Direct punishment and indirect reputation-based tactics to intervene against offences

Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Junhui Wu

Punishment and reputation-based mechanisms play a major role in supporting the evolution of human cooperation. Theoretical accounts and field observations suggest that humans use multiple tactics to intervene against offences—including confrontation, gossip and ostracism—which have unique benefits and costs. Here, we draw a distinction between direct punishment tactics (i.e. physical and verbal confrontation) and indirect reputation-based tactics (i.e. gossip and ostracism). Based on this distinction, we sketch the common and unique social functions that different tactics are tailored to serve and describe information-processing mechanisms that potentially underlie decisions concerning how to intervene against offences. We propose that decision rules guiding direct and indirect tactics should weigh information about the benefits of changing others' behaviour versus the costs of potential retaliation. Based on a synthesis of existing evidence, we highlight the role of situational, relational and emotional factors in motivating distinct punishment tactics. We suggest that delineating between direct and indirect tactics can inform debates about the prevalence and functions of punishment and the reputational consequences of third-party intervention against offences. We emphasize the need to study how people use reputation-based tactics for partner recalibration and partner choice, within interdependent relationships and social networks, and in daily life situations. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Molho ◽  
Junhui Wu

Punishment and reputation-based mechanisms play a major role in supporting the evolution of human cooperation. Theoretical accounts and field observations suggest that humans use multiple tactics to intervene against offenses—including confrontation, gossip, and ostracism—which have unique benefits and costs. Here, we draw a distinction between direct punishment tactics (i.e., physical and verbal confrontation) and indirect reputation-based tactics (i.e., gossip and ostracism). Based on this distinction, we sketch the common and unique social functions that different tactics are tailored to serve and describe information-processing mechanisms that potentially underlie decisions concerning how to intervene against offenses. We propose that decision rules guiding direct and indirect tactics should weigh information about the benefits of changing others’ behavior versus the costs of potential retaliation. Based on a synthesis of existing evidence, we highlight the role of situational, relational, and emotional factors in motivating distinct punishment tactics. We suggest that delineating between direct and indirect tactics can inform debates about the prevalence and functions of punishment, and the reputational consequences of third-party intervention against offenses. We emphasize the need to study how people use reputation-based tactics for partner recalibration and partner choice, within interdependent relationships and social networks, and in daily life situations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 184-200
Author(s):  
Leonie Fleischmann

AbstractWhen a non-violent resistance campaign does not have leverage to challenge powerful opponents, third-party intervention has been shown to assist. While the role of external third-party interveners – foreign activists – has been documented, less attention has been given to intervention from members of the dominant population. Drawing from the literature on civil resistance and through the study of Israeli Jews who intervene in Palestinian resistance campaigns against the Israeli military occupation, I argue that intervention from members of the dominant population is strategically desirable. Through an analysis of three Palestinian campaigns, this article identifies that the physical presence of Israeli Jews was needed to ensure the Palestinians could maintain their resistance efforts and presence on the land, despite the repression they faced. Furthermore, the skills and knowledge of the Israelis were needed to help the Palestinians achieve some of their goals, at least in the short term.


2001 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-416
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractThis article focuses on the potentially positive and negative impact that multiple and competing external stakeholders (influential foreign powers, supranational institutions, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs from various countries) can have on official and non-official third-party peace building initiatives. The example examined in this article describes a Swiss NGO-initiated intercommunal project in Cyprus. It analyzes the failure of this confidence-building project by looking at the role of external (and to a lesser degree, internal) stakeholders in the intervention. The article is descriptive and narrative due to the fact that access to confidential information of key stakeholder governments and institutions remains limited. The aim of the authors is to use this field experience in Cyprus to further develop the theory and practice of third-party intervention into persistent and malignant conflicts characterized by interference from multiple external stakeholders.


Author(s):  
Francesca Giardini ◽  
Daniele Vilone ◽  
Angel Sánchez ◽  
Alberto Antonioni

When there is an opportunity to gain a positive reputation, individuals are more willing to sacrifice their immediate self-interest. Partner choice creates opportunities for competitive altruism, i.e. individuals compete to be regarded as more generous and to be chosen for future partnerships. Tests of the competitive altruism hypothesis have focused so far on reputation based on direct observation, whereas the role of gossip has not been theoretically and empirically addressed. Partner choice can create an incentive to cooperate and to send truthful messages, but it can also work in the opposite direction. In order to understand the consequences of partner choice on cooperation and gossip, we designed an experimental study in which participants played a sequence of Public Goods games and gossip rounds. In our two treatments, we observed that cooperation increased when there was an opportunity to be selected, but also that cooperators sent more honest messages than defectors, and that this strategy was prevalent in the treatment in which inter-group competition was implemented. We also found evidence that participants detached themselves from the information more often when lying. Taken together, our study fills a theoretical and empirical gap by showing that partner choice increases both cooperation and honesty of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-188
Author(s):  
Paula Wojcikiewicz Almeida

Abstract By adjudicating inter-State claims, international courts can also contribute to the protection and promotion of community interests. However, the main obstacle faced by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relates to the existing tension between the bilateral nature of its own proceedings and the multilateral nature of the conflicting substantive law. As procedure may guide and shape the application of substantive law, it should itself be interpreted and developed in a manner to ensure community interests. By using its power to “frame rules for carrying out its functions”, the Court should assume expanded procedural powers in order to ensure the effective application of substantive law whenever community interests are at issue. Most procedural rules can be adjusted for multiparty aspects, notably the rules on third-party intervention, with the aim of protecting community interests and enhancing the Court’s legitimacy. It is up to the Court to find the balance between States’ rights and commonly aspired goals.


2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Potter ◽  
John L. Scott

Research on third-party intervention into conflict has accelerated in recent years. Although some studies have explicitly assumed that third parties only value peace, recent theory has modeled parties to a conflict more flexibly. In addition, empirical results provide evidence that third-party motives are more complex than straightforward peacemaking. In particular, although the United Nations attempts peacemaking missions, evidence suggests that United Nations interventions prolong conflict. We sample the literature on interventions and offer directions for further research. On the empirical side, we suggest that third-party research should exploit recent applications of statistical modeling that unravel the complexity created by the fact that the decision to intervene in a conflict may depend on the same factors that contribute to the duration of the conflict. On the theoretical side, in contrast to previous studies, we suggest modeling the destruction that armed conflict causes as a choice variable.


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