Quantization of Blackjack: Quantum Basic Strategy and Advantage

Quantum computers that process information by harnessing the remarkable power of quantum mechanics are increasingly being put to practical use. In the future, their impact will be felt in numerous fields, including in online casino games. This is one of the reasons why quantum gambling theory has garnered considerable attention. Studies have shown that the quantum gambling theory often yields nontrivial consequences that classical theory cannot interpret. We formulated blackjack game, which is one of the most famous card games, as a quantum game and found possible quantum entanglement between strategies. We also devised a quantum circuit reproducing classical blackjack. This circuit can be realized in the near future when quantum computers are commonplace. Furthermore, we showed that the player’s expectation increases compared to the classical game using quantum basic strategy, which is a quantum version of the popular basic strategy of blackjack.

Quantum Game of Dual-channel Supply Chain under Free-riding Behavior

Based on the perspective of the quantum game, this paper explores when the online direct sales channel takes the free-riding behavior after the retail channel provides high-quality experience and services and how the dual-channel supply chain establishes a commodity pricing strategy. The retailer’s selling price follows a decreasing function of the free-riding behavior coefficient. while the online direct selling price does an increasing function of the free-riding behavior coefficient. Under centralized decision-making, there is no quantum entanglement, so the quantum game solution is consistent with the classical game solution. Under decentralized decision-making, the optimal price and profit of the quantum game are higher than those of the classical game when the quantum entanglement degree is greater than zero. When the quantum entanglement tends to be infinite, the optimal price of the quantum game finally remains in convergence. The quantum game theory is a more optimal decision-making method than the classical game theory.

The evolution of strategy in bacterial warfare via the regulation of bacteriocins and antibiotics

Bacteria inhibit and kill one another with a diverse array of compounds, including bacteriocins and antibiotics. These attacks are highly regulated, but we lack a clear understanding of the evolutionary logic underlying this regulation. Here, we combine a detailed dynamic model of bacterial competition with evolutionary game theory to study the rules of bacterial warfare. We model a large range of possible combat strategies based upon the molecular biology of bacterial regulatory networks. Our model predicts that regulated strategies, which use quorum sensing or stress responses to regulate toxin production, will readily evolve as they outcompete constitutive toxin production. Amongst regulated strategies, we show that a particularly successful strategy is to upregulate toxin production in response to an incoming competitor’s toxin, which can be achieved via stress responses that detect cell damage (competition sensing). Mirroring classical game theory, our work suggests a fundamental advantage to reciprocation. However, in contrast to classical results, we argue that reciprocation in bacteria serves not to promote peaceful outcomes but to enable efficient and effective attacks.

Sociological game theory: agency, social structures and interaction processes

This article presents two sociological theories, alternatives to classical game theory. These social science-based game theories discussed here present reformulations of classical game theory in applied mathematics (CGT). These theories offer an important advance to classical game theory, thanks to the application of central concepts in sociology and social psychology, as well as the results of empirical analyses of individual and collective behaviour. These two theories emerging in the social sciences are, the first, based on systems theory, is social science game theory (SGT); the other is Erwing Goffman’s interactionist theory (IGT) based on social psychology. Each of these theories, both focused on the analysis of social games, are presented and contrasted with classical game theory, highlighting the centrality of social rules in structuring and regulating human behaviour, and the need to include them in any analysis.

SudoQ -- a quantum variant of the popular game

(pp781-799) doi: https://doi.org/ Abstracts: We introduce SudoQ, a quantum version of the classical game Sudoku. Allowing the entries of the grid to be (non-commutative) projections instead of integers, the solution set of SudoQ puzzles can be much larger than in the classical (commutative) setting. We introduce and analyze a randomized algorithm for computing solutions of SudoQ puzzles. Finally, we state two important conjectures relating the quantum and the classical solutions of SudoQ puzzles, corroborated by analytical and numerical evidence.

Hangman–Hangaroo Game Design Using Automata Theory

Automata theory plays an important role in various areas especially in game design. This paper describes the concept of automata theory in designing one of the most popular classical game which is Hangman. In this study, we focused on a game called Hangaroo, which implemented the same concept as in Hangman game. We studied and discussed the combination of automata and game theory that can be considered in order to design the game. As a result, we found that, automata theory is the fundamental access in designing and developing Games.

Tripartite Dynamic Zero-Sum Quantum Games

The Nash equilibrium plays a crucial role in game theory. Most of results are based on classical resources. Our goal in this paper is to explore multipartite zero-sum game with quantum settings. We find that in two different settings there is no strategy for a tripartite classical game being fair. Interestingly, this is resolved by providing dynamic zero-sum quantum games using single quantum state. Moreover, the gains of some players may be changed dynamically in terms of the committed state. Both quantum games are robust against the preparation noise and measurement errors.

Game Theory and the Law

Classical game theory analyses strategic interactions under extreme idealisations. It assumes cognitively unconstrained players with common knowledge concerning game forms, preferences, and rationality. Such ideal theory is highly relevant for human self-understanding as a rational being or what Selten called ‘rationology’. Yet, ideal theory is highly irrelevant for real actors who are in Selten’s sense boundedly rational. Starting from essential features of real bargaining problems, elements of Selten’s ‘micro-psychological’ and Raiffa’s ‘telescopic’ behavioural bargaining theory are introduced. From this, an outline of a workable rationality approach to bargaining emerges. It suggests relying on telescopic elements from Raiffa’s model to provide general outcome orientation and on insights from Selten’s aspiration adaptation model of individual decision making to develop process-sensitive action advice. A bird’s eye view of a prominent recent case of ‘bargaining in the shadow of the courts’ shows a surprisingly good fit of outcomes with the implications of Raiffa’s telescopic approach while remaining compatible with a Seltenian process. Though due to a lack of specific information because the micro-foundations for the telescopic theory cannot be provided, it is at least clear how further case studies and experiments might be put to work here.

Kleptoparasitic Hawk-Dove Games

The Hawk-Dove game is a classical game-theoretical model of potentially aggressive animal conflicts. In this paper, we apply game theory to a population of foraging animals that may engage in stealing food from one another. We assume that the population is composed of two types of individuals, Hawks and Doves. Hawks try to escalate encounters into aggressive contests while Doves engage in non-aggressive displays between themselves or concede to aggressive Hawks. The fitness of each type depends upon various natural parameters, such as food density, the mean handling time of a food item, as well as the mean times of conflicts over the food. We find the Evolutionarily Stable States (ESSs) for all parameter combinations and show that there are two possible ESSs, pure Hawks, or a mixed population of Hawks and Doves. We demonstrate that for any set of parameter values there is exactly one ESS.