Why Bother? Supporters of Locally Weaker Parties Are Less Likely to Vote or to Vote Sincerely

Author(s):  
Fred Cutler ◽  
Alexandre Rivard ◽  
Antony Hodgson

Abstract Voters are deterred from casting a vote and more likely to vote strategically if their preferred choice is less competitive in their electoral district. We use 2019 Canadian Election Study data to show that respondents’ answers to a “how likely are you to vote” question depend on their estimate of their preferred party's local chances of winning, relative to other parties. This deterrent effect on turnout from the competitiveness of a voter's preferred party is concentrated among certain parties (NDP, Green, People's Party of Canada). Under first-past-the-post (FPTP), voters with particular policy perspectives are systematically deterred from voting, relative to other voters. Furthermore, we find that despite supporters of all parties having an incentive to vote strategically if their party is outside the top two in the district, strategic voting is heavily concentrated among voters who prefer parties other than the nationally most competitive two parties.

Gaining Voice ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 97-122
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Clark ◽  
Ray Block

A healthy representative democracy requires that citizens be politically involved, and it is especially important to consider the political involvement of groups that are marginalized, such as African Americans. Building on the political empowerment hypothesis, the chapter argues that an increased black seat share and black representation ratio should be associated with increased black political involvement. Using 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study data, the chapter describes how in states with an increased black seat share in the legislature blacks are more likely to be highly interested in politics and are more likely to vote. In states with a higher black representation ratio, blacks are more inclined to persuade others to vote. Black representation in the US House does not increase black political involvement, despite being the focus of many scholarly works of political empowerment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siim Trumm

Politics in Wales is often portrayed as being relatively consensual and enjoying healthy levels of trust between voters and elites when compared with the rest of the United Kingdom. Recent events, like the decision of Welsh voters to reject membership of the EU against the advice of most of its political establishment, are however calling into question this perception. Using the 2016 Welsh Candidate Study and 2016 Welsh Election Study data, this article evaluates the extent of policy divisions between voters and candidates in Wales. I find that candidates hold more liberal policy positions and are less likely than voters to think of immigration as the most important policy priority. In addition, they tend to favour a different approach to parliamentary representation, deeming it more acceptable for Assembly Members to discard the views of their voters in favour of their own views or those of their party.


2014 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 771-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas J. Caruana ◽  
R. Michael McGregor ◽  
Laura B. Stephenson

AbstractThe origins and implications of partisan identification are well-studied, but negative partisan attitudes—dislike for a particular party—have escaped such scrutiny, even as the politics of negativity enjoys sustained popularity, especially come election time. In this paper we build upon the comparatively modest negative partisanship literature to consider the effects of negative partisan attitudes on a range of political behaviours. There are reasons to suspect that negative and positive partisanship may have different effects; thus, accounting for the unique influence of negative attitudes is important for understanding the full effect of partisanship on political behaviour. Our results, based upon Canadian Election Study data from 2008 and 2011, reveal that, in addition to vote choice, negative partisanship influences voter turnout and a range of political activities, both related and unrelated to parties. These findings provide evidence of the power of the “dark side” of partisanship.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Humpage ◽  
Simone Baillie

Have increasing levels of conditionality fundamentally changed the attitudes of the unemployed towards social security, work obligations and welfare dependency? Both neopaternalist and governmentalist theorising suggests that workfare policies should have shifted this group's conceptions of self-interest over time yet previous evidence has been rather mixed. This article makes a fresh contribution to the literature by drawing upon New Zealand Election Study data (1990–2014) and New Zealand qualitative data (2007–2008; 2014) to analyse the attitudes of “undeserving” unemployed benefit recipients who are subject to work obligations over 21 years and by comparing their attitudes to those of “deserving” benefit recipients not subject to work obligations (the retired and students) and wage/salary earners. It finds a notable hardening of unemployed people's attitudes towards some welfare dependency propositions over time and evidence of “self-governing rationalities” being adopted by some unemployed individuals but, overall, attitudes amongst this group remain nuanced and ambivalent.


