Troubled Asset Relief Program and earnings informativeness

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-68
Author(s):  
Jose G. Vega ◽  
Jan Smolarski ◽  
Jennifer Yin
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Total Compensation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Troubled Asset Relief Program ◽  
Earnings Informativeness ◽  
Window Approach ◽  
Relief Program

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine restrictions placed by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on executive compensation during the financial crisis. Since it remains unclear if TARP restored public confidence in financial institutions, the authors also analyze what effect such regulations had on investors’ confidence in the information provided by earning with respect to executive compensation during this critical period. Design/methodology/approach To test the assertions, the authors employ an Earnings Response Coefficient model, which captures the association between firms’ earnings surprise (ES) and perceived earnings informativeness. The authors implement both a long- and short-window test to obtain a better understanding of the effects of TARP on financial institutions’ earnings informativeness. The authors use the long-window approach to gather evidence about whether and how financial institutions’ ES are absorbed into security prices conditional on both their participation in TARP and their compliance with TARP’s compensation restrictions. The authors attempt to establish a stronger causal link by also using a short-window approach. Findings The authors find that firms paying their CEOs above the TARP threshold show higher earnings informativeness. Financial institutions that paid their CEOs above the TARP threshold achieved better performance during their participation in TARP. The authors also find that a decrease in total compensation while participating in TARP is associated with improved earnings informativeness. Lastly, separating total compensation into its cash and stock-based components, the authors find that firms improve earnings informativeness when they increase (decrease) cash (performance) compensation during TARP. However, overall earnings informativeness decreases during and after TARP relative to the pre-TARP period. Practical implications The research suggests that executive compensation incentives affect earnings informativeness and that tradeoffs are made between direct and indirect costs in retaining executives. The results have implications for policy makers, investors and researchers because the results allow policy makers and regulators to improve on how they design and implement accounting, market and finance regulations and reforms. Investors may potentially use the results when evaluating firm experiencing financial and, in some case, political distress. It also helps firms and offering optimal compensation contracts to create proper incentives for executives and ensure that managerial actions result in successful firm performance. Social implications The study shows how firms react to changing regulations that affect executive compensation and earning informativeness. The results of the study allow regulators to potentially design more effective regulations by targeting certain aspects of firms’ operation such excessive risk-taking behavior and rent extraction opportunities. Originality/value There are very few studies that deal with how firms react to regulation that affect executive compensation. The authors provide evidence regarding what effect TARP and its compensation restrictions had on financial institutions’ earnings informativeness. The evidence in the study will further regulators’ understanding of whether TARP improved investors’ confidence in financial institutions. The paper also contributes to the understanding in how changes in executive compensation in times of high political scrutiny affect investors’ perceptions of firm performance.

Corporate social responsibility and financial stability: evidence from the Troubled Asset Relief Program

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (8) ◽  
pp. 1111-1128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Cooper ◽  
Christopher Henderson ◽  
Andrew Kish
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Banking Industry ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Troubled Asset Relief Program ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Relief Program ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to test the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the banking industry using Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as an experimental backdrop. Design/methodology/approach The authors match banks that received TARP with CSR data on publicly available firms. Using this data set, the authors are able to perform both univariate and multivariate analyses to determine the impact of CSR on bank management behavior. Findings The authors find evidence that supports stakeholder theory as applied to a sample of large financial institutions. The authors show that banks increased their CSR involvement and intensity following TARP, evidence that CSR is not merely transitory in nature but structural and an important aspect of firm value. The authors also find that capital ratios increase to a greater degree in banks whose CSR ratings were stronger prior to TARP. Finally, while all banks in the sample repaid Treasury, it took strong CSR banks a longer time to repay than banks with weaker CSR. The authors show how CEO compensation played a role in this relationship. Research limitations/implications The findings are limited to large banks. Practical implications Practically speaking, this study helps to discern the motivations and actions of large financial institutions. This is especially important from a regulator perspective, whose function is to maintain overall national financial stability. Originality/value This is the first study to link TARP and CSR literatures. Overall, there are a limited number of studies on CSR in the banking industry, and this paper adds to this burgeoning area. It is important and valuable to managers and policymakers to understand implications of CSR in the financial sector.

