Spain’s struggling multi-party system is here to stay

Subject Spain's party system. Significance As Spain heads towards its fourth general election in four years (in November), a fragmented party system has failed to live up to expectations. New parties -- Ciudadanos, Unidas Podemos and Vox -- are not burdened by old, often corrupt party structures, but with notable exceptions at regional and local level they have been unable to contribute positively to central government formation. Impacts Political discourse will become increasingly acrimonious due to mistrust and some ill feeling among party leaders. Devising policy and a vision for Spain's future will be hampered by arguments over who is to blame for the current situation. Such risks to socioeconomic stability as unemployment, healthcare and pensions sustainability will remain largely unattended to.

Subject Political contention between central and local government. Significance The central government has identified a set of reforms to address China's structural economic and social problems, but it faces a challenge ensuring compliance. Even if the Xi administration manages to silence political opponents in the top echelons, a greater challenge lies on the front line of policy implementation, at the county and township levels where silent non-implementation and policy distortion threaten the outcome of the reforms. Impacts Beijing has limited capacity to monitor local cadres; major progress is likely only on reforms singled out as national priorities. Political and administrative reforms and environmental policies have the brightest prospects for local implementation. Financial reform, wealth redistribution and marketisation of local-level state-owned enterprises will be more challenging.


Subject The Local Administration Draft Law. Significance A new Local Administration Draft Law is currently being discussed in parliament to replace the existing legislation, dating from 1979. The capacity of local government to carry out various developmental functions has long been undermined by the centralised political and fiscal system. The new law, however, aims to give broader powers to subnational authorities. The law is meant to pave the way for local elections, scheduled for the first quarter of 2019. Impacts The central government will use local elections to boost its popularity and demonstrate commitment to democratic reform. The application of the new law will increase competition among local government units to attract private investment. The local economy will grow in areas where councillors can ease the process of doing business and decrease bureaucracy. More job opportunities will be created at the local level.


2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 112-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Su Maddock

PurposeTurbulent times are here to stay and public leadership needs to become less managerial, more adept at harnessing resources and transforming governance. While the media continues to search for heroic leaders there is a growing awareness that there is more to public leadership than charisma and that compliant leaders do little to nurture innovation. The purpose of this paper is to address the varying concepts of leadership within public services in the UK.Design/methodology/approachThis paper addresses the varying concepts of leadership within public services in the UK and offers a comparative discussion on these choices of types of leadership.FindingsEvidence shows that successful public leaders tend to motivated by social values rather than money and that in the UK, transformative leadership is stronger at the local level than in central government, where although embryonic, political and executive leaders are forging platforms for innovation and new governance systems that central governments could learn from.Originality/valueThere are examples of exemplary public leadership in the UK and this paper attempts to unpack where these are, how they challenge existing leadership thinking and why new forms of leadership are critical at this time.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali T. Akarca ◽  
Aysit Tansel

Purpose – Two major earthquakes which struck Northwestern Turkey in 1999 exposed rampant corruption involving construction and zoning code violations. The government’s relief efforts were tainted by corruption as well, and exhibited a great deal of incompetence. How voters responded to these in the next election held in 2002 is investigated. The fact that different group of parties were responsible for the construction of the shoddy buildings, and for the corruption and mismanagement related to relief, provided us with a unique opportunity to determine whether and how the electorate punished the culprits for each of these. The purpose of this paper is to shed light also on the new party system which emerged in Turkey after 2002. Design/methodology/approach – Vote equations are estimated for the seven major political parties. These are fitted to cross-provincial data individually, using ordinary least squares and robust regression methods, and as a system, using seemingly unrelated regressions procedures. The same picture emerges from each of these methods. Findings – Not just those ruling at the time of the earthquakes, but also other parties which were in power when the substandard buildings, were built were held accountable by the electorate. Furthermore, the Turkish voters appear to have allocated the blame rationally, taking into consideration the division of labor in the central government, and the relative influences the parties had on local administrations. Reaction of the voters to government incompetence and corruption was one of the factors which resulted in the emergence of a new party system. In 2002, the AKP, established only a year before, captured almost all of the far-right Islamist, about half of the far-right nationalist, and more than half of the center-right votes in 2002. Originality/value – Corruption usually makes little difference in the fortunes of politicians. Some recent studies suggest that it takes more than just exposure of corruption to get the voters to react. Politicians pay a significant price only when the corruption touches all political parties across the board, is not accompanied by good governance, and competent non-corrupt alternatives are available. The results provide support for this assertion from the natural experiment that has taken place in Turkey.


