Disinformation fuels South-east Asian censorship risks

Significance A Thai court blocked the order on August 6, but the government is expected to push back forcefully. This comes as South-east Asian governments struggle to contain disinformation on COVID-19, which is fuelling vaccine hesitancy and thwarting attempts to contain the virus. Impacts Forthcoming elections in some of the region's countries will boost the use of disinformation. Rising support for Western over Chinese vaccines will fuel anti-China sentiment online and possibly violence against ethnic Chinese. Disinformation on COVID-19 by Islamic State and local jihadists, particularly in Indonesia, raises the risk of terrorist attacks.

Subject Islamic State threat. Significance Over the last year, Islamic State group (ISG) has expanded its presence in Indonesia. The government estimates that at least 56 Indonesians joined ISG in Iraq and Syria in mid-2014 -- a figure that may have reached 500 by end-2014. Of these, at least 200 are estimated to have returned, with some believed to be planning attacks in Indonesia. Despite the somewhat equivocal stance of national and local authorities on secularism, the threat posed by ISG to security is taken seriously. Impacts Social media and legitimate religious networks are the top two avenues for ISG recruitment in Indonesia and the broader region. Financial institutions, state buildings and tourist destinations are likely targets for terrorist attacks. Inter-regional intelligence cooperation on tackling ISG networks is likely to intensify. South-east Asian countries will seek greater US counterterrorism support. Civil society calls for a clearer state position on secularism will intensify, but they may go unheeded.


Significance This places two-thirds of Ukrainian regions under the most stringent COVID-19 restrictions. In its second pandemic autumn, Ukraine is performing poorly because this year's vaccination programme has been slow to pick up, until a recent acceleration prompted by tougher restrictions. Vaccine hesitancy has been compounded by a scandal involving fake certificates. Impacts The government will blame the COVID-19 surge for poor macroeconomic performance. President Zelensky's standing will be largely unaffected, as responsibility for restrictions is mostly devolved to regions. COVID-19 will not sideline the many challenges facing the government, currently reflected in an emerging cabinet reshuffle.


Author(s):  
Beng Huat Chua

The emergence of East Asian Pop Culture as an integrated regional media cultural economy is a result of the penetration of Japanese and Korean pop cultures into the historically well established distribution and exhibition networks of Chinese languages pop culture in locations where ethnic-Chinese constitutes the majority population; namely, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the People’s Republic of China and Singapore. Regionalization has produced transnational and transcultural audience communities of different scale in different reception locations, from those looking merely to be entertained to conventional fan clubs to sub-fan community who translates and subtitles foreign programs for free distribution on the Internet, bypassing state censorship and circuits of profit for the producers. In regional political economy, pop culture has become both a vehicle of transnational collaboration for co-production and market expansion and an instrument of competition in soft power diplomacy, which aims to produce positive sentiments towards the exporting nation among the target audiences. The exporting nation’s achievement in engendering such positive influence is limited by the fragmented nature of the audiences who respond differently to the same products; by backlash from local mobilization against ‘foreign cultural invasion’ in ‘defence’ of the national culture, among the non-consumers in the target location and, finally, by the government of the PRC, the largest consuming country, to control the flow of import, restrict exhibition time and encourage co-production which enables it to shape the content of the co-produced programs.


Significance The process looks in danger. Serious local conflicts in south-eastern Turkey are straining tensions between Kurds and the government, even though guerrilla warfare has not resumed. Kurdish self-confidence is rising because of its fighters' success in expelling Islamic State group (ISG) from Kobani. However, dialogue between the government and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan continues, and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu seems more sensitive to Kurdish aspirations than his predecessors. Impacts Ocalan's leadership of the PKK is unshakable, but his ability to persuade his followers to avoid clashes on the streets is weakening. The conflict between the Kurds and Islamists inside Turkey will grow. Public opinion, including conservative religious elements, will block significant concessions to the Kurds, limiting the government's scope. The Kurds are emerging as a key regional opponent of Islamist politics.


