Corporate governance of Islamic banks

Author(s):  
Rihab Grassa ◽  
Hamadi Matoussi

Purpose – This paper aims to understand the current governance practices and governance structure of Islamic banks (IBs) in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Southeast Asia countries with the purpose of providing relevant information in guiding the future development of the governance system for IBs. As well, the paper discusses and compares the state of the governance system in GCC countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and Southeast Asia countries (Malaysia and Indonesia). Design/methodology/approach – The study utilizes descriptive analysis approach in extracting and analyzing data collected for 83 IBs observed for the period 2002-2011. The authors test for differences in means and medians of corporate governance attributes between a sample of IBs in GCC countries and another one for Southeast Asia countries. They use selected variables of corporate governance of different governance structures, namely, the ownership structure, the board of directors, the Shariah board and the CEO attributes. Findings – The paper findings argue that there are significant differences and divergence of corporate governance structure of IBs in GCC countries and those in Southeast Asia countries. This position acknowledges that there are shortcomings to the existing governance framework for IBs which needs further improvement and standardization. Practical implications – The paper is a very useful source of information that may provide relevant guidelines in guiding the future development of corporate governance of IBs. As well, the paper provides relevant guidelines for improving regulations and laws covering the governance of IBs. Originality/value – This paper provides fresh data and recent information on the actual corporate governance system in IBs in GCC and Southeast Asia countries. As well, the paper discusses a significant shortage in corporate governance literature of Islamic finance.

Author(s):  
Hana Ajili ◽  
Abdelfettah Bouri

Purpose This paper aims to assess the measurement of the Corporate Governance (CG) quality of Islamic Banks (IBs) and its effect on financial performance. Design/methodology/approach In the applied part of this study, a sample of 44 IBs operating in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were investigated according to information provided by the national central bank websites of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. To measure the governance quality, CG-index was constructed based on three sub-indices which are the Board of Directors (BOD), the Audit Committees (AC) and the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) indices. Findings Findings revealed that CG quality of IBs in GCC countries adhere to 74 per cent of the attributes addressed in the CG-index. The results also showed that IBs in GCC countries valued the effectiveness of SSB much more than the conventional CG mechanisms. Using multiple regression models, findings suggested no statistically significant relation between CG quality and financial performance which would imply that good CG had an insignificant association with high performance in GCC IBs. Originality/value The current paper may serve to assist IBs stakeholders to better understand the CG practices of IBs. In addition, the observed insignificant relation between the quality of CG practices and performance should sensitize the IBs regulators in the GCC countries to the necessity of improving the existing CG requirements.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Srairi ◽  
Khawla Bourkhis ◽  
Asma Houcine

Purpose The motivation of the study is to shed further light on the question of whether the governance structure of Islamic banks (IBs) has an impact on the efficiency and risk of Islamic banks operating in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) after the global financial crisis and during the period 2010–2018. This study aims to examine the extent of governance structure on the efficiency and risk of IBs as the effect of the financial crisis has been less on IBs. In addition, the authors are interested in the GCC region as it represents the hub of Islamic finance. Design/methodology/approach In this study, the authors examine how the banking governance structure affects the risk-taking and performance of IBs in the GCC countries between 2010 and 2018. The authors construct a banking governance index (CGI) composed of sub-indices for the board structure, risk management, transparency and disclosure, audit committee, Sharia supervisory board and investment account holders. Unlike the majority of previous studies, bank performance is measured with technical efficiency scores using a data envelopment analysis and the authors use a comprehensive CGI. Findings The results show that IBs in GCC countries adhere to 54% of the attributes covered in the CGI. The authors also note a lack of disclosure regarding the investment account holders and the audit committee. As well, the results indicate that bank governance is positively associated with risk-taking and bank efficiency. Banking risk is influenced by the Sharia board and risk management while bank efficiency is affected by the characteristics of the board structure and investment account holders. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that has developed a comprehensive governance index for IBs in GCC countries that includes a wide range of governance dimensions. The study contributes to the literature on governance in the banking sector by simultaneously examining its impact on the risk-taking and efficiency of IBs and recognizes the dynamic relation between these three variables for IB.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rihab Grassa

