Sudan’s junta may exploit centre-periphery tensions

Significance Nevertheless, Sudan’s military has been able to retain some partnerships, notably with groups representing constituencies from the periphery, which offer it a potentially crucial alternative support base. Impacts Recent unrest in Darfur could provide an early test of how the regime can manage local tensions that map onto cleavages in its own ranks. Ultimatums from Western governments based on binary civil-military framings may polarise positions by pressuring groups to pick sides. Pressure for military integration risks institutionalising factionalism among armed groups within the security forces.

Significance The fight has been hampered by the contest between the GNA and two rival administrations -- the now-sidelined Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) and the eastern, Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). Some armed groups support the rival administrations, but others are outside their control and are pursuing their own agendas. Impacts International diplomatic pressure for an agreement between the GNA and Haftar may grow. However, progress on security will hinge on developing and implementing a single framework for national and local security forces. Meanwhile, sporadic attacks against political targets will be a risk in Tripoli and other cities. Disruptions in oil and gas production are likely, even after restarts.


Significance Although a ceasefire has been in place since October 2020, very little has been done during that time to integrate or demobilise the many armed forces and groups that exist across the country. The obstacles are formidable. Impacts Significant demobilisation and reintegration will not happen in the near term. Local security will continue to rest on fragile political and financial arrangements between armed groups and governing authorities. The current high levels of oil and gas revenue will tend to discourage unrest.


Significance The closure of border crossings since March 2020 has fuelled violent competition for control of lucrative informal crossings (trochas) and frontier towns. However, the Venezuelan military is ill-prepared to deal with the expanding presence of Colombia’s irregular armed groups. Recent incursions highlight weaknesses in the Venezuelan armed forces, which have suffered casualties. Impacts The penetration of organised crime groups into Venezuela’s disintegrating state and economy will continue to intensify. Organised criminal violence coupled with the violence of military operations will fuel displacement, COVID and civilian casualties. A speedy, negotiated solution to Venezuela’s political impasse is needed to preclude fusion with Colombia’s own protracted insurgency.


2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan McCargo

Thailand's ‘southern border provinces’ of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat – along with four districts of neighbouring Songkhla – are the site of fiery political violence characterised by daily killings. The area was historically a Malay sultanate, and was only loosely under Thai suzerainty until the early twentieth century. During the twentieth century there was periodic resistance to Bangkok's attempts to suppress local identity and to incorporate this largely Malay-speaking, Muslim-majority area into a predominantly Buddhist nation-state. This resistance proved most intense during the 1960s and 1970s, when various armed groups (notably PULO [Patani United Liberation Organization] and BRN [Barisan Revolusi Nasional]) waged war on the Thai state, primarily targeting government officials and the security forces. In the early 1980s, the Prem Tinsulanond government brokered a deal with these armed groups and proceeded to co-opt the Malay-Muslim elite. By crafting mutually beneficial governance, security and financial arrangements, the Thai state was able largely to placate local political demands.


Significance The government claims opposition factions linked to Guaido are behind the upsurge of ‘GEDO’ violence (Grupo Estructurado de Delincuencia Organizada, or Structured Organised Crime Group). Efforts by security forces to ‘stabilise’ GEDO-dominated communities may portend an upsurge in state violence. Impacts The Haitian president’s killing has strengthened the government narrative of externally orchestrated mercenary warfare. Concerns about state decomposition in Venezuela will add urgency to international efforts at successful dialogue. An already weakened Guaido is on the back foot following Guevara’s arrest and lacks the authority to enforce any negotiated outcomes.


Significance The region’s main challenges include lack of money and personnel, corruption, large geographies, escalating violent conflict and abuses by security forces -- deeply rooted problems that have no easy solutions. Impacts Although COVID-19’s public health impact has been less severe than seemed likely, the economic effects will compound other problems. Mali's transition back to a constitutional government (after an August 2020 coup) is unlikely to address deep governance challenges. Political continuity elsewhere in the region means imaginative new policies to improve governance do not appear to be in the offing.


Significance These have long been matters of serious concern. President Cyril Ramaphosa on August 5 responded with a cabinet reshuffle that replaced the minister of defence, closed down the ministry of state security and moved intelligence agencies into the presidency. Impacts Planned cuts to security force budgets will be politically unsustainable. Ramaphosa’s decision to retain Minister of Police Bheki Cele in post casts doubt on the prospects of much-needed police reform. Incorporating intelligence functions into the presidency may speed reforms but also poses long-term dangers of more abuses.


Significance The outcomes of these meetings may indicate the dynamics of external states' future behaviour, which will shape domestic developments until elections are held on December 24. Impacts Turkish investment in Libya will increase, strengthening Ankara’s foothold. Greece and Egypt will be most affected by Turkish dominance in Libya and both will seek to undermine any status quo that supports it. The new government will rely on oil money to secure support from the various armed groups and constituencies. Investment in the oil industry will rise as government provides support to repair and upgrade infrastructure and increase output.


Significance His nomination to run for yet another term met large protests in major towns including N'Djamena, where fighting broke out with security forces leading to arrests. In the last three years, Chad’s security and humanitarian situations have deteriorated as Deby battles escalating jihadist violence in the Sahel and the Lake Chad region, growing discontent from diverse interest groups and pressing humanitarian needs across the country. Impacts Chad and other G5 Sahel countries will seek an extension to the G20’s debt moratorium to help improve their precarious fiscal situation. The G5 Sahel will pursue expansion, potentially to include Ivory Coast and Senegal, in a bid to boost troop strength. Aid agencies will intensify their appeal for funds to help over 12 million people in need before the onset of the rainy period in June.


Significance Instability in Libya has exacerbated an already fraught security environment in the Maghreb and the Sahel. Several militant groups co-exist in these parts, usually in competition with each other. The Islamic State group (ISG) has taken centre stage, but despite high profile attacks in Libya, it has failed to establish a foothold in other Maghreb countries. Impacts ISG encroachment in Libya will strengthen calls for international action to address Libya's crisis. Sporadic attacks are expected against security forces and government targets in Tunisia and Algeria. Government pressure and expanded counterterrorism operations could cause more widespread abuses of human rights. Fighters returning from jihad in Syria and Iraq could bolster the capabilities of local jihadist cells.


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