Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies

2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
HANNA BÄCK ◽  
MARC DEBUS ◽  
PATRICK DUMONT
Keyword(s):  
Portfolio Allocation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments

What You See Is Not Always What You Get: Bargaining before an Audience under Multiparty Government

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 1138-1154 ◽  
Author(s):  
LANNY W. MARTIN ◽  
GEORG VANBERG
Keyword(s):  
Original Data ◽  
Portfolio Allocation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Relative Success ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Party Elites ◽  
Simple Heuristics ◽  
Do So

AbstractParty elites in coalition governments are acutely aware that the deals they strike will be critically evaluated by their supporters, and that they risk losing support if they are perceived as ineffective negotiators. This has a powerful influence on the bargains parties strike. Because most supporters are unaware of the complex aspects of bargains and instead rely on simple heuristics to evaluate their most visible features, parties have incentives to meet supporter expectations primarily on easily observable outcomes. To do so, they make trade-offs on less observable outcomes. This implies that the more visible features of a bargain typically do not accurately reflect the relative success of parties in coalition negotiations. We evaluate our argument using original data on the office rewards and policy risks of portfolio allocation in 16 parliamentary democracies. Our findings support our argument, and they have important implications for the nature of representation under multiparty government.

Ministerial Autonomy or Ministerial Accommodation? Contested Bases of Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL V. WARWICK
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Portfolio Allocation ◽  
Initial Test ◽  
Simulation Experiments ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Significant Survival ◽  
West European

In this article the ability of Laver and Shepsle's portfolio allocation (PA) theory to account for the survival records of coalition governments in twelve West European parliamentary democracies is examined. The initial test consists of determining whether governments that are in PA equilibrium survive longer than other governments. Simulation experiments are then used to estimate the robustness of these equilibria in order to assess whether robust equilibria have significant survival-enhancing properties. The foil in this investigation is the ideological diversity approach, which sees ministerial accommodation, not ministerial autonomy, as the key to decision making in coalition governments. The evidence favours the latter perspective.

scholarly journals Professional activists? Party activism among political staffers in parliamentary democracies

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110273
Author(s):  
Pieter Moens
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
High Intensity ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Strong Commitment ◽  
Staff Recruitment

Although the position of the party on the ground has been weakened by cartelization, grassroots activists remain an important recruitment pool for political professionals. Based on unique survey data collected among the staff of 14 Belgian and Dutch parties (N = 1009), this article offers an in-depth analysis of party activism among this under-researched population. Introducing a new supply and demand framework, I argue that staff recruitment is shaped by candidate preferences (supply) and party preferences (demand). The findings demonstrate that most political staffers are high-intensity activists with a strong commitment to their party. Moreover, the theoretical model accurately predicts that non-activists are more common among policy and communication experts, ministerial staff, and those working for ideologically moderate parties. These findings show that paid staffers do not necessarily widen the gap between parties and activists. They also raise normative questions about internal congruence within parties in coalition governments.

scholarly journals PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION AS THE PRESIDENT'S CALCULATIONS: LOYALTY, COPARTISANSHIP, AND POLITICAL CONTEXT IN SOUTH KOREA

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don S. Lee
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Portfolio Allocation ◽  
Political Context ◽  
Critical Difference ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Key Policy ◽  
Portfolio Allocations ◽  
Political Leverage ◽  
Ruling Party

AbstractHow do the president's calculations in achieving policy goals shape the allocation of cabinet portfolios? Despite the growing literature on presidential cabinet appointments, this question has barely been addressed. I argue that cabinet appointments are strongly affected not only by presidential incentives to effectively deliver their key policy commitments but also by their interest in having their administration maintain strong political leverage. Through an analysis of portfolio allocations in South Korea after democratization, I demonstrate that the posts wherein ministers can influence the government's overall reputation typically go to nonpartisan professionals ideologically aligned with presidents, while the posts wherein ministers can exert legislators' influence generally go to senior copartisans. My findings highlight a critical difference in presidential portfolio allocation from parliamentary democracies, where key posts tend to be reserved for senior parliamentarians from the ruling party.

The Distribution of Ministerial Posts in Parliamentary Systems

2020 ◽  
pp. 313-335
Author(s):  
Hanna Bäck ◽  
Royce Carroll
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Portfolio Allocation ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Democratic Process ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Parliamentary Systems

The distribution of ministerial posts is an important step in the democratic process in parliamentary democracies, as ministers are likely to influence the policy outputs of governments. Several scholars have thus aimed to explain and predict portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies. Some scholars have focused exclusively on predicting how many portfolios each party gets, whereas others have focused on predicting which party gets which post. There is also a growing field that focuses on understanding why certain individuals are selected to the cabinet, and why some individuals stay longer in their posts whereas others are shuffled out early. Few studies have connected these questions, fully aiming to explain the distribution of posts between and within political parties negotiating to enter government. We suggest that this is an important step for future research

“Why Can’t We Be Friends?” The Coalition Potential of Presidents in Semi-presidential Republics—Insights from Romania

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronica Anghel
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Presidential Regimes ◽  
Depth Interviews

Coalition governments are a regularly studied feature of parliamentary democracies. Debates still linger in the field as to what extent the outcomes of these studies are also applicable in determining who has the upper hand over coalition formation in semi-presidential regimes. This article explores the dynamics of government formation under semi-presidential regimes using evidence from Romania (1990–2016) and discusses the formal and informal potential of the president to shape coalitions. It covers a lacuna in qualitative studies by using evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with prime ministers, cabinet members, and key party decision makers and shows that under certain circumstances presidents can play an influential role in government formation, but these are rather the exception than the rule. Using a case that presents the incentives for an increase in the presidentialization of politics, I show that the mechanisms of a multiparty regime mostly limit the president’s exclusive bargaining advantage to nominating the prime minister and then, much as in a parliamentary democracy, render him or her dependent on the coalition potential of his or her own party.

scholarly journals The cost of coalition compromise: The electoral effects of holding salient portfolios

2020 