scholarly journals Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton M. Unakafov ◽  
Thomas Schultze ◽  
Igor Kagan ◽  
Sebastian Moeller ◽  
Stephan Eule ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Realistic Model ◽  
Time Constraints ◽  
Small Probability ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
High Transparency ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Evolutionary Simulations ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Classical Game Theory

AbstractReal-world agents, such as humans, animals and robots, observe each other during interactions and choose their own actions taking the partners’ ongoing behaviour into account. Yet, classical game theory assumes that players act either strictly sequentially or strictly simultaneously (without knowing the choices of each other). To account for action visibility and provide a more realistic model of interactions under time constraints, we introduce a new game-theoretic setting called transparent game, where each player has a certain probability to observe the choice of the partner before deciding on its own action. Using evolutionary simulations, we demonstrate that even a small probability of seeing the partner’s choice before one’s own decision substantially changes evolutionary successful strategies. Action visibility enhances cooperation in a Bach-or-Stravinsky game, but disrupts cooperation in a more competitive iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In both games, strategies based on the “Win–stay, lose–shift” and “Tit-for-tat” principles are predominant for moderate transparency, while for high transparency strategies of “Leader-Follower” type emerge. Our results have implications for studies of human and animal social behaviour, especially for the analysis of dyadic and group interactions.

scholarly journals Evolutionary successful strategies in a transparent iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton M. Unakafov ◽  
Thomas Schultze ◽  
Igor Kagan ◽  
Sebastian Moeller ◽  
Alexander Gail ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Relative Timing ◽  
Partial Explanation ◽  
High Transparency ◽  
Sequential Game ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Evolutionary Simulations ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

AbstractA Transparent game is a game-theoretic setting that takes action visibility into account. In each round, depending on the relative timing of their actions, players have a certain probability to see their partner’s choice before making their own decision. This probability is determined by the level of transparency. At the two extremes, a game with zero transparency is equivalent to the classical simultaneous game, and a game with maximal transparency corresponds to a sequential game. Despite the prevalence of intermediate transparency in many everyday interactions such scenarios have not been sufficiently studied. Here we consider a transparent iterated Prisoner’s dilemma (iPD) and use evolutionary simulations to investigate how and why the success of various strategies changes with the level of transparency. We demonstrate that non-zero transparency greatly reduces the set of successful memory-one strategies compared to the simultaneous iPD. For low and moderate transparency the classical “Win – Stay, Lose – Shift” (WSLS) strategy is the only evolutionary successful strategy. For high transparency all strategies are evolutionary unstable in the sense that they can be easily counteracted, and, finally, for maximal transparency a novel “Leader-Follower” strategy outperforms WSLS. Our results provide a partial explanation for the fact that the strategies proposed for the simultaneous iPD are rarely observed in nature, where high levels of transparency are common.

FROM CLASSICAL TO EPISTEMIC GAME THEORY

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (01) ◽  
pp. 1440001 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDRÉS PEREA
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Historical Overview ◽  
Its Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
To Come ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Classical Game Theory

In this paper, we give a historical overview of the transition from classical game theory to epistemic game theory. To that purpose we will discuss how important notions such as reasoning about the opponents, belief hierarchies, common belief, and the concept of common belief in rationality arose, and gradually entered the game theoretic picture, thereby giving birth to the field of epistemic game theory. We will also address the question why it took game theory so long before it finally incorporated the natural aspect of "reasoning" into its analysis. To answer the latter question we will have a close look at the earliest results in game theory, and see how they shaped our approach to game theory for many years to come.

