Corporate governance and generalist CEOs: evidence from board size

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard ◽  
Viput Ongsakul ◽  
Pornsit Jiraporn ◽  
Ali Uyar

Purpose The purpose of this study is to contribute to the debate in the literature about generalist CEOs by exploring the effect of board governance on CEO general managerial ability, focusing on one of the most crucial aspects of the board of directors, board size. Prior research shows that smaller boards constitute a more effective governance mechanism and therefore are expected to reduce agency costs. Design/methodology/approach The authors estimate the effect of board size on CEO general managerial ability, using a fixed-effects regression analysis, propensity score matching, as well as an instrumental-variable analysis. These techniques mitigate endogeneity greatly and make the results much more likely to show causality. Findings The results show that firms with smaller board size are more likely to hire generalist CEOs. Specifically, a decline in board size by one standard deviation raises CEO general managerial ability by 15.62%. A lack of diverse experiences in a small board with fewer directors makes it more necessary to hire a CEO with a broad range of professional experiences. Furthermore, the agency costs associated with generalist CEOs are greatly diminished in firms with a smaller board. Hence, firms with a smaller board are more inclined to hire generalist CEOs. Originality/value Although prior research has explored the effects of board size on various corporate outcomes, strategies and policies, this study is the first to investigate the effect of board size on CEO general managerial ability. This study contributes to the literature both in corporate governance and on CEO general managerial ability.

Author(s):  
Mohamed H. Elmagrhi ◽  
Collins G. Ntim ◽  
Richard M. Crossley ◽  
John K. Malagila ◽  
Samuel Fosu ◽  
...  

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which corporate board characteristics influence the level of dividend pay-out ratio using a sample of UK small- and medium-sized enterprises from 2010 to 2013 listed on the Alternative Investment Market. Design/methodology/approach The data are analysed by employing multivariate regression techniques, including estimating fixed effects, lagged effects and two-stage least squares regressions. Findings The results show that board size, the frequency of board meetings, board gender diversity and audit committee size have a significant relationship with the level of dividend pay-out. Audit committee size and board size have a positive association with the level of dividend pay-out, whilst the frequency of board meetings and board gender diversity have a significant negative relationship with the level of dividend pay-out. By contrast, the findings suggest that board independence and CEO role duality do not have any significant effect on the level of dividend pay-out. Originality/value This is one of the first attempts at examining the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy in the UK’s Alternative Investment Market, with the analysis distinctively informed by agency theoretical insights drawn from the outcome and substitution hypotheses.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Viput Ongsakul ◽  
Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard ◽  
Napatsorn Jiraporn ◽  
Pornsit Jiraporn

Purpose This study aims to investigate the role of the market for corporate control as an external governance mechanism and its effect on executive risk-taking incentives. Managers tend to be risk-averse as they are more exposed to idiosyncratic risk, resulting in sub-optimal risk-taking that does not maximize shareholders’ wealth. The takeover market alleviates this problem, inducing managers to take more risk. Therefore, risk-taking incentives inside the firm are less powerful when the outside takeover market is more active. Design/methodology/approach Exploiting a novel measure of takeover vulnerability recently constructed by Cain et al. (2017), the authors explore how takeover vulnerability influences executive risk-taking incentives. Using a large sample of US firms, the authors use fixed-effects regressions, propensity score matching and instrumental variable analysis. Findings Consistent with this study’s hypothesis, a more active takeover market results in less powerful risk-taking incentives. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation diminishes executive risk-taking incentives by 22.39%, which is an economically meaningful magnitude. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the effect of the takeover market on managerial risk-taking incentives, using a novel measure of takeover susceptibility. The authors’ measure of takeover vulnerability is considerably less susceptible to endogeneity, enabling the authors to draw causal inferences with more confidence.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1734
Author(s):  
Dong-Soon Kim ◽  
Eunjung Yeo ◽  
Li Zhang

This study examines whether an influence from a difference in corporate governance structure exists on firms’ agency costs between Chinese companies cross-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) and those that are domestically listed ones. We determine that, overall, companies with an HKSE cross-listing had better corporate governance than those without. The corporate governance advantage of the HKSE cross-listed firms holds if we control for firm fixed effects and resolve the potential endogeneity problem between corporate governance and agency costs by using two-stage least square (2SLS) regression analysis with instrumental variables. Specifically, the HKSE cross-listed firms had better corporate governance in terms of board size and institutional ownership. By contrast, domestically listed firms experienced the adverse effects of institutional owner’s roles and higher board pay. The advantages of HKSE cross-listed firms may stem from the benefits of having a larger board size and the effective monitoring of the management by the institutional stockholders. Implications are drawn for the debate on cross-listing and the future challenges of Chinese firms, and a more robust monitoring is necessary for sustainable finance of their stock markets.


