct objective registration of mental activity in the human brain. Previously we developed and described (published) a new experimental model and software for recognizing the true and false mental responses of a person with the EEG wavelet transform. The developed experimental model and software-and-data support allowed us to compare (by EEG parameters) two mental states of brain activity, one of which is the false state, while another is the true state. The goal of this study is to develop an absolutely new information technology for recognizing the true and false states in mental activity of the brain by means of the EEG wavelet transform. Our study showed that the true and false states of the brain can be distinguished using the method of continuous wavelet transform and calculation of the EEG wavelet energy. It was revealed that the main differences between truthful and false mental responses are observed in the delta and alpha ranges of the EEG. In the EEG delta rhythm, the wavelet energy is much higher under conditions of the false response as compared to that in the true response. In the EEG alpha rhythm, the wavelet energy is significantly higher with the true answer than in the false one. These data open a new principal possibility of revealing the true and false mental state of the brain by means of continuous wavelet transform and calculation of the EEG wavelet energy.

scholarly journals Hallucinations on demand: the utility of experimentally induced phenomena in hallucination research

2020 ◽  
Vol 376 (1817) ◽  
pp. 20200233
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rogers ◽  
Rebecca Keogh ◽  
Joel Pearson
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Sensory Information ◽  
Research Progress ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
External Stimulation ◽  
On Demand ◽  
Visual Phenomena ◽  
Laboratory Models ◽  
Experimentally Induced

Despite the desire to delve deeper into hallucinations of all types, methodological obstacles have frustrated development of more rigorous quantitative experimental techniques, thereby hampering research progress. Here, we discuss these obstacles and, with reference to visual phenomena, argue that experimentally induced phenomena (e.g. hallucinations induced by flickering light and classical conditioning) can bring hallucinations within reach of more objective behavioural and neural measurement. Expanding the scope of hallucination research raises questions about which phenomena qualify as hallucinations, and how to identify phenomena suitable for use as laboratory models of hallucination. Due to the ambiguity inherent in current hallucination definitions, we suggest that the utility of phenomena for use as laboratory hallucination models should be represented on a continuous spectrum, where suitability varies with the degree to which external sensory information constrains conscious experience. We suggest that existing strategies that group pathological hallucinations into meaningful subtypes based on hallucination characteristics (including phenomenology, disorder and neural activity) can guide extrapolation from hallucination models to other hallucinatory phenomena. Using a spectrum of phenomena to guide scientific hallucination research should help unite the historically separate fields of psychophysics, cognitive neuroscience and clinical research to better understand and treat hallucinations, and inform models of consciousness. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.

scholarly journals Offline perception: an introduction

2020 ◽  
Vol 376 (1817) ◽  
pp. 20190686
Author(s):  
Peter Fazekas ◽  
Bence Nanay ◽  
Joel Pearson
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Research Directions ◽  
External Stimulation ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Similarities And Differences

Experiences that are self-generated and independent of sensory stimulations permeate our whole life. This theme issue examines their similarities and differences, systematizes the literature from an integrative perspective, critically discusses state-of-the-art empirical findings and proposes new theoretical approaches. The aim of the theme issue is to foster interaction between the different disciplines and research directions involved and to explore the prospects of a unificatory account of offline perception in general. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation’.

scholarly journals Curious and Fantastical: The Daydreaming of Creative Writers

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Marie Zedelius ◽  
Jonathan Schooler
Keyword(s):  
Experience Sampling ◽  
Sampling Procedure ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
Creative Behavior ◽  
Lifetime History ◽  
Creative Writers ◽  
History Of

What are the daydreams of creative individuals like? Do they reflect the daydreamer’s level of creativity? To answer this question, this research examines the daydreams of creative writers and ordinary people. Among several daydream qualities, the research focused particularly on curiosity, or the extent to which daydreams revolve around unresolved questions and problems. Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence that curious daydreams—along with fantastical daydreams—predict creativity in community samples. Study 3 compares the daydreams of professional creative writers and non-writers, and examines what daydream qualities predict creativity within these groups. On questionnaires and in a week-long experience sampling procedure, writers reported more curious and fantastical daydreams than non-writers. Fantastical daydreams predicted their lifetime history of creative behavior and achievement. Moreover, daily creative behavior and inspiration throughout the study were predicted by curious, fantastical, meaningful, and pleasant daydreaming, with notable differences between writers and non-writers.

