Sudan coup attempt may reopen political faultlines

Significance Military and civilian leaders within the current power-sharing government have since accused each other of creating the conditions that prompted the coup, in an escalating confrontation over security sector reform that risks becoming a greater threat to the transition than the coup attempt itself. Impacts The more aggressively the commission established to dismantle the former regime conducts its work, the more the risk of coups will rise. Concrete guarantees of immunity for past crimes could encourage some (but not all) military leaders to consider more serious reforms. Civilian leaders might revive discussions shelved last year about creating a new internal security organ under civilian control.

Subject Security sector reform in the Arab world. Significance Security sector reform (SSR) has gradually dropped down the political agenda of regional governments in recent years. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, it was seen as a top priority for transition states because it had been a key demand of many protesters across the region. However, the subsequent rise in instability in many transition states, and a successful 'counter-revolution' in others, has effectively stalled SSR efforts. Impacts Tunisia and Egypt may make modest efforts to improve the image of the internal security forces in an effort to reduce public anger. Escalating crackdowns and abuses by Arab security services risk stoking militant opposition and recruitment to jihadist groups. Failure to carry out deep SSR will reduce prospects for transition to more representative forms of government. In conflict zones, informal security actors, in particular sectarian and tribal militias, will slow efforts to restore state authority.


Significance There is broad consensus that security sector reform is necessary, but lingering concern that the government lacks a coherent plan, and will end up being distracted by other issues. Impacts The economic crisis resulting from the debt crisis will continue to put the government under severe fiscal pressure. Small amounts of gas should begin to be exported in 2022, but uncertainty over the timelines for larger projects will persist. Mozambique’s relations with neighbours should continue to improve over the immediate term.


Subject Security sector reform challenges in Uganda. Significance In October, President Yoweri Museveni issued new guidelines instructing the security services to manage “rioters, terrorists, criminals and looters” firmly -- using deadly force if necessary -- while treating all citizens with the utmost respect. The distinct and quite contradictory tones reflect the president’s complex relationship with the security apparatus, and the effects this has on his political platform. Impacts High-profile prosecutions of former security officials may be perceived as politically motivated rather than reform driven. Pending treason charges against Bobi Wine and others may be a source of rising political tensions. Even deep security sector reforms are unlikely to win Museveni new support among disaffected youth.


Subject Outlook for the Central African Republic's peace process. Significance Three months after signing a peace agreement with the country’s main armed groups, President Faustin-Archange Touadera continues to emphasise his commitment to the deal. However, some rebel groups have denounced the government’s concessions as insufficient. For their part, rebels seem more interested in further negotiations than implementing peace. This raises the risks that the flaws in the agreement could become increasingly exposed. Impacts Armed violence will likely continue until the new government is respected by all parties, which may prove challenging to achieve. A sustainable transition to peace will require credible measures for restorative justice, security-sector reform and economic recovery. The government will look to secure more financial and technical assistance from its regional and international partners.


Author(s):  
Alexander Noyes

This chapter discusses the elements that influenced and constrained Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Zimbabwe during the country’s 2009 to 2013 power-sharing government period. The chapter argues that the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front’s (ZANU-PF) historically rooted symbiotic links with the security sector and the regional solidarity politics of ZANU-PF’s ruling fellow African liberation struggle parties, greatly undermined SSR in Zimbabwe. Thabo Mbeki, of South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC), an ostensibly ‘neutral’ mediator between ZANU-PF and opposition parties in the power-sharing talks, negotiated an agreement that lacked precise detail on the nature of SSR and how its implementation would be enforced. Coupled with ZANU-PF’s obstruction of attempts to delink the party from the security sector, and opposition parties’ lack of expertise in SSR issues and diplomacy, SSR faltered. The chapter further argues that in the absence of SSR, ZANU-PF was able to use the security sector to out-manoeuvre opposition parties in the power-sharing government and win the 2013 elections decisively. The failure of SSR in the power-sharing phase has had powerful consequences for civil–military relations after 2013. The security sector’s influence on politics mounted, culminating in the military staging a coup against president Robert Mugabe in 2017, which heightened the military’s political influence.


Significance This is the first time that an opposition party has won a multi-party election in Nigeria. Popular support has never before trumped the advantages of incumbency which have historically been used to rig or win elections. The impartiality of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the clear margin of victory give a strong and legitimate mandate to the incoming government. Impacts After pulling off a credible election in difficult circumstances, Nigeria may seek to re-assume its moral regional leadership role. The government and armed forces will be given renewed confidence to tackle Boko Haram, possibly with more international support. Policy focus will have similarities (eg electricity and agriculture) but also differences (eg youth employment and security sector reform). Without being hampered by corruption and low public support, the APC should be better placed to deliver.


Significance The response underlines the military's continued internal security role but, given that the restive areas are home to large Rohingya populations, also highlights residual political sensitivity about the military's position and the importance of effective government-military relations. Impacts An immediate trigger for civil-military frictions could be a breakdown in peace negotiations with ethnic minority groups. The government will struggle to convince military leaders that wide concessions to armed ethnic groups are needed. Centralisation of power within the NLD will hamper junior civilian leaders gaining experience of working with the military. In time, the military's economic influence will be politically problematic for the NLD.


Significance Already on the rise, al-Shabaab now also benefits from rising distraction among its domestic and international opponents, which may prolong efforts to defeat it by many years. Impacts Somali and allied forces may need to revise their overall counterterrorism strategy to account for contracting resources. Even with sustained reforms, it may take years for Somali forces to develop capacity to assume AMISOM’s security responsibilities. Recent splits within the security forces will set security sector reform efforts back significantly.


Subject The role of the military in Sudan's transition. Significance Sudan now has a nominally civilian-led transitional government, but the military forces that ousted former President Omar al-Bashir remain highly placed within those structures. In particular, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Lieutenant-General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ‘Himedti’ of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have transitioned smoothly from being the head and deputy head, respectively, of the Transitional Military Council to the same roles in the new Sovereign Council, and look likely to wield considerable influence over Sudan’s transition. Impacts Economic and political reform challenges, rather than security sector reform, will preoccupy the cabinet’s attention. Public dissatisfaction about lack of improvements will be directed mainly at the cabinet. While there will be some frictions and rivalries between SAF and the RSF, they are unlikely to turn against each other for now.


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