Purpose This paper aims to assess the effects of deposits structure and ownership structure on the GCC Islamic banks’ corporate governance disclosure (CGD) practices. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on a sample of 38 Islamic banks operating in five Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and the authors observed them over the period from 2006 to 2011. The authors used the transparency and disclosure score, developed by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), to identify the sample’s CGD scores. Findings This paper’s findings suggest that the level of CGD is lower for Islamic banks with higher ownership concentration, for levered Islamic banks and for Islamic banks with greater concentration of nonprofit-sharing investment accounts (PSIA) and is higher for Islamic banks with greater concentrations of PSIA; the Islamic bank size; the bank age; listed bank and the country transparency index. By disaggregating the total CGD into the three sub-categories, the authors are able to specify, also, the components of corporate governance (CG) impacted by various determinants. Research limitations/implications This paper is subject to a number of limitations. First, there is manual scoring of annual reports (subjectivity). Second, the research focuses exclusively on the GCC context and excludes the other Middle East, Southeast Asia and Far East countries, where ownership structure and deposits structure might affect CGD differently. Third, the governance score, which is used in this research, is developed by S&P and does not take into account the characteristics of Islamic banks. Practical implications The findings of this paper suggest many policy implications. First, through the optimization of ownership structure, GCC countries’ regulators have to improve the Islamic banking system’s CG mechanisms through the optimization of ownership structure (dispersed ownership) to promote transparency and disclosure. Second, regulators and policymakers should revise guidelines with the main purpose of protecting PSIA’ holders (considered to be minor shareholders without voting power) through promoting disclosure and transparency. Third, the findings can be useful for many international supervisory bodies, like the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), in evaluating transparency and disclosure standards. Originality/value This study is expected to be useful for all market participants, namely, investors, financial analysts, managers, marker regulators and many international Islamic supervisory bodies, such as the IFSB and AAOIFI, by providing new requirements on CGD in the GCC region and in better understanding its determinants for Islamic banks in this region.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 388-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jan de Graaf

Purpose Using the global financial crisis as a critical event and based on institutional theory and stakeholder theory, this paper aims to explore the relationship between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The question is how stakeholders can influence corporate responses to societal change by using their position in the governance structure. Design/methodology/approach The analysis is based on a historical analysis of data collected mainly between 2002 and 2004. The historical perspective enables an understanding of the response of the company to environmental changes. Findings The approach enables researchers to relate the normative component of CSR to specific governance mechanisms. These governance mechanisms are specified in direct and indirect influence pathways. Historical data shed light on how, in the upbeat of the crisis, stakeholders have influenced the principles and policies of the ING Group, a Dutch financial company. Research limitations/implications The paper suggests that stakeholders influence principles – normative assumptions that guide corporate decisions – mainly in dialogue-based meetings (direct influence pathways). Companies are made accountable in indirect influence pathways such as regulations. The author also demonstrates that a historical approach enables an understanding of long-term historical developments and the linking of corporate policies to the normative assumptions of stakeholders. Practical implications If stakeholders wish to assess the social responsibility of a company, then they should assess the governance structure in relation to the principles and policies. The power structure within a company and that within the institutional framework in which the company operates (the governance system) strongly influences how a company executes its social responsibilities. Social implications The paper demonstrates how stakeholders can use the governance structure to influence a bank. If society – or a specific group in society – wants banks to play a different role, this paper points to what could be the levers of change in the governance system and the governance structure. Originality/value Insights into the complex relationship between corporate governance and the processes in which the social responsibilities of a company are developed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 607-638
Author(s):  
Mohd Shukor Harun ◽  
Khaled Hussainey ◽  
Khairul Ayuni Mohd Kharuddin ◽  
Omar Al Farooque