scholarly journals Internally-directed cognition and mindfulness: An integrative perspective derived from reactive versus predictive control systems theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans IJzerman
Keyword(s):  
Systems Theory ◽  
Control Systems ◽  
Predictive Control ◽  
Information Integration ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Reactive Control ◽  
External Stimulation ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Control Systems Theory

In the present paper we will apply the Predictive And Reactive Control Systems (PARCS) theory as a framework that integrates competing theories of neural substrates of awareness by describing the “default mode network” (DMN) and anterior insula (AI) as parts of two different behavioral and homeostatic control systems. The DMN, a network that becomes active at rest when there is no external stimulation or task to perform, has been implicated in self-reflective awareness and prospection. By contrast, the AI is associated with awareness and task-related attention. This has led to competing theories stressing the role of the DMN in self-awareness versus the role of interoceptive and emotional information integration in the AI in awareness of the emotional moment. In PARCS, the respective function of the DMN and AI in a specific control system explains their association with different qualities of awareness, and how mental states can shift from one state (e.g., prospective self-reflection) to the other (e.g., awareness of the emotional moment) depending on the relative dominance of control systems. These shifts between reactive and predictive control are part of processes that enable the intake of novel information, integration of this novel information within existing knowledge structures, and the creation of a continuous personal context in which novel information can be integrated and understood. As such, PARCS can explain key characteristics of mental states, such as their temporal and spatial focus (e.g., a focus on the here and now vs. the future; a 1st person vs. a 3rd person perspective). PARCS further relates mental states to brain states and functions, such as activation of the DMN or hemispheric asymmetry in frontal cortical functions. Together, PARCS deepens the understanding of a broad range of mental states, including mindfulness, mind wandering, rumination, autobiographical memory, imagery, and the experience of self.This paper was published in Frontiers:Tops, M., Boksem, M. A., Quirin, M., IJzerman, H., & Koole, S. L. (2014). Internally directed cognition and mindfulness: An integrative perspective derived from predictive and reactive control systems theory. Frontiers in Psychology, 5.

scholarly journals Why do imagery and perception look and feel so different?

2020 ◽  
Vol 376 (1817) ◽  
pp. 20190703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Koenig-Robert ◽  
Joel Pearson
Keyword(s):  
Convincing Evidence ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Cortical Layers ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
External Stimulation ◽  
The Past ◽  
Underlying Causes ◽  
First Time ◽  
Flow Of Information ◽  
Shed Light

Despite the past few decades of research providing convincing evidence of the similarities in function and neural mechanisms between imagery and perception, for most of us, the experience of the two are undeniably different, why? Here, we review and discuss the differences between imagery and perception and the possible underlying causes of these differences, from function to neural mechanisms. Specifically, we discuss the directional flow of information (top-down versus bottom-up), the differences in targeted cortical layers in primary visual cortex and possible different neural mechanisms of modulation versus excitation. For the first time in history, neuroscience is beginning to shed light on this long-held mystery of why imagery and perception look and feel so different. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

scholarly journals Neuromodulation of the mind-wandering brain state: the interaction between neuromodulatory tone, sharp wave-ripples and spontaneous thought

2020 ◽  
Vol 376 (1817) ◽  
pp. 20190699 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire O'Callaghan ◽  
Ishan C. Walpola ◽  
James M. Shine
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Brain State ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
External Stimulation ◽  
Sharp Wave ◽  
Brain States ◽  
Spontaneous Thought ◽  
The Mind

Mind-wandering has become a captivating topic for cognitive neuroscientists. By now, it is reasonably well described in terms of its phenomenology and the large-scale neural networks that support it. However, we know very little about what neurobiological mechanisms trigger a mind-wandering episode and sustain the mind-wandering brain state. Here, we focus on the role of ascending neuromodulatory systems (i.e. acetylcholine, noradrenaline, serotonin and dopamine) in shaping mind-wandering. We advance the hypothesis that the hippocampal sharp wave-ripple (SWR) is a compelling candidate for a brain state that can trigger mind-wandering episodes. This hippocampal rhythm, which occurs spontaneously in quiescent behavioural states, is capable of propagating widespread activity in the default network and is functionally associated with recollective, associative, imagination and simulation processes. The occurrence of the SWR is heavily dependent on hippocampal neuromodulatory tone. We describe how the interplay of neuromodulators may promote the hippocampal SWR and trigger mind-wandering episodes. We then identify the global neuromodulatory signatures that shape the evolution of the mind-wandering brain state. Under our proposed framework, mind-wandering emerges due to the interplay between neuromodulatory systems that influence the transitions between brain states, which either facilitate, or impede, a wandering mind. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

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