2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-314
Author(s):  
Zahid Irshad Younas ◽  
Bilal Mehmood ◽  
Asal Ilyas ◽  
Haseeb Asif Bajwa

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance, firm performance on CEO compensation. More specific, firm performance, board size and audit expenditure are linked with CEO compensation. Using panel data for 151 Pakistani firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), fixed effects regression has been performed. The results indicate firm performance is negatively associated with CEO compensation, which hold managerial power theory. While, board size and audit expenditure showed a positive relationship with CEO compensation, which reflects the presence of human capital theory. The results of study are in line with the prior studies done on CEO compensation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rohaida Basiruddin ◽  
Habib Ahmed

Purpose This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and Shariah non-compliant risk (SNCR) that is unique for Islamic banks. The study examines the roles of Shariah committee along with the board of directors in mitigating SNCR. Design/methodology/approach The paper empirically investigates the implications of characteristics of board of directors and Shariah committee on the SNCR by using a sample of 29 full-fledge Islamic banks from Malaysia and Indonesia over the period 2007-2017. All data is hand collected from the Islamic banks' annual reports with the exception of country-level data collected from the World Bank database. Findings The results show that banks with a smaller board size and higher proportion of independent board members are likely to have lower SNCR. The findings also indicate that the financial expertise and higher frequency of Shariah committee meetings reduces the SNCR. Collectively, the analysis shows that banks with strong corporate governance environments reduce SNCR. Practical implications The findings of the study shed light on the relationship between corporate governance practice, Shariah committee characteristics and SNCR. The results can be used by different stakeholders such as policymakers, boards of directors and senior management of Islamic banks to mitigate SNCR. Originality/value This study extends the literature on corporate governance and risk-taking by including additional dimensions of governance and risk type. The corporate governance mechanism at the board level is complemented by including the Shariah committee characteristics and SNCR which is relevant to Islamic financial institutions is examined.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Smaili ◽  
Paulina Arroyo

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a change of corporate governance occurs after financial crimes in Canada revealed through external whistleblowing. Design/methodology/approach Based on the methodology of Smaili and Arroyo (2019), the authors implement a qualitative research framework to examine 11 alleged Canadian corporate financial statement fraud cases publicly exposed during the 1995–2012 period. Findings The analysis suggests that firms had a weak traditional corporate governance mechanism before the external whistleblowing occurred. In almost every case, the chief executive officer (CEO) was also the chair of the board of directors. Although the reports by Dey and Saucier recommend that independent directors make up at least 75% of Canadian boards, we note that the percentage of independent directors was under 70% in six cases. Moreover, only two firms had a whistleblowing policy in place, and seven firms had a major shareholder. Regarding the consequences for corporate governance after whistleblowing, the analysis shows that the companies that survived the whistleblowing had enhanced their internal corporate governance by the third year after the whistleblowing. In fact, at all the surviving companies, the CEO was no longer the chair, and the percentage of independent directors had increased to 80%. However, for those survival companies that did not have a whistleblowing policy before the event, the situation did not change quickly, and they only implemented a policy after the enforcement of the new regulation in the year 2003. Originality/value This paper adds new insights to the research on financial crime by investigating the relation between corporate governance and whistleblowing.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1073-1090 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ejaz Aslam ◽  
Razali Haron

Purpose Corporate governance plays a significant role to overcome agency issues and develop the culture of transparency and openness. In this context, this paper aims to examine how corporate governance mechanisms affect the performance of Islamic banks (IBs). Design/methodology/approach Stepwise, two-step system generalize method of moment estimation technique is used in the analysis in which control variables are added into the model sequentially. This study used data on 129 IBs from 29 Islamic countries (Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia) during the period of 2008 to 2017. Findings The findings suggest that the audit committee (AUDC) and Shariah board (SB) have positive impact on the performance of IBs (return on assets and return on equity). However, board size and risk management committee have negative and significant effect on the performance of IBs. CEO duality and non-executive directors have mixed relationship with the performance of IBs. These results support the argument that IBs need to improve their financial performance through appropriate governance mechanism. Research limitations/implications The findings of the study added a new dimension to the governance research that could be a valuable source of knowledge for policymakers and regulators to improve the existing governance mechanism for better performance of IBs. Originality/value The study fills the gap in the literature by addressing the issue of corporate governance on performance of IBs across countries. Agency theory is discussed to explain the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and performance.


