Rating Agencies as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Power and Trust Production in Debt Capital Markets

Author(s):  
Clea Bourne
Think India ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
Hitesh Shukla ◽  
Nailesh Limbasiya

Growth, progress, and prosperity of any country depend highly on the corporate governance mechanism of that country. Good governance of a country helps it to sustainable growth and consistency in progress. The good governance should contribute towards the improvement in transparency, ethics, morality, and disclosure. The principles of good governance stand on honesty, trust, integrity, openness, and performance orientation. Our honorable Prime Minister Narendra bhai Modi had given the three E for good governance during his speech on Independence Day i.e. Effective Governance, Electronic Governance, and Ethical Governance. The fundamental concern of corporate governance mechanism is to ensure the protection of minority shareholders/owners of specific firms. Mechanism of a corporate governance specifies the relations among the shareholders, board of directors, and managers. The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the board by calculating the corporate governance score. The mandatory and non-mandatory guidelines have been considered while assigning points to specific parameters of the corporate governance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 010-031
Author(s):  
Animah Animah ◽  
Lukman Effendy ◽  
Alamsyah M. Thahir ◽  
Erna Widiastuty

The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms,  firm size of financial performance. The Population of this research is the company manufacturing  in BEI. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling. The analytical tool used is using partial least  square program. The independent variables in this research are corporate governance mechanism,  firm size  while the dependent variable is the performance of the financial. The result of the research shows that firm size  influence to financial performance, while other variables such as corporate governance mechanisms have no effect negative  to financial performance.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faisal Javaid

Corporate governance is considered to have significant impact on the growth and development perspective of an economy. Sound corporate governance practices leads the economy towards the achievement of higher performance, provide sources for capital investment by increasing the creditability of shareholders. The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship of corporate governance and firm performance in terms of accounting as well as market performance i.e.to be measured by Return on asset, Return on equity and Tobin’s Q. The theoretical base to conduct the study is the demand of separation of ownership and control characterize as agency theory. The previous studies have yielded inconsistent result. To achieve the purpose 58 textile sector companies were selected listed in the Karachi stock exchange and data was taken from annual reports of the companies for the period of 2009 to 2013. Descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression estimation using pooled, fixed effect, random effect and Hausman specification test were carried out after developing a composite index based on 21 proxies. The result entails that corporate governance index (CGI) and firm performance has positive and significant association but the relationship for each specific index is dependent upon the measure of firm performance. The result also shows that companies having strong corporate governance mechanism has greater chances to acquire finance. The implication of study demands that the reform effort should be directed towards the improvement in internal corporate governance mechanism and regulatory framework for the governance system.


Green Finance ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-262
Author(s):  
Muhammad Junaid ◽  
◽  
Ye Xue ◽  
Muzzammil Wasim Syed ◽  
Muhammad Ziaullah ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jyoti Dixit ◽  
Poonam Singh ◽  
Arunima Haldar

Purpose Takeovers play a critical role as an external corporate governance mechanism to ensure investor protection. There is a long-standing debate on whether the convergence of corporate governance to global standards can enable emerging economies to ensure investor protection. This paper aims to analyse the evolution of the takeover code, namely, Securities Exchange Board of India’s Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers (2011) in India from the lens of investor protection. It then compares the takeover provisions in India, the USA, the UK, Singapore and Australia to examine the extent of convergence and its implications for investor protection. Design/methodology/approach Using a cross-national comparative analysis of takeover mechanisms in common law countries, the study analyses the extent and relevance of convergence in form. The focus of the comparison is on regulations governing offer size, offer price, creeping acquisition and initial trigger limit for the mandatory open offer. Findings The findings suggest that certain provisions such as the initial trigger threshold for the mandatory offer and the offer prices of the Indian takeover code are converging with the standards in common law countries. However, the offer price determination based on market prices may not reflect true market value in an inefficient market like India. Other provisions such as creeping acquisition and offer size are not only diverging from the international standards but are also inconsistent with the key objective of investor protections of the Indian regulator. Research limitations/implications Indian takeover regulation needs to converge to higher global standards to ensure adherence to improved investor protection. This needs to be done for the initial trigger limit for mandatory bid and offer prices, after accounting for the differences in institutional structure. The Indian regulators need to revisit provisions on the initial trigger, creeping acquisition to converge to the broader principle of investor protection. Originality/value This technical paper provides a comprehensive depiction of takeover mechanisms in an emerging economy context as a means of investor protection. Further using a comparative lens, it analyses the relevance of convergence of takeover laws. Thus, advances the theoretical knowledge of limited extant work on external corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy context.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-34
Author(s):  
Anak Agung Kompiyang Ratih Maldini ◽  
Pananda Pasaribu ◽  
Christian Haposan Pangaribuan

Objective – This study aims to find the impact of privatization, which proxied by good corporate governance toward the financial performance of SOEs in Indonesia. Methodology – This study used 16 privatized SOEs that are listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange and also 16 privatized non-SOEs as the comparison. The data is collected from the year 2014 to 2018 and analyzed by using multiple regression panel data. Findings – This study found that director size and board independence have a positive impact toward SOEs financial performance. The director size and board independences have a positive significant impact toward the SOEs financial performance while the privatized non-SOEs is not significantly affected Novelty – This study examines proper governance structure in SOEs and non-SOEs, thus providing new insights about good corporate governance regulation in the Indonesian context.


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Maria Gorethi Berek ◽  
Elok Pakaryaningsih

The objective of this research is to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanism on investment decision. Using two ways of measurement, namely, board size and institutional ownership, corporate governance is hypothesized to have an effect oninvestment decision in which measured by asset growth, equity growth and debt growth.Using real estate industry listed at Jakarta Stock Exchange as the sample, the result shows that both institutional ownership and board size do not affect investment decision.Keywords: Corporate governance, investment decision, institutional ownership, board size


Author(s):  
Sami Ben Mim ◽  
Yosra Mbarki

This study investigates the efficiency of the Shariah supervisory board as a corporate governance mechanism in Islamic banks. The authors mainly seek to examine the effect of the Shariah board's composition (size and academic background of its members) on the performance of Islamic banks. They also try to highlight the transmission channels explaining this effect, and compare the efficiency of the Shariah board with that of traditional corporate governance mechanisms, namely the board of directors. The empirical investigation is based on a sample of 72 Islamic banks from 19 countries. Estimation results suggest that the Shariah board positively affects the Islamic banks performance through the number of Islamic Shariah scholars. This effect is mainly due to the size and cost transmission channels. These results are robust to different performance measures. On the other hand, results show that the board of directors' size produces a positive effect on a bank's performance, offering evidence for complementarity between traditional and Islamic governance mechanisms.


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