Discussion of Troubled Asset Relief Program and earnings informativeness

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-152
Author(s):  
Nan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Capital Market ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficient ◽  
Market Effects ◽  
Troubled Asset Relief Program ◽  
Real Effects ◽  
Earnings Informativeness ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Relief Program

PurposeVega et al. (2020) find that incentives in executive compensation result in higher earnings informativeness. The discussion focuses on two areas for improvement. First, the authors could look into additional measures of earnings quality. This further analysis could help us understand whether the enhanced earning informativeness stems from capital market effects or real effects. Second, the authors could consider replacing their main earnings response coefficient (ERC) model with one of the alternative ERC models in the literature. Three different ERC models are discussed.Design/methodology/approachThis paper discusses capital market effects versus real effects and illustrates different ERC models.FindingsThe discussed paper could differentiate between capital market effects and real effects and use an alternative ERC model.Originality/valueAn accounting audience could be interested in the discussion on capital market effects versus real effects and the illustration on various ERC models.

Kashkari will shape 'too big to fail' US debate

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Too Big To Fail ◽  
Crowd Sourcing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Troubled Asset Relief Program ◽  
Policy Ideas ◽  
Relief Program

Subject A profile of Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kashkari. Significance Shortly after his appointment as President of the Federal Reserve (Fed) Bank of Minneapolis in January, Neel Kashkari delivered a speech, arguing that the largest US banks remain 'too big to fail' (TBTF), posing risks to the economy. While Kashkari is not a professional economist, his experience at the Treasury as director of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and at major investment firms gives his views greater salience than those of less well-known Fed officials. Impacts Kashkari's willingness to speak directly could influence the debate on the restructuring of financial institutions. His recent speech will renew attention to the efficacy and scale of the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime. Kashkari will use a tech sector, crowd-sourcing approach to generate new policy ideas.

scholarly journals An Assessment of TARP Assistance to Financial Institutions

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles W. Calomiris ◽  
Urooj Khan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Social Costs ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Troubled Asset Relief Program ◽  
Social Costs And Benefits ◽  
Relief Program ◽  
Single Approach ◽  
Perceived Unfairness

Six years after the passage of the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program, commonly known as TARP, it remains hard to measure the total social costs and benefits of the assistance to banks provided under TARP programs. TARP was not a single approach to assisting weak banks but rather a variety of changing solutions to a set of evolving problems. TARP's passage was associated with significant improvements in financial markets and the health of financial intermediaries, as well as an increase in the supply of lending by recipients. However, a full evaluation must also take into account other factors, including the risks borne by taxpayers in the course of the bailouts; moral-hazard costs that could result in more risk-taking in the future; and social costs related to perceived unfairness. Our evaluation is organized in five parts: 1) What did policymakers do? 2) What are the proper objectives of interventions like TARP assistance to financial institutions? 3) Did TARP succeed in those economic objectives? 4) Were TARP funds allocated purely on an economic basis, or did political favoritism play a role? 5) Would alternative policies, either alongside or instead of TARP, and alternative design features of TARP, have worked better?

scholarly journals The governance-performance relationship: evidence from Ghana

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrews Owusu ◽  
Charlie Weir
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Developing Economies ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Governance Index ◽  
Code Of Corporate Governance ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Post Code

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact corporate governance, measured by a governance index, on the performance of listed firms in a developing economy, Ghana. It also evaluates the effect of the introduction of a code of corporate governance on compliance rates across Ghanaian firms as well as assessing the impact of the code’s introduction on firm performance for the study period 2000-2009. Design/methodology/approach The paper develops a Ghanaian corporate governance index (GCGI) containing 33 provisions to measure corporate governance quality during the pre-code and the post-code sub-periods. The authors use a panel data analytical framework and fixed effects regressions to analyse the governance-performance relationships. Findings After controlling for endogeneity, the authors find a statistically significant and positive relationship between the GCGI and firm performance. The analysis shows evidence of a statistically significant increase in the degree of compliance with the Ghanaian Code from the pre-2003 sub-period to the post-2003 sub-period. The authors also find that the introduction of the code has led to improved firm performance. However, not all elements of corporate governance appear to have a significant effect on firm performance. Research limitations/implications One limitation of this study is the development of a corporate governance index. The binary coding used to construct the GCGI may not reflect the relative importance of the different corporate governance provisions. This means that all elements included in the index are given equal weighting. Future research may assign weights to each of the corporate governance provisions but this may have the disadvantage of making subjective judgements relative to the importance of each corporate governance provision recommended by the Ghanaian Code. Practical implications These results have important implications for both policy makers and companies. For policy makers, it is encouraging for the development of a code of corporate governance to regulate firms rather than enforcing rigid laws that may not be value relevant. For companies, the improvement in compliance with a code of corporate governance can provide a means of achieving improved performance. Originality/value This paper adds to the limited evidence on the governance-performance relationship in developing economies and in particular it analyses the role of a governance index. It is also the first paper to compare the pre- and the post-code governance index-performance relationship in an African or developing country.

