Generalised free energy and active inference: can the future cause the past?
AbstractWe compare two free energy functionals for active inference under Markov decision processes. One of these is a functional of beliefs about states and policies, but a function of observations, while the second is a functional of beliefs about all three. In the former (expected free energy), prior beliefs about outcomes are not part of the generative model (because they are absorbed into the prior over policies). Conversely, in the second (generalised free energy); priors over outcomes become an explicit component of the generative model. When using the free energy function, which is blind to counterfactual (i.e., future) observations, we equip the generative model with a prior over policies that ensure preferred (i.e., priors over) outcomes are realised. In other words, selected policies minimise uncertainty about future outcomes by minimising the free energy expected in the future. When using the free energy functional – that effectively treats counterfactual observations as hidden states – we show that policies are inferred or selected that realise prior preferences by minimising the free energy of future expectations. Interestingly, the form of posterior beliefs about policies (and associated belief updating) turns out to be identical under both formulations, but the quantities used to compute them are not.