Purpose This study aims to explore the corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) practices of the Islamic banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries during the period 2010-2014 and examines the determinants of CSRD and its effects on firm value. Design/methodology/approach Based on the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions Governance Standard No. 7 guidelines and using content analysis, the paper develops a comprehensive CSRD index for GCC Islamic banks. The study applies ordinary least squares regression analysis for hypothesis testing and for finding determinants of respective dependent variables. Findings The results show a very low level of CSRD among the sample Islamic banks in GCC countries. When using corporate governance characteristics to examine the determinants of CSRD, this study provides evidence of a significant positive association between board size and CSRD practice in Islamic banks and a significant negative relationship of chief executive officer (CEO) duality with CSRD, as per expectation. For the economic consequences of CSRD, the study documents an inverse performance effect of CSRD while board size, board composition and CEO duality indicate significant positive effects on firm value. Research limitations/implications The relatively small sample size of GCC Islamic banks may limit the application of the findings to other Islamic financial institutions such as Takaful and the Islamic unit trust company. Practical implications The findings of this study initiate the global debate on the need for corporate governance reform in Islamic banks by providing insights on the role played by corporate governance mechanisms in encouraging and enhancing CSRD practices among Islamic banks. The findings also have important implications for investors, managers, regulatory bodies, policymakers and Islamic banks in the GCC countries. Social implications The results of the study do not support the idea that Islamic banks operating on Islamic principles can meet their social responsibilities through promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and by differentiating themselves from non-Islamic banks. Originality/value This is the first study to examine the determinants of CSRD in GCC Islamic banks using comprehensive CSRD and corporate governance variables and, therefore, adds value to the existing CSR literature in banking.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 551-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ghada Ben Zeineb ◽  
Sami Mensi

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to determine the simultaneous effect of corporate governance (CG) of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Islamic banks (IBs) on efficiency and risk. Design/methodology/approach The authors include Shariah supervisory board (SSB) size, Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-duality and ownership structure as CG variables. Efficiency and risk are measured using the data envelopment analysis (DEA)/stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and Z-score, respectively. This paper also examines the risk-efficiency relationship. To test the hypotheses, the authors used seemingly unrelated regressions on a sample of 56 GCC IBs during the period 2004-2013. Findings The results indicate that implementing rigorous CG structures correlate with higher efficiency levels. Particularly, the authors show that the governance structure of IBs allows them to take higher risks to achieve a high efficiency level. In addition, results show that bank efficiency and risk are positively related. Practical implications This paper gives some insights to policy makers. It points out detail attention toward the importance of CG in IB that influences the efficiency level and risk-taking behavior. Thus, IB should improve governance procedures that can lead to higher efficiency and survival in a competitive environment and sustain financial crisis. Moreover, the economic conditions of a country are the main determinant of an IB’s efficiency and risk relationships. Originality/value The simultaneous effect of the CG of the GCC IBs on efficiency and risk is examined, taking into consideration different CG proxies, i.e., SSB size, CEO-duality and ownership structure, and different efficiency estimation techniques, i.e., SFA and DEA.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 1377-1402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naji Mansour Nomran ◽  
Razali Haron

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effect of dual board governance structure, i.e. Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB) and board of directors (BoD), on the performance of Islamic banks (IBs) in Southeast Asia region versus banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 45 IBs over seven countries covering the period of 2007-2015 based on the GMM estimator – First Difference (2-step). Findings The findings reveal that SSB and BoD for IBs in both regions are segmented in terms of ROA (negative interaction) and integrated in terms of Zakat ratio (Zakat on equity [ZOE]) (positive interaction) only for Southeast Asia region. Furthermore, SSBs positively affect multi-bank performance in Southeast Asia while its effect is absent for GCC. This suggests that Shari’ah governance practices for IBs in Southeast Asia are stronger compared to GCC IBs. Finally, BoD has a significant association with low ZOE for IBs in both the regions. Research limitations/implications The implications of this research is that the unique agency theory depicted in this study can be inferred when analyzing how dual board structure affects IBs' performance. Practical implications For regulators in both regions, SSBs must be given real power to monitor BoD. They should also balance the number of SSB scholars with experience in Shari’ah, as well as in law, accounting and finance. It is also important that such a balance of scholars with PhD in these areas be required for Southeast Asia IBs. For the GCC’s regulators, CG practices need to be improved by giving due importance to SSB characteristics and BoD structure. Originality/value Though the effects of dual board structure on IBs' performance has been previously examined in the literature, only SSB size has been used as a single proxy of SSB governance. Furthermore, no empirical evidence is recorded to date on this issue in Southeast Asia and the GCC regions. One of the innovations of this paper is the use of multi-bank performance measures in the IBs performance and corporate governance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 1757-1770
Author(s):  
Imene Guermazi

