Central African Republic peace deal faces risks

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Central African Republic ◽  
Technical Assistance ◽  
Security Sector Reform ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Armed Violence ◽  
The Government

Subject Outlook for the Central African Republic's peace process. Significance Three months after signing a peace agreement with the country’s main armed groups, President Faustin-Archange Touadera continues to emphasise his commitment to the deal. However, some rebel groups have denounced the government’s concessions as insufficient. For their part, rebels seem more interested in further negotiations than implementing peace. This raises the risks that the flaws in the agreement could become increasingly exposed. Impacts Armed violence will likely continue until the new government is respected by all parties, which may prove challenging to achieve. A sustainable transition to peace will require credible measures for restorative justice, security-sector reform and economic recovery. The government will look to secure more financial and technical assistance from its regional and international partners.

Mozambique party politics may trump national interest

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Security Sector Reform ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government ◽  
Fiscal Pressure ◽  
Broad Consensus

Significance There is broad consensus that security sector reform is necessary, but lingering concern that the government lacks a coherent plan, and will end up being distracted by other issues. Impacts The economic crisis resulting from the debt crisis will continue to put the government under severe fiscal pressure. Small amounts of gas should begin to be exported in 2022, but uncertainty over the timelines for larger projects will persist. Mozambique’s relations with neighbours should continue to improve over the immediate term.

Nigeria poll signals profound political shift

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Support ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Leadership Role ◽  
Security Sector Reform ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Regional Leadership ◽  
The Government ◽  
First Time

Significance This is the first time that an opposition party has won a multi-party election in Nigeria. Popular support has never before trumped the advantages of incumbency which have historically been used to rig or win elections. The impartiality of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the clear margin of victory give a strong and legitimate mandate to the incoming government. Impacts After pulling off a credible election in difficult circumstances, Nigeria may seek to re-assume its moral regional leadership role. The government and armed forces will be given renewed confidence to tackle Boko Haram, possibly with more international support. Policy focus will have similarities (eg electricity and agriculture) but also differences (eg youth employment and security sector reform). Without being hampered by corruption and low public support, the APC should be better placed to deliver.

Central African Republic peace deal needs executing

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Central African Republic ◽  
Technical Assistance ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
African Union ◽  
Humanitarian Relief ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government ◽  
Relief Efforts ◽  
The Eu

Significance The accord, the full contents of which are still not public, differs from previous deals in that it follows the first direct talks between the parties and because the government has reportedly met two key demands of armed groups: amnesty and power-sharing. These are controversial measures, but they may give the deal a greater chance of success than earlier efforts. Impacts If implemented, the peace agreement could facilitate humanitarian relief efforts and lead to gradual economic recovery. The new government should secure additional financial and technical assistance for the transition from the EU, UN and individual states. The actions of the African Union and neighbouring states, particularly Sudan and Chad, will carry more weight than Western partners.

Uganda may struggle to balance security sector tension

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Deadly Force ◽  
Complex Relationship ◽  
Security Sector Reform ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Security Services ◽  
High Profile ◽  
New Guidelines

Subject Security sector reform challenges in Uganda. Significance In October, President Yoweri Museveni issued new guidelines instructing the security services to manage “rioters, terrorists, criminals and looters” firmly -- using deadly force if necessary -- while treating all citizens with the utmost respect. The distinct and quite contradictory tones reflect the president’s complex relationship with the security apparatus, and the effects this has on his political platform. Impacts High-profile prosecutions of former security officials may be perceived as politically motivated rather than reform driven. Pending treason charges against Bobi Wine and others may be a source of rising political tensions. Even deep security sector reforms are unlikely to win Museveni new support among disaffected youth.

Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice after the Arab-Majority Uprisings

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omar Ashour ◽  
Sherif Mohyeldeen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Security Sector Reform ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
The Government ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
The Military

In Chapter 12, Omar Ashour and Sherif Mohyelden examine the linked demands for transitional justice and security sector reform during and after the uprisings in Egypt. They trace the targeting of security and intelligence forces during the uprising, as perpetrators of particular abuses, and the demands in the post-Mubarak period for transitional justice and specific measures of security sector reform. These were initiated in limited ways, such as through fact-finding committees, but further steps were not taken, and following the coup in 2013, the military authorities did not support reform of the sector or transitional justice. Although human rights and transitional justice bodies were established by the government, few substantive steps were taken and the prospects for reform are slim.

