scholarly journals Coordination games in cancer

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Bayer ◽  
Robert Gatenby ◽  
Patricia H. McDonald ◽  
Derek R. Duckett ◽  
Katerina Stankova ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Tumor Growth ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Cancer Cells ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Cancer Initiation ◽  
Dependent Cell ◽  
Model Frequency

We propose a model of cancer initiation and progression where tumor growth is modulated by an evolutionary coordination game. Evolutionary games of cancer are widely used to model frequency-dependent cell interactions with the most studied games being the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Coordination games, by their more obscure and less evocative nature, are left understudied, despite the fact that, as we argue, they offer great potential in understanding and treating cancer. In this paper we present the conditions under which coordination games between cancer cells evolve, we propose aspects of cancer that can be modeled as results of coordination games, and explore the ways through which coordination games of cancer can be exploited for therapy.

Two Classes of Potential Games and the Solving Method of the Equilibria

2013 ◽  
Vol 464 ◽  
pp. 333-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiu Hua Hu ◽  
Hong Wei Gao ◽  
Dong Ye Wang ◽  
Yan Mei Li ◽  
Zhi Hong Ji
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Potential Functions ◽  
Potential Games ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Social Coordination

Using the definitions of potential functions and ordinal potential functions of strategic form games, we characterize two classes of potential games and give the solving method of the equilibria of finite potential games by testing and verifying potential games. The main contribution is proving that public goods games and social coordination games based on location strategic interaction with an exogenous network are potential games, and giving the equilibria by the method of solving potential games and ordinal potential games.

scholarly journals Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games

2006 ◽  
Vol 273 (1600) ◽  
pp. 2565-2571 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Hauert ◽  
Miranda Holmes ◽  
Michael Doebeli
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Natural Extension ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Darwinian Evolution ◽  
Ecological Dynamics ◽  
Public Goods Games

The emergence and abundance of cooperation in nature poses a tenacious and challenging puzzle to evolutionary biology. Cooperative behaviour seems to contradict Darwinian evolution because altruistic individuals increase the fitness of other members of the population at a cost to themselves. Thus, in the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperation should decrease and vanish, as predicted by classical models for cooperation in evolutionary game theory, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and public goods games. Traditional approaches to studying the problem of cooperation assume constant population sizes and thus neglect the ecology of the interacting individuals. Here, we incorporate ecological dynamics into evolutionary games and reveal a new mechanism for maintaining cooperation. In public goods games, cooperation can gain a foothold if the population density depends on the average population payoff. Decreasing population densities, due to defection leading to small payoffs, results in smaller interaction group sizes in which cooperation can be favoured. This feedback between ecological dynamics and game dynamics can generate stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors in public goods games. However, this mechanism fails for pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma interactions and the population is driven to extinction. Our model represents natural extension of replicator dynamics to populations of varying densities.

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