Investigating the associations between executive compensation and firm performance

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nader Elsayed ◽  
Hany Elbardan
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Performance Pay ◽  
Simultaneous Equation ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Executive Remuneration ◽  
Study Results ◽  
And Performance

PurposeWhile there have been extensive empirical investigations of pay-performance sensitivity, the perspective of performance-pay has received less attention to date. While executive compensation is sensitive to firm performance, firm performance is also likely to be affected by executive compensation. Adopting multiple theoretical perspectives, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether executive compensation has a greater influence on firm performance or whether the latter has a greater influence on compensation.Design/methodology/approachUsing data from a five-year period (2010-2014) for Financial Times and Stock Exchange 350 companies, the authors employ a set of simultaneous equation modelling to jointly investigate, after accounting for endogeneity problem, the mutual association of executive compensation and firm performance by employing four control variables (board size, non-executive directors, leverage and boardroom ownership).FindingsThe authors find strong evidence for the greater influence of executive compensation on firm performance than the pay-performance framework. This finding supports the tournament theory compared with the agency perspective.Research limitations/implicationsInevitably, there are limitations in a wide-ranging study of this nature that could be addressed in future research. As any empirical study utilising company data, there may be concerns to the effect of survivorship bias and the manner in which companies have reorganised, if there is any, themselves during the period under examination. There are also issues as to missing data, some measures relating to both executive compensation and corporate governance are not provided by the BoardEx database.Practical implicationsThe study results provide evidence that using the tournament perspective by remuneration committees as a guide for determining executive compensation helps in achieving better performance. This helps in developing appropriate mechanisms for setting executive remuneration.Originality/valueThis paper combines an empirical investigation of the frameworks of pay-performance and performance-pay and develops a system of six simultaneous equations to examine the associations between executive compensation and firm performance.

scholarly journals Board governance quality and risk disclosure compliance among financial institutions in Uganda

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Geofrey Nkuutu ◽  
Joseph Mpeera Ntayi ◽  
Isaac Nabeeta Nkote ◽  
John Munene ◽  
Will Kaberuka
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Partial Least Square ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Risk Disclosure ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis paper aims to examine the impact of board governance quality (BGQ) and its mechanisms, namely board activity, board independence, board communication and board expertise, on the level of risk disclosure compliance (RDC) among financial institutions (FIs) in Uganda.Design/methodology/approachThe study adopts a cross-sectional design where data are collected through a questionnaire survey and audited financial statements of 83 FIs. The authors employ partial least square structural equation modeling (SmartPLS32.7) to test hypotheses.FindingsThe authors find that the level of RDC in Ugandan FIs is low. Further, the study finds the positive relation between BGQ and RDC. Moreover, the authors find that RDC is positively and significantly related with board activity, board independence, board communication and board expertise. Furthermore, the authors find that the level of RDC is positively and significantly related to ownership type, firm size and board size, respectively. Nevertheless, industry type, number of branches and firm age are insignificantly related to RDC.Practical implicationsThe study provides relevant insights into regulators and policy makers with early symptoms of potential problems regarding weak board governance in FIs. Policy makers may also use these findings as a guideline tool for improving existing board governance frameworks in place and development of new disclosure policies. In addition, the study provides an input into the review and amendments of existing corporate governance codes for the regulators.Originality/valueThis study offers the empirical evidence on the nexus between BGQ and RDC of FIs in Uganda. Moreover, the study also offers evidence on how BGQ mechanisms impact RDC. The study also further adds theoretical foundations to the RDC literature.