Significance The June 26 suicide attack inside the Imam al-Sadiq Mosque killed 27 people and was Kuwait's worst terrorist attack in over three decades. The attack, claimed by Islamic State group (ISG) and carried out by a Saudi citizen, was intended to inflame sectarian tensions that have spiralled in recent years. US officials have long identified Kuwait as an epicentre of funding and other forms of materiel assistance for participants in the Syrian civil war. However, unlike Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where support largely has flowed in one direction toward Sunni rebel groups, Kuwaitis have provided high-profile support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. Impacts The government will use the attack to reinforce its narrative that the bidun constitute a security threat rather than a human rights issue. Initial solidarity among Kuwait Sunni and Shia could dissipate quickly into political wrangling over the government's response. Kuwaiti salafi aid will boost hardline Islamist rebel groups in Syria. Key commercial and business interests, and oil installations are unlikely to be affected seriously by the rising terrorist threat. Reinforced security measures will further restrict political freedoms in the GCC's most open state.


Significance The fate of the deeply divisive General Khalifa Haftar is a key -- if not main -- obstacle to the HoR approving the GNA, a step which is essential to efforts to finding a sustainable solution to Libya's almost two-year-old civil war. Impacts Several army commanders in east and west Libya distrust Haftar and will not take orders from him. If he keeps his position, this will hinder efforts to unify Libya's divided armed factions against Islamic State. If he stays in Libya, Haftar would likely continue to challenge the government, even if the GNA is approved.


Subject Lone-actor terrorist motivations. Significance Recent lone-actor terrorist attacks in Orlando, Nice, Munich and elsewhere have made this threat salient for the public and policymakers alike. The number of lone-actor attacks has almost trebled since 1990 -- from a base rate of 5-6 per year, according to recent research. Yet the authorities find these types of attacks difficult to detect and disrupt ahead of time. Impacts Lone-actor attacks are likely to recur in the West while authorities struggle to respond. Islamic State group (ISG)-inspired lone-actor attacks may incentivise far-right lone actors to respond violently and vice-versa. The rise of encrypted messaging services and the dark net will fuel the debate around policing this problem without curbing free speech.


Significance The bill's declared purpose is to prevent the import of foreign ideologies and to give law enforcement wider authority, in particular for 'special' security operations, arrests and searches. Its origins lie not in recent events in Nardaran but the destabilisation of the Middle East after the 'Arab spring', the chair of the parliamentary committee on religious organisations and public associations, Siyavush Novruzov, said. The secular regime sees a rising threat in radical Islam, represented by both Islamic State group (ISG) and a multitude of smaller groups. Impacts The government will strive for socioeconomic stability at all costs, expanding benefits and using the State Oil Fund's substantial reserves. The deteriorating regional security situation may undercut Azerbaijan's strategy of becoming a prime supplier of gas to Turkey and the EU. Baku will become more tempted to use anti-terrorism and anti-extremism as a political weapon against the domestic non-religious opposition. Azerbaijan's Shia form 75% of its Muslims, who form 97% of the population.


Subject Online radicalisation. Significance On May 25, the Indonesian parliament unanimously passed stringent anti-terrorism laws allowing the military to be directly involved in counterterrorism operations. The vote followed a string of suicide bombings attributed to local jihadist networks that have pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS). Jakarta joins other South-east Asian governments -- notably those of Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore -- in attempting to counter a new push in the region by IS, as it loses territory in Iraq and Syria. Impacts Rising anti-Shia sentiment in the region, a by-product of increased Saudi influence, will likely give IS new issues to exploit. The Rohingya crisis gives IS a regional boost, especially in terms of operations in Myanmar and more likely in Yangon than Rakhine State. Non-ideological, low-wage overseas workers, particularly from the Philippines and Indonesia, are most susceptible to IS.


Significance The Kurdish referendum has complicated Abadi’s efforts to win reselection after provincial and national elections, expected in April 2018. Abadi -- an Arab Shia -- is vying for voters within a fractured Shia constituency. The referendum, which could break up the country, is deeply unpopular among the Shia base; Abadi, however, needs an alliance with the Kurds to confront Shia political rivals. Impacts The referendum is likely to go ahead, and could prove a flashpoint. Iraq will boost diplomatic engagement with Washington, Riyadh and Ankara. Mainstream Shia parties will work together to limit the rise of Shia militia leaders. A sharp increase in IS terrorist attacks could undermine faith in the government.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document