Middle East instability will slow security reform

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Arab World ◽  
Transition States ◽  
Political Agenda ◽  
Security Sector Reform ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Conflict Zones ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Arab Uprisings

Subject Security sector reform in the Arab world. Significance Security sector reform (SSR) has gradually dropped down the political agenda of regional governments in recent years. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, it was seen as a top priority for transition states because it had been a key demand of many protesters across the region. However, the subsequent rise in instability in many transition states, and a successful 'counter-revolution' in others, has effectively stalled SSR efforts. Impacts Tunisia and Egypt may make modest efforts to improve the image of the internal security forces in an effort to reduce public anger. Escalating crackdowns and abuses by Arab security services risk stoking militant opposition and recruitment to jihadist groups. Failure to carry out deep SSR will reduce prospects for transition to more representative forms of government. In conflict zones, informal security actors, in particular sectarian and tribal militias, will slow efforts to restore state authority.

Al-Shabaab will entrench its gains in Somalia

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Security Sector Reform ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Content Type

Significance Already on the rise, al-Shabaab now also benefits from rising distraction among its domestic and international opponents, which may prolong efforts to defeat it by many years. Impacts Somali and allied forces may need to revise their overall counterterrorism strategy to account for contracting resources. Even with sustained reforms, it may take years for Somali forces to develop capacity to assume AMISOM’s security responsibilities. Recent splits within the security forces will set security sector reform efforts back significantly.

Sudan coup attempt may reopen political faultlines

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Power Sharing ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Security Sector Reform ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
Coup Attempt

Significance Military and civilian leaders within the current power-sharing government have since accused each other of creating the conditions that prompted the coup, in an escalating confrontation over security sector reform that risks becoming a greater threat to the transition than the coup attempt itself. Impacts The more aggressively the commission established to dismantle the former regime conducts its work, the more the risk of coups will rise. Concrete guarantees of immunity for past crimes could encourage some (but not all) military leaders to consider more serious reforms. Civilian leaders might revive discussions shelved last year about creating a new internal security organ under civilian control.

Hollowing

2021 ◽  
pp. 187-214
Author(s):  
Sharath Srinivasan
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Security Sector Reform ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Security Sector ◽  
Sector Reform ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Civil Politics ◽  
Civic Space

This chapter, ‘Hollowing’, examines how means-end peacemaking may have withering effects on post-agreement political change. Examining politics in northern Sudan after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the chapter explains the role of peacemaking in the institutionalization of authoritarian rule and the constraining of plural civil politics that in turn contributed to Sudan’s ‘unending wars’. Rejecting explanations of contingent events or poor implementation, the chapter argues that this failure may be written into the means of making peace. Foreign-led peacemaking initiatives can become a damaging site of ‘extroverted’ domestic politics that exert a pull on civil political actors yet rebuff them in favor of elite belligerent deals, leaving civil actors enfeebled and cynical right when they are expected to pluralize post-agreement politics. By paying attention to matters of constitutional review, security sector reform, civic space and the elections, this chapter unravels the manner in which the edifice for politics championed by Sudan’s CPA order proved to be a hollow façade.

CAR truth commission may fail to deliver

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Central African Republic ◽  
International Community ◽  
Truth Commission ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Peace Agreement ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government ◽  
Outlying Regions ◽  
Opposition Parties

Subject The Central African Republic's Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission. Significance The Central African Republic (CAR) parliament in late February passed a bill establishing the Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Reparation Commission (TJRRC). The TJRRC is the main justice initiative envisaged under the February 2019 peace agreement between the government and 14 armed groups. However, the TJRRC will face significant political hurdles to delivering on its lofty premise. Impacts It is unlikely that victims will receive reparations without significant technical and financial backing from the international community. Due to its Bangui-centric approach, the TJRRC may neglect abuses committed by the government and armed groups in outlying regions. During the election period, the TJRRC could be employed as a political threat against opposition parties.

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