Why is there so Little Strategic Voting in Canadian Plurality Rule Elections?

2002 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Blais
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Strong Preference ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Election Study

Using the 1988 Canadian Election Study I examine why there was only restricted strategic voting in single-member district plurality elections. In that election 19 percent of Canadian voters preferred the party that actually finished third in their constituency, but among these third party supporters only one in eight decided to vote strategically for one of the top two contenders. Strategic voting was relatively rare for two key reasons. First, many third party supporters had a strong preference for their party over all others and were therefore reluctant to rally to either of the top two contenders. Second, many overestimated their party's chance of winning and as a consequence did not feel that their vote would be wasted.

The Study of Strategic Voting

2019 ◽  
pp. 291-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Blais ◽  
Arianna Degan
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Strategic Vote ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
Lab Experiments ◽  
Voting Rule

This chapter stresses the necessity of distinguishing between a strategic vote and a strategic voter. The sincere voter always casts a sincere vote, while the strategic voter casts a sincere or strategic vote depending on the context and the voting rule. This leads to two definitions of strategic voting: a broad one, where a strategic vote is one that is partly based on expectations about the outcome of the election, and a narrow one, where a strategic vote also entails not voting sincerely. The chapter then reviews three types of empirical research that differ with respect to the type of data used: the observation of electoral outcomes, survey data, and lab experiments. That literature has confirmed that indeed some voters cast a strategic vote, though many studies have found most votes to be sincere. That research has also shown that there is some degree of strategic voting under all kinds of voting rules; that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is as much strategic voting under proportional representation as under plurality rule; and that the propensity to vote strategically depends very much on the type of information that is available.

Why Bother? Supporters of Locally Weaker Parties Are Less Likely to Vote or to Vote Sincerely

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Fred Cutler ◽  
Alexandre Rivard ◽  
Antony Hodgson
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Study Data ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
Election Study ◽  
People's Party ◽  
Electoral District

Abstract Voters are deterred from casting a vote and more likely to vote strategically if their preferred choice is less competitive in their electoral district. We use 2019 Canadian Election Study data to show that respondents’ answers to a “how likely are you to vote” question depend on their estimate of their preferred party's local chances of winning, relative to other parties. This deterrent effect on turnout from the competitiveness of a voter's preferred party is concentrated among certain parties (NDP, Green, People's Party of Canada). Under first-past-the-post (FPTP), voters with particular policy perspectives are systematically deterred from voting, relative to other voters. Furthermore, we find that despite supporters of all parties having an incentive to vote strategically if their party is outside the top two in the district, strategic voting is heavily concentrated among voters who prefer parties other than the nationally most competitive two parties.

Voter Coordination and the Rise of the Republican Party: Evidence from New England

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 311-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Chamberlain
Keyword(s):  
New England ◽  
Republican Party ◽  
Political History ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Party Development ◽  
Party Voting ◽  
American Party

The development of the Republican Party is a significant event in American political history. While scholars describe its formation as a realignment caused by the slavery issue, this article reinterprets this perspective. Focusing on gubernatorial elections in New England from 1840 to the mid-1850s, I present evidence that the rise of the Republican Party in the region was due to a lack of strategic voting coupled with third-party, antislavery voting that did not consistently affect the Whigs across states. A counterfactual argument suggests that Whig elites would have sought to change the nature of party politics and, had the distribution of third-party voting affected the Whigs similarly across states, then the Republicans may not have formed. Thus, the distribution of antislavery, third-party voting was more important than the presence of antislavery sentiment. This finding is important for understanding American party development and how strategic voting fits into the study of US elections.