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 1103-1126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson ◽  
David W. Romero

Most applications of spatial modeling to the problem of electoral competition are pessimistic regarding the prospects for candidate equilibrium in more than one policy dimension. Probabilistic models of the vote, however, increase the likelihood of equilibrium. We expand the probabilistic model to include measured nonissue variables, thereby representing the general multivariate model of behavioral research. For this model we offer a general candidate equilibrium solution and illustrate with some simulations based on 1988 National Election Study data. The more complicated one's model of voters' motivations, the greater appears to be the chance of locating a candidate equilibrium position in policy space.


2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 979-995 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Matthew Wilson ◽  
Michael Lusztig

Abstract. A literature has emerged in American voting studies noting a “marriage gap”—the propensity for married voters to support the Republican party. Using Canadian Election Study data, we establish the existence of a significant marriage gap in Canada. We also seek to determine if the marriage gap is driven by socio-demographic factors or attitudinal ones. We find that while socio-demographic factors contribute to the marriage gap, they explain relatively little variance. In probing the attitudinal basis of the marriage gap further, we find that married Canadians differ from the unwed very strongly on issues of moral traditionalism, but much less so on other issues that measure generalized conservatism.Résumé. Des travaux sont apparus dans les études américaines sur le vote remarquant l'existence d'un “écart mariage” (marriage gap) – la tendance des électeurs mariés à soutenir le parti républicain. Utilisant des données sur les élections nationales canadiennes, nous établissons l'existence d'un écart significatif au Canada. Nous cherchons aussi à déterminer si ce phénomène est poussé par les facteurs socio-démographiques ou les facteurs d'attitude. Nous constatons que bien que les facteurs socio-démographiques contribuent à cet écart, ils n'expliquent que relativement peu de variation. En recherchant davantage la base attitudinale, nous constatons que les canadiens mariés diffèrent très fortement de ceux qui ne sont pas mariés sur les questions de traditionalisme moral, mais cependant beaucoup moins sur les questions de conservatisme géneral.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Michael A. Hansen ◽  
Jennifer L. Clemens ◽  
Kathleen Dolan

Abstract This article explores the gender gap in attitudes toward the use of military force in the United States. Given that the United States has been continuously engaged in war for the last 17 years, we revisit the topic and explore whether a gender gap in attitudes persists by utilizing Cooperative Congressional Election Study data for 2006–16. In addition, given the primacy of partisanship to issue attitudes, we go beyond examining the gender gap to explore the impact of partisanship on these attitudes. We find that women are less likely than men to support the use of force in most circumstances. We also find gender gaps in the Democratic and Republican parties and acknowledge the diversity among women and among men in these attitudes because of partisan identity. Finally, we identify points of cross-pressure on individuals whose gender and partisan identities pull them in different directions, namely, Republican women and Democratic men.


2002 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
André Blais

Using the 1988 Canadian Election Study I examine why there was only restricted strategic voting in single-member district plurality elections. In that election 19 percent of Canadian voters preferred the party that actually finished third in their constituency, but among these third party supporters only one in eight decided to vote strategically for one of the top two contenders. Strategic voting was relatively rare for two key reasons. First, many third party supporters had a strong preference for their party over all others and were therefore reluctant to rally to either of the top two contenders. Second, many overestimated their party's chance of winning and as a consequence did not feel that their vote would be wasted.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth C. McKee ◽  
Daniel A. Smith ◽  
M. V. (Trey) Hood

ABSTRACTThe surprise outcome of the 2016 presidential election continues to raise more questions as experts grapple with the evidence for why most prognosticators considered a Hillary Clinton victory almost certain. This article uses the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study data to show that a primary explanation for why the election of Donald Trump was difficult to predict is that the bulk of his support did not materialize until Election Day, in the battleground states that he had to carry to win the Electoral College.


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