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the two components of market discipline, investment account holder (IAH) monitoring and the consequent reaction of the Islamic banks in GCC countries for the 2004–2013 period, including the recent financial crisis of 2008. Design/methodology/approach We address the research question that Investment Account holders (IAH) in GCC countries suc as Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (UAE) monitor their banks. Regression analysis was used to examine the dependence level of profit-sharing investment account (PSIA) growth rate on bank risk characteristics (CAMEL variables). Then, the reaction of banks by regression influencing CAMEL variables of one-lagged period on PSIA growth rate was verified. Findings The results provide evidence of the first component of market discipline, i.e. the IAH monitoring, in KSA, Bahrain and UAE. The common result to the three countries is that market actors are concerned with accounting information on capital adequacy. However, in UAE, they are also interested in assets performance, whereas they look more at earnings in Bahrain. The results show evidence of the second component in Bahrain; the bank reaction to IAH monitoring and subsequently IAH discipline in Bahrain. Finally, the results do not support any impact of the financial crisis. Research limitations/implications The sample size is small although it is constituted by banks having a sufficient number of observations. Practical implications This study highlights the importance of IAH discipline, which would help prudential bank monitoring by regulators and wealth development for both investors and managers. It should increase the disclosure of relevant information as for the part of effective accountability of Islamic banks’ governance. Originality/value This study contributes to the literature on market discipline by dealing with Islamic banks. It is one of the very few studies to investigate IAH discipline in Islamic banks and the second component of market discipline, i.e. the influence of monitoring on banks.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1073-1090 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ejaz Aslam ◽  
Razali Haron

Purpose Corporate governance plays a significant role to overcome agency issues and develop the culture of transparency and openness. In this context, this paper aims to examine how corporate governance mechanisms affect the performance of Islamic banks (IBs). Design/methodology/approach Stepwise, two-step system generalize method of moment estimation technique is used in the analysis in which control variables are added into the model sequentially. This study used data on 129 IBs from 29 Islamic countries (Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia) during the period of 2008 to 2017. Findings The findings suggest that the audit committee (AUDC) and Shariah board (SB) have positive impact on the performance of IBs (return on assets and return on equity). However, board size and risk management committee have negative and significant effect on the performance of IBs. CEO duality and non-executive directors have mixed relationship with the performance of IBs. These results support the argument that IBs need to improve their financial performance through appropriate governance mechanism. Research limitations/implications The findings of the study added a new dimension to the governance research that could be a valuable source of knowledge for policymakers and regulators to improve the existing governance mechanism for better performance of IBs. Originality/value The study fills the gap in the literature by addressing the issue of corporate governance on performance of IBs across countries. Agency theory is discussed to explain the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and performance.


2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini ◽  
Bruno S. Sergi ◽  
Emiliano Sironi

Purpose – Alternative corporate governance systems (CGSs) have attracted a significant bulk of research recently. While the connection between the adoption of an alternative system (one tier board or two tier board system) and firms’ performances has not been fully analysed yet, the purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies which have turned into an alternative board system have eventually improved their performance over time. Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of more than 15,000 Italian unlisted joint stock companies, the authors compare performance outcomes in 2009 of firms adopting alternative systems with performances of firms that maintained the system in force before the 2003 Corporate Law Reform (defined as “traditional”). Because of the choice of an alternative system (one tier or two tier board) instead of a traditional one is not random, the authors reduce selection bias implementing matching methods and comparing firms that are close in terms of propensity score measured in 2003 (the year before the new CGSs have been introduced by a corporate law reform). Findings – The authors do not find evidence of a significant improvement of performances in 2009 concerning those firms that have adopted a one tier or two tier board systems with respect to those which maintained a traditional one. Originality/value – The novelty of the study concerns the application of propensity score matching for the evaluation of the impact of the change of the CGS that is possible in presence of two conditions that are all verified in our setting: first, to have a country where corporate law allows for choosing among different systems; in this case Italy is a good laboratory, because it allows for the choice among three different systems; and second, to have the opportunity to evaluate the effect of the change in light of a relatively recent “pre-treatment” condition; this is made possible by the fact that before the 2003 Reform of corporate law all the companies had a traditional system.


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