2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (12) ◽  
pp. 1110-1136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Kipkirong Tarus ◽  
Federico Aime

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of boards’ demographic diversity on firms’ strategic change and the interaction effect of firm performance. Design/methodology/approach – This paper used secondary data derived from publicly listed firms in Kenya during 2002-2010 and analyzed the data using fixed effects regression model to test the effect of board demographic and strategic change, while moderated regression analysis was used to test the moderating effect of firm performance. Findings – The results partially supported board demographic diversity–strategic change hypothesis. In particular, results indicate that age diversity produces less strategic change, while functional diversity is associated with greater levels of strategic change. The moderated regression results do not support our general logic that high firm performance enhances board demographic diversity–strategic change relationship. In effect, the results reveal that at high level of firm performance, board demographic diversity produces less strategic change. Originality/value – Despite few studies that have examined board demographic diversity and firm performance, this paper introduces strategic change as an outcome variable. This paper also explores the moderating role of firm performance in board demographic diversity–strategic change relationship, and finally, the study uses Kenyan dataset which in itself is unique because most governance and strategy research uses data from developed countries.


Humanomics ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Moradi ◽  
Mohammad Ali Bagherpour Velashani ◽  
Mahdi Omidfar

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of product market competition and corporate governance on firm’s management performance in the Tehran Stock Exchange market. According to the research literature, the governance mechanisms used in this study consist of ownership structure, structure of the board of directors and capital structure. In addition, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and market size were used to measure the product market competition. Design/methodology/approach This study used one selected sample among the firms in the capital market of Iran from 2004 to 2012. Findings The results of this study indicated that there is a significant relation among the major governance mechanisms (including ownership concentration, independence of the board of directors and debt ratio) and product market competition and management performance. The findings of this study also showed that product market competition is effective on the relation between corporate governance and the performance, and this is what has been ignored in most of the conducted studies. Originality/value In general, the results of this study supported the idea that product market competition is effective on implementation and efficiency of governance mechanisms.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Sonu Goyal ◽  
Sanjay Dhamija

Subject area The case “Corporate Governance Failure at Ricoh India: Rebuilding Lost Trust” discusses the series of events post disclosure of falsification of the accounts and violation of accounting principles, leading to a loss of INR 11.23bn for the company, eroding over 75 per cent of its market cap (Financial Express, 2016). The case provides an opportunity for students to understand the key components of corporate governance structure and consequences of poor corporate governance. The case highlights the responsibility of the board of directors, audit committee and external auditors and discusses the changes required in the corporate governance structure necessary to ensure that such incidents do not take place. The case also delves into the classic dilemma of degree of control that needs to be exercised by the parent over its subsidiaries and freedom of independence given to the subsidiary board, which is a constant challenge all multinationals face. Such a dilemma often leads to the challenge of creating appropriate corporate governance structures for numerous subsidiaries. Study level/applicability The case is intended for MBA courses on corporate governance, business ethics and also for the strategic management courses in the context of multinational corporations. The case can be used to develop an understanding of the essential of corporate governance with special focus on the role of the board of directors, audit committee and external auditors. The case highlights the consequences and cost of poor corporate governance. The case can also be used for highlighting governance challenges in the parent subsidiary relationship for multinational corporations. The case can be used for executive training purposes on corporate governance and leadership with special focus on business ethics. Case overview This case presents the challenges faced by the newly appointed Chairman Noboru Akahane of Ricoh India. In July 2016, Ricoh India, the Indian arm of Japanese firm Ricoh, admitted that the company’s accounts had been falsified and accounting principles violated, leading to a loss of INR 11.23 bn for the financial year 2016. The minority shareholders were agitating against the board of directors of Ricoh India and were also holding the parent company responsible for not safeguarding their interest. Over a period of 18 months, Ricoh India had been in the eye of a storm that involved delayed reporting of financials, auditor red flags regarding accounting irregularities, a forensic audit, suspension of top officials and a police complaint lodged by Ricoh India against its own officials. Akahane needed to ensure continuity of Ricoh India’s business and also act quickly and decisively to manage the crisis and ensure that these incidents did not recur in the future. Expected learning outcomes The case provides an opportunity for students to understand the key components of corporate governance structure and consequences of poor corporate governance. More specifically, the case addresses the following objectives: provide an overview of corporate governance structure; highlight the role of board of directors, audit committee and external auditors; appreciate the rationale behind mandatory auditor rotation; appreciate the consequences of poor corporate structure; explore the interrelationship between sustainability reporting and transparency in financial disclosures of a corporation; understand management and governance of subsidiaries by multinational companies; and understand the response to a crisis situation. Supplementary materials Teaching notes are available for educators only. Please contact your library to gain login details or email [email protected] to request teaching notes. Subject code CSS 11: Strategy.


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