Classical Game Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Ramón Alonso-Sanz
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Classical Game Theory

scholarly journals Model of information deterrence between states based on the theory of reflexive games

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. A. Savchenko ◽  
◽  
T. M. Dzyuba
Keyword(s):  
State Level ◽  
Soviet Period ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
State Behavior ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Pragmatic Aspects ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach ◽  
Post Soviet Period

The article considers the approach to modeling the processes of information counteraction and information deterrence at the state level. The shortcomings of the game-theoretic approach to the development of formalized models of information counteraction are identified. The concept of formalization of interstate information deterrence on the basis of the theory of reflexive management of V. Lefevre is offered. Unlike classical game theory, this approach takes into account the possible irrationality of human (state) behavior in combination with moral-motivational and pragmatic aspects of choice. The adequacy of the proposed model is confirmed by the analysis of examples of information confrontation between Ukraine and Russia in the post-Soviet period.

Fuzzy Optimal Approaches to 2-P Cooperative Games

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-35
Author(s):  
Mubarak S. Al-Mutairi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Favourable Outcome ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Fuzzy Approach ◽  
Fuzzy Information ◽  
Missing Information ◽  
Conflicting Objectives ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Classical Game Theory

In game theory, two or more parties need to make decisions with fully or partially conflicting objectives. In situations where reaching a more favourable outcome depends upon cooperation between the two conflicting parties, some of the mental and subjective attitudes of the decision makers must be considered. While the decision to cooperate with others bears some risks due to uncertainty and loss of control, not cooperating means giving up potential benefits. In practice, decisions must be made under risk, uncertainty, and incomplete or fuzzy information. Because it is able to work well with vague, ambiguous, imprecise, noisy or missing information, the fuzzy approach is effective for modeling such multicriteria conflicting situations. The well-known game of Prisoner's Dilemma, which reflects a basic situation in which one must decide whether to cooperate or not with a competitor, is systematically solved using a fuzzy approach. The fuzzy procedure is used to incorporate some of the subjective attitudes of the decision makers that are difficult to model using classical game theory. Furthermore, it permits researchers to consider the subjective attitudes of the decision makers and make better decisions in subjective, uncertain, and risky situations.

Exponential Families and Game Dynamics

1982 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 374-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Akin
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Exponential Families ◽  
Von Neumann ◽  
Rational Player ◽  
Large Populations ◽  
Pure Strategies ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Classical Game Theory

A symmetric game consists of a set of pure strategies indexed by {0, …, n} and a real payoff matrix (aij). When two players choose strategies i and j the payoffs are aij and aji to the i-player and j-player respectively. In classical game theory of Von Neumann and Morgenstern [16] the payoffs are measured in units of utility, i.e., desirability, or in units of some desirable good, e.g. money. The problem of game theory is that of a rational player who seeks to choose a strategy or mixture of strategies which will maximize his return. In evolutionary game theory of Maynard Smith and Price [13] we look at large populations of game players. Each player's opponents are selected randomly from the population, and no information about the opponent is available to the player. For each one the choice of strategy is a fixed inherited characteristic.

Why is the equilibrium notion essential for a unified institutional theory? A friendly remark on the article by Hindriks and Guala

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
MASAHIKO AOKI
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Flow Diagram ◽  
Unified Approach ◽  
Shared Beliefs ◽  
Integrated Theory ◽  
Linguistic Representations ◽  
Short Commentary ◽  
Individual Dimension ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Classical Game Theory

AbstractThis short commentary basically supports the unified approach to institutions of Hindriks and Guala (2014). First, using a flow diagram over the two-by-two boxes in the space spanned by the collective-individual dimension and the behavior (play)-cognitive (belief) dimension, it argues that the classical game theory and the so-called institution-as-rule theory are both incomplete and that they should be regarded as complementary for an integrated theory of institution as a process. However, the substantive forms of institutions ought to be linguistic representations (i.e. rules and ideas) that summarize equilibrium states of play of the societal game so as to mediate them to be incorporated into minds of players as collective intentionality (i.e. shared beliefs). From this perspective this note also supports the authors’ argument to unpack the ‘Y’ term in Searle's notion of constitutive rule (that is, the regulative rule) and submit it to be based on a neo-Hegelian notion of mutual recognition (i.e. equilibrium).

