The preventive effect of hedge fund activism: investment, CEO compensation and payout policies

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Heqing Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Managerial Compensation ◽  
Standard Deviation Increase ◽  
Corporate Policy ◽  
Investment Policies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of hedge fund activism (HFA) in preventing corporate policy deviations.Design/methodology/approachThis paper identifies HFA interventions through a hand-collected sample of Schedule 13D filings between 1994 and 2016, and uses mechanical mutual fund fire sales as the instrument variable (IV) for the likelihood of such interventions. Armed with the instrument, this paper estimates firm's distribution, managerial compensation and investment policies in response to a change in the perceived likelihood of HFA interventions.FindingsAn increase in the HFA intervention likelihood leads to increases in shareholder distribution, decreases in CEO pay and investments and increases in operating performance. Compared to the sample average, a one standard deviation increase in the intervention likelihood leads to a 9.29% increase in the firm's payout ratio, a 7.42% decrease in CEO compensation, a 2.67% decrease in capital expenditures and a 4.96% decrease in R&D expenses. These changes are consistent with the threat of intervention curbing managerial empire-building behaviors and improving firm operation. The relationships are causal, significant and robust to a variety of alternative specifications and sample divisions.Originality/valueResults of this paper suggest that as a mechanism for corporate governance, the threat of HFA is effective in preventing corporate policy deviations. They also demonstrate a stronger and broader impact of HFA on corporate policy than previously documented. By showing that HFA is an effective and viable mechanism for corporate governance, this study allows policymakers to make more informed decisions to whether increase hedge fund regulations or not.

Corporate governance and hedge fund activism

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole M. Boyson ◽  
Robert M. Mooradian
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism

scholarly journals Unexpected corporate outcomes from hedge fund activism in Japan

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Buchanan ◽  
Dominic H Chai ◽  
Simon Deakin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Management Effectiveness ◽  
Managerial Decisions ◽  
Country Level ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Market Perception ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

Abstract Hedge fund activism has been identified in the USA as a driver of enduring corporate governance change and market perception. We investigate this claim in an empirical study to see whether activism produced similar results in Japan in four representative areas: management effectiveness, managerial decisions, labour management and market perception. Experience from the USA would predict positive changes at Japanese target companies in these four areas. However, analysis of financial data shows that no enduring changes were apparent in the first three areas, and that market perception was consistently unfavourable. Our findings demonstrate that the same pressures need not produce the same results in different markets. Moreover, while the effects of the global financial crisis should not be ignored, we conclude that the country-level differences in corporate governance identified in the varieties of capitalism literature are robust, at least in the short term.

scholarly journals Can compensation committees effectively mitigate the CEO horizon problem? The role of co-opted directors

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Ruonan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Research And Development ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Horizon Problem ◽  
Accruals Management ◽  
Compensation Committees

Purpose This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011. Findings In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem. Originality/value The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.

Executive options with inflated equity prices

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 266-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linus Wilson ◽  
Yan Wendy Wu
Keyword(s):  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Managerial Compensation ◽  
Equity Prices ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Closed Form Solutions ◽  
Compensation Package ◽  
Applied Game Theory

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to solve the optimal managerial compensation problem when shareholders are either naïvely optimistic or rational. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses applied game theory to derive the optimal CEO compensation package with over optimistic shareholders. Findings – The results suggest that boards of directors should decrease option grants to CEOs when equity is likely to be irrationally overvalued at the date when the CEO's options vest. Research limitations/implications – The implications of the model are consistent with the available empirical evidence. In addition, the model generates new testable predictions about managerial stock price manipulation, the number of options granted, and the magnitude of the options’ strike prices that have not yet been formally tested. Originality/value – This is the only paper to derive closed-form solutions to optimal CEO compensation when shareholders are naïvely optimistic.

The impact of corporate governance on the relationship between earnings management and CEO compensation

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oheneba Assenso-Okofo ◽  
Muhammad Jahangir Ali ◽  
Kamran Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

PurposeThe study examines whether corporate governance moderates the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses 1,800 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2010 and employ multiple regression analyses and other sensitivity tests.FindingsThe study finds a positive relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management. The study’s results also suggest that CEO bonus compensation increases in relation to earnings management and therefore the study infers that managers may become involved in earnings management to increase their compensation. However, the study finds that the relationship is moderated by a strong corporate governance system which reduces the impact of earnings management on CEO compensation.Research limitations/implicationsThe study is conducted in a specific context, and therefore it may be subject to a set of limitations. The study emphasises exclusively on whether executives manage earnings to increase their compensation. The study does not consider the issue of several other and potentially contradictory motivations here.Practical implicationsThe study’s findings highlight potential implications and offer useful propositions for stakeholders, particularly accounting and corporate governance regulators, to consider. The findings offer a basis for the accounting professions to further discuss and improve accounting standards to provide adequate regulations and monitoring to decrease managerial opportunistic behaviours in earnings manipulations. The findings also emphasise the need for appropriately designed CEO compensation packages in such a manner that improves the manager–shareholder alignment and reduces the information asymmetry problem. The results signify that corporate governance plays a vital role in mitigating the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings management.Originality/valueThis study adds to the existing literature by documenting empirical support on the link between earnings management and CEO compensation against a backdrop of high demand for strong corporate governance practices.

Mapping the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation: a multilevel approach

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julija Winschel
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Behavioral Science ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Change Impact ◽  
Research Propositions

Purpose In view of the current climate change emergency and the growing importance of the climate-related accountability of companies, this paper aims to advance a comprehensive understanding of the determinants of carbon-related chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Design/methodology/approach Building on the agency-theoretical perspective on executive compensation and existing work in the fields of management, corporate governance, cultural studies, and behavioral science, this paper derives a multilevel framework of the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation. Findings This paper maps the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation at the societal, organizational, group, and individual levels of analysis. It also provides research propositions on the determinants that can support and challenge the implementation of this instrument of environmental corporate governance. Originality/value In the past literature, the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation have remained largely unexplored. This paper contributes to the academic discussion on environmental corporate governance by showcasing the role of interlinkages among the determinants of carbon-related CEO compensation and the possible countervailing impacts. In view of the complex interdisciplinary nature of climate change impact, this paper encourages businesses practitioners and regulators to intensify their climate change mitigation efforts and delineates the levers at their disposal.

Does corporate governance matter in determining CEO compensation in the publicly listed companies in New Zealand? An empirical investigation

2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna Reddy ◽  
Sazali Abidin ◽  
Linjuan You
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Uk

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010. Design/methodology/approach – Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance. Findings – After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Research limitations/implications – The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis. Practical implications – The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation. Originality/value – Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.

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