The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 581-594 ◽  
Author(s):  
Éric Bélanger
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Vote Choice ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Election Study ◽  
Major Party ◽  
Federal Election ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Party Dominance

Abstract. This study proposes a new test of Maurice Pinard's theory on the rise of third parties applied to the case of the 1993 Canadian federal election. We assess the effect at the individual level of Pinard's factors (one-party dominance and grievances) on support for the Reform party and the Bloc Québécois using data from the Canadian Election Study. Logistic regression analyses of vote choice indicate that the extent to which the second major party was perceived to be electorally weak at the constituency level was a significant factor in leading some Western voters to support Reform. In Quebec, however, perceptions of predominance did not matter to a vote for the Bloc because the latter is a “radical” third party attracting support mostly on the basis of communal values and interests. The results further show that political grievances, but not economic ones, were a significant predictor of support for both third parties in that election.Résumé. Cette étude propose un nouveau test empirique de la théorie de Maurice Pinard concernant la percée électorale des tiers partis. L'impact des facteurs de Pinard (prédominance d'un parti et présence de griefs) sur l'appui au Parti réformiste et au Bloc québécois à l'élection fédérale canadienne de 1993 est vérifié au niveau micro-sociologique à l'aide des données de l'Étude sur l'élection canadienne. Les analyses de régression logistique du vote indiquent que la perception que certains électeurs de l'Ouest avaient de la faible compétitivité du second parti traditionnel dans leur circonscription les a encouragés à appuyer le Parti réformiste. Au Québec, les perceptions de prédominance n'ont cependant pas eu d'effet significatif sur le vote en faveur du Bloc en raison du fait que ce dernier est un tiers parti “ radical ” dont l'appui repose principalement sur des valeurs et des intérêts de groupe. Les résultats indiquent enfin que, contrairement aux griefs de nature économique, les griefs politiques régionaux ont significativement contribué au succès électoral des deux partis.

Strategic Voting Under Conditions of Uncertainty: A Re-Evaluation of Duverger's Law

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
EMILY CLOUGH
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Agent Based Model ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Duverger's Law ◽  
The Way

Political scientists have long recognized that the number of parties in a country influences the way that interests are represented in that country. One explanation for the number of parties in a system relies on the idea of strategic voting, i.e. voters may not want to ‘waste a vote’ by voting for a third party. However, work in this area does not address the role of an important factor that may affect party systems through strategic voting: information. Without polls, how could voters know which parties were likely to win, and hence how to vote strategically? Using an agent-based model, this article assesses the role that information plays in shaping the party system through strategic voting. The results of this model demonstrate that, contrary to Duverger's Law, more than two parties may emerge in single-member plurality systems, even when all voters are strategic.

Abandon Ship? An Analysis of Strategic Voting among Liberal Democrat Voters in the 2015 UK Election

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-521
Author(s):  
Isaac D Hale
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Ideal Case ◽  
Electoral Outcome ◽  
Liberal Democrats ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Uk

Abstract Strategic voting occurs when voters make vote choices using their ex ante expectations about the results of an election in addition to their sincere candidate preferences. While there is ample theoretical reason to believe strategic voting should occur under certain electoral conditions and institutional arrangements, the evidence for it in the literature has been mixed. I theorise that the polarisation of the two main British political parties and the highly publicised predictions of defeat for Britain’s primary national third party, the Liberal Democrats, make the 2015 UK election an ideal case for studying strategic voting. I adapt established methods of identifying strategic voting to this election and find evidence that Liberal Democrat voters in the UK voted strategically for Labour and Conservative candidates to maximise their odds of affecting the electoral outcome in their constituency.

scholarly journals Strategic voting in the 2011 and 2015 Polish Senate elections: Testing Duvergerʼs Law in the second-order elections

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Maškarinec
Keyword(s):  
Strong Influence ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Senate Elections ◽  
Duverger's Law ◽  
Upper Chamber ◽  
Country Specific

AbstractThis article tests Duverger’s law through analysis of the Polish Senate elections in 2011 and 2015. These two elections were held under the new first-past-the-post (or single-member plurality) system, which replaced formerly used unlimited vote. The main aim of the article is to test, whether we can confirm the expectations of strategic voting in the context of the so-called second-order elections, as the Polish Parliament is a classical example of the asymmetrical bicameralism, with the secondary role of the upper chamber, the Senate. The results show that the strategic voting was not universal phenomenon under the plurality rule, as indicated by many violations of Duverger’s law. Our research confirmed that the effect of electoral institutions (institutional structure) is contingent and (at the district level) inhibited by country-specific conditions, with potentially strong influence of the second-order character of the Polish Senate elections.

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