scholarly journals Compatibility in tax reporting

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-102
Author(s):  
Vilen Lipatov
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Design Method ◽  
Heterogeneous Firms ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Compliance Monitoring ◽  
Tax Reporting ◽  
High Level ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Method Approach ◽  
Classical Game Theory

Purpose – to describe a compliance-monitoring equilibrium in presence of compatibility costs in a setting when managers and other parties have different attitude towards compliance. Design/Method/Approach. Classical game theory – Nash equilibrium. Findings. If compatibility costs are small, there exist a unique stable Nash equilibrium of the game between the tax authority and a population of heterogeneous firms. In this equilibrium, the relation between compatibility costs and compliance is non-monotonic and depends on the curvature of auditing function. However, compatibility costs reduce non-compliance in low cheating regimes and may enhance it when many firms are cheating. Limitations. The model is at high level of abstraction and neglects many important detail that characterize each field where it could be potentially applied. Theoretical implications. The results provide one rationale for developing countries to be cautious with employing refined auditing schemes and for developed countries to promote complicated accounting procedures. Originality/value. Compatibility costs are not previously considered in economic analysis of compliance.   Paper type – conceptual.

scholarly journals Quantum Conditional Strategies and Automata for Prisoners’ Dilemmata under the EWL Scheme

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (13) ◽  
pp. 2635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Giannakis ◽  
Georgia Theocharopoulou ◽  
Christos Papalitsas ◽  
Sofia Fanarioti ◽  
Theodore Andronikos
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Finite Automata ◽  
State Machines ◽  
Conditional Strategy ◽  
Abstract Machines ◽  
Quantum Finite Automata ◽  
Quantum Version ◽  
Important Field ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Classical Game Theory

Classical game theory is an important field with a long tradition of useful results. Recently, the quantum versions of classical games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), have attracted a lot of attention. This game variant can be considered as a specific type of game where the player’s actions and strategies are formed using notions from quantum computation. Similarly, state machines, and specifically finite automata, have also been under constant and thorough study for plenty of reasons. The quantum analogues of these abstract machines, like the quantum finite automata, have been studied extensively. In this work, we examine well-known conditional strategies that have been studied within the framework of the classical repeated PD game. Then, we try to associate these strategies to proper quantum finite automata that receive them as inputs and recognize them with a probability of 1, achieving some interesting results. We also study the quantum version of PD under the Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein scheme, proposing a novel conditional strategy for the repeated version of this game.

scholarly journals Fairness in multi-agent systems

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEVEN DE JONG ◽  
KARL TUYLS ◽  
KATJA VERBEECK
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Computational Models ◽  
Computer Software ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Classical Game ◽  
Descriptive Models ◽  
Classical Game Theory

AbstractMulti-agent systems are complex systems in which multiple autonomous entities, called agents, cooperate in order to achieve a common or personal goal. These entities may be computer software, robots, and also humans. In fact, many multi-agent systems are intended to operate in cooperation with or as a service for humans. Typically, multi-agent systems are designed assuming perfectly rational, self-interested agents, according to the principles of classical game theory. Recently, such strong assumptions have been relaxed in various ways. One such way is explicitly including principles derived from human behavior. For instance, research in the field of behavioral economics shows that humans are not purely self-interested. In addition, they strongly care aboutfairness. Therefore, multi-agent systems that fail to take fairness into account, may not be sufficiently aligned with human expectations and may not reach intended goals. In this paper, we present an overview of work in the area of fairness in multi-agent systems. More precisely, we first look at the classical agent model, that is, rational decision making. We then provide an outline of descriptive models of fairness, that is, models that explain how and why humans reach fair decisions. Then, we look at prescriptive, computational models for achieving fairness in adaptive multi-agent systems. We show that results obtained by these models are compatible with experimental and analytical results obtained in the field of behavioral economics.

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