Chapter 12 China's Growing Participation in Preferential Trade Agreements: Implications for China and Its Trading Partners

2010 ◽  
pp. 357-378
Author(s):  
Robert Scollay ◽  
John Gilbert
Keyword(s):  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Trading Partners

Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements: An Empirical Analysis

2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S Magee
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
The Political ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Regional Agreements

Abstract This paper provides one of the first assessments of the hypothesis that two countries are more likely to form a preferential trade agreement (PTA) if they are already major trading partners. The paper also tests a number of predictions from the political economy literature about which countries are expected to form regional agreements. The results show that countries are more likely to be preferential trading partners if they have significant bilateral trade, are similar in size, and are both democracies. Finally, the paper measures the effect of preferential agreements on trade volumes while, unlike previous studies, treating PTA formation as endogenous.

Dial PTAs for Peace: The Influence of Preferential Trade Agreements on Litigation between Trading Partners

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petros C. Mavroidis ◽  
André Sapir
Keyword(s):  
Inverse Correlation ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Atlantic Trade ◽  
Policy Tool ◽  
The Us ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
The Eu

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are en vogue both as policy tool, as well as research subject. We do not beg to differ. In this paper, inspired by the in-going negotiations between the EU (European Union) and the US (United States) on the TTIP (Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), we ask whether the conclusion of the agreement will, among other things, signal fewer disputes between the two partners before the WTO. This could happen either because there will be a forum diversion (litigate before the bilateral forum with the same or different intensity), or because differences of opinion will be addressed in extra-judicial manner. Our prediction is that, judging from past behaviour, e.g. the amount of litigation between the EU and the US with their preferential partners before and after they had signed an agreement with them, it is quite likely that they will litigate less against each other before the WTO. Without assigning causal relationship to the signature of a bilateral agreement and the amount of litigation between preferential partners, we show that there is inverse correlation between the two. It remains to be seen whether the WTO will profit or suffer from the likelihood of fewer disputes between the two largest trading partners.    

Nondiscrimination and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards

2003 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHAD P. BOWN ◽  
RACHEL McCULLOCH
Keyword(s):  
Developing Country ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Fundamental Principle ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Most Favored Nation ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Safeguard Measures ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Trading Partners

Most-favored-nation treatment, i.e., nondiscrimination among trading partners, is a fundamental principle of the GATT/WTO system. The WTO Agreement on Safeguards has thus been seen as encouraging use of a preferred form of contingent protection relative to antidumping and other inherently discriminatory measures. In practice, however, safeguard protection may also incorporate discriminatory elements. This paper focuses on three ways that policies conforming to the Agreement on Safeguards may nonetheless discriminate explicitly or implicitly among trading partners. First, the form of the safeguard policy matters: quantitative restrictions discriminate among foreign suppliers by preserving historical market shares more than a safeguard implemented as a tariff. Second, safeguard measures discriminate against faster-growing exporters and new entrants in import markets. Third, formal exemptions for partners in preferential trade agreements and for small developing-country suppliers allow these countries to gain market share at the expense of non-exempted exporters. We provide evidence of these discriminatory effects in actual cases of safeguard protection.

Natural Trading Partners? A Public Opinion Perspective on Preferential Trade Agreements

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
VVctor Umaaa ◽  
Thomas Bernauer ◽  
Gabriele Spilker
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Trading Partners

Subsidies Regulation Beyond the WTO

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonardo Borlini
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Bilateral Agreements ◽  
Negative Function ◽  
Public Aid ◽  
The Eu

An increasingly important aspect of EU trade policy since the lifting of its self-imposed moratorium on preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has been the inclusion of WTO+ provisions on subsidies in bilateral agreements negotiated with a number of third countries. This article covers the main bilateral PTAs negotiated after the publication of the Commission’s Communication on ‘Global Europe’ in order to explore the implications of the different subsidy disciplines they set out. It also discusses the questions that arise when examining the legal discipline of public aid provided by such agreements, regarding not only the substantive appropriateness of standards and rules on compatibility, but also the procedural mechanisms designed to guarantee the implementation and the enforcement of such rules. It concludes that the most advanced among the EU PTAs are shaped as competition regulation and go beyond a mere negative function, ensuring that subsidies can contribute to fundamental public goals.

Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States

2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 896-914 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuno Limão
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Trade Liberalization ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
The United States ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Detailed Data ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
Multilateral Trade ◽  
Multilateral Trade Liberalization ◽  
Tariff Reductions

Most countries are members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The effect of these agreements has attracted much interest and raised the question of whether PTAs promote or slow multilateral trade liberalization, i.e., whether they are a “building block” or “stumbling block” to multilateral liberalization. Despite this long-standing concern with PTAs and the lack of theoretical consensus, there is no systematic evidence on whether they are actually a stumbling block to multilateral liberalization. We use detailed data on U.S. multilateral tariffs to provide the first systematic evidence that the direct effect of PTAs was to generate a stumbling block to its MTL. We also provide evidence of reciprocity in multilateral tariff reductions.

The Ties between the World Trade Organization and Preferential Trade Agreements: A Textual Analysis

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd Allee ◽  
Manfred Elsig ◽  
Andrew Lugg
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Textual Analysis ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade Agreements ◽  
Preferential Trade ◽  
The World
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document