Subject The negative consequences of policy centralisation in China. Significance Policy experimentation at the local level has played a key role in China’s economic reforms and the Communist Party’s regime durability. However, it has decreased significantly under President Xi Jinping, due largely to a recentralisation of political power and the ongoing anti-corruption campaign. Impacts Individual policymakers will still implement policies tailored to the local environment and potentially contradictory to central directives. Local officials will be inclined to conceal innovative policies and solutions from the central government. Despite centralisation, foreign organisations are most likely to succeed in China if they engage at the local level.


Significance Recent developments suggest that policymakers are happy with slower investment growth, but worry about the possibility of an abrupt slowdown in lending and the risk that household consumption will not yet be able to pick up the slack as investment slows. Impacts The central government will struggle to control spending at the local level. Policymakers will find it difficult to channel capital towards health, education and housing as urbanisation and development targets demand. If deflationary pressure from oil prices and overcapacity feeds through this will drive up the real cost of credit. Without further liberalisation of interest rates, funding future investment is likely to become more costly. Fast-tracking projects in industrial sectors where capital expenditure is weakening may risk inefficient investment.


Significance A second phase will now begin, in which the government will review and reform the system based on assessments of its successes and shortcomings so far. Impacts The central government will play a stronger role in dictating limits to the SCS at the local level. There will be greater protections for personal and corporate data, and greater institutional accountability. There will be some regional and local variation, which businesses need to take into account in their compliance strategies. The SCS may also assist businesses in due diligence, hiring and other operational decisions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Savage

Party systems provide the essential structure of the coalition bargaining environment. Stability in party systems ensures the presence of regularities that can be observed in government formation, but most empirical research focuses on established democracies. In new democracies, party systems are less institutionalized, which means that interactions between parties can be unpredictable and has significant implications for coalition formation. This article presents the first study of coalition formation in new democracies that employs an empirical design comparable to that of the leading research on Western Europe. The author uses a new data set of potential coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe to examine three explanations for government formation that arise when party systems are weakly institutionalized. The results show first that incumbency is a disadvantage for governments in new democracies when formation occurs postelection. This disadvantage is due to high levels of electoral volatility caused by policy failure and clientelistic practices. Incumbents are advantaged when formation takes place midterm, as weak party system institutionalization leads to an inchoate pattern of interaction between opposition parties, which therefore fail to provide a viable alternative. Second, the presence of former dominant parties influences government formation by stifling the development of programmatic competition. Instead, programmatic competition is subjugated to contestation based on historical enmities. And third, established parties collude to exclude new parties from coalition formation—a possible indicator that a party system is becoming more institutionalized. The article provides new insights into the importance of routinized and stable political practices and institutions.


Author(s):  
Michael Laver ◽  
Ernest Sergenti

This chapter extends the survival-of-the-fittest evolutionary environment to consider the possibility that new political parties, when they first come into existence, do not pick decision rules at random but instead choose rules that have a track record of past success. This is done by adding replicator-mutator dynamics to the model, according to which the probability that each rule is selected by a new party is an evolving but noisy function of that rule's past performance. Estimating characteristic outputs when this type of positive feedback enters the dynamic model creates new methodological challenges. The simulation results show that it is very rare for one decision rule to drive out all others over the long run. While the diversity of decision rules used by party leaders is drastically reduced with such positive feedback in the party system, and while some particular decision rule is typically prominent over a certain period of time, party systems in which party leaders use different decision rules are sustained over substantial periods.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mindaugas Jurkynas

AbstractThe article discusses conceptualisation of populism, Lithuania’s party system and electoral dynamics and their relation to the sustainability of populist parties. Special attention is given to Party Order and Justice, a former populist and protest party, and its leadership, namely to the issues related to scope and competencies of a leader’s intra-partisan power, leadership selection rules and history, development of leaders’ political careers and their electoral activity. The L ithuanian party system now exhibits moderate fragmentation without centrifugal tendencies. Voter volatility is still relatively high, yet the share of new parties has dropped to zero. The protest and populist parties in Lithuania went into the margins of political establishment. Popularity of the Order and Justice party has long been connected to the formerly impeached president Rolandas Paksas. His long-term leadership in the face of plummeting electoral support and an emphasis on his political martyrdom resulted in poor electoral performances, ensuing internal squabbles and his departure. Party Order and Justice’s internal regulations, however, remained favourable to strong leadership.


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