Tracing the links between executive compensation structure and firm performance: evidence from the Brazilian market

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (7) ◽  
pp. 1393-1408
Author(s):  
Alexandre Dias ◽  
Victor Vieira ◽  
Bruno Figlioli
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Performance Indicators ◽  
Multiple Correspondence Analysis ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Compensation Structure

Purpose This study aims to investigate how different executive compensation structures were related to the performance of firms. Design/methodology/approach This study was based on a sample of companies with the highest standards of corporate governance listed on the Brazilian Stock Exchange. We adopted the multiple correspondence analysis followed by the hierarchical cluster analysis to propose a typology defined by fixed and variable components of the executive compensation and multiple firm performance indicators. Findings The analysis produced three clusters, which were submitted to robustness tests, highlighting that companies used the compensatory incentives in striking distinct ways as governance mechanisms. The study found a positive relationship between the performance of companies and the variable incentives of executive compensation, especially the long-term incentive, as well as a negative relationship between the performance of firms and the fixed component of the compensation structure. Research limitations/implications This research, whose sample was based on an emerging market, adds empirical evidence to the literature. However, future studies are invited to address the relationships between executive compensation structures and firm performance in other markets, as well as to examine these relationships in companies with distinct levels of governance. Practical implications This study provides insights on how the incentive structure can be adopted as an efficient governance mechanism, especially for companies in emerging markets. Originality/value The main novelty of this paper is that the methodological strategy used here enabled the authors to discriminate distinct executive compensation structures and establish a relationship between these compensation structures and different types of performance indicators.

scholarly journals How do executive pay and its gap with employee pay influence corporate performance? Evidence from Thailand tourism listed companies

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurence Ferry ◽  
Guanming He ◽  
Chang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Pay Gap ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe authors investigate how executive pay and its gap with employee pay influence the performance of Thailand tourism listed companies.Design/methodology/approachThe authors manually collect data on the executives' and employees' remunerations for Thailand tourism listed companies and use the data for the authors’ OLS regression analysis. To check the robustness of the results to potential endogeneity issues, the authors employ the two-stage least-squares regression analysis and the impact threshold for a confounding variable approach.FindingsThe authors find that short-term executive compensation enhances firm performance, and that long-term executive compensation reduces the likelihood of unfavorable corporate performance. The authors also find that the gap in short-term pay between executives and employees has an inverted-U relation with firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis study suggests that higher executive pay relative to employee pay could encourage executives to work hard to improve corporate performance, but that too large a pay gap between executives and employees could impair employees' morale and harm firm performance.Practical implicationsIt is important for tourism companies to not only pay executives well but also avoid too large a pay gap between executives and employees.Social implicationsThis study implies the important role of compensation design in contributing to employee engagement and good performance for tourism firms.Originality/valueThis study sheds light on agency problems between executives and employees in tourism companies and provides new evidence and insights on compensation research in the tourism sector in emerging markets.

The determinants of CEO compensation: new insights from United States

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Bouteska ◽  
Salma Mefteh-Wali
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Ceo Power ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of CEO compensation for sample of the US firms. It emphasizes the presence of executive compensation persistence and the importance of CEO power besides performance while setting CEO pay.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical analysis is conducted on a large sample of US firms during the period 2006–2016. It is based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) models to assess the impact of numerous factors on CEO compensation.FindingsThe main findings reveal that firm performance proxied by accounting-based proxies, as well as market-based proxies, plays a significant role in explaining variations in levels of executive compensation. Moreover, there is a significant persistence in executive compensation among the US sample firms. The authors also document that poor governance conditions (managerial power hypothesis) lead to high compensation levels offered to CEO.Research limitations/implicationsAt the end, without a doubt, the analysis has some limitations that prompt the authors to consider future research directions. One future research avenue that can help better explain the effect of firm performance on the CEO compensation is to study this issue using an international sample to determine whether country-level characteristics (e.g. creditor rights, shareholder rights and the enforcement climate) can influence this relationship. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile to deepen the analysis of CEO power and its impact on CEO compensation. It will be interesting to emphasize how the CEO power interacts with the other governance characteristics and some CEO attributes as CEO gender.Practical implicationsThe paper's findings have implications for practitioners, policymakers and regulatory authorities. First, the findings inform regulators that performance is not the only determinant of CEO pay level. This may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure. Second, the study offers insights to policymakers and members of boards of directors interested in enhancing the design of executive compensation and internal corporate governance, to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Firms should strengthen the board independence and properly constitute the board committees (compensation, risk, nomination…).Originality/valueThis paper presents a comprehensive overview of the CEO compensation determinants. It supplements the classic pay-for-performance sensitivity predictions with insights gained from the dynamics of wage setting theory and managerial power theory. The authors develop a composite index to measure the CEO power in order to test the impact of CEO attributes on CEO pay. Additionally, it verifies whether the determinants of CEO pay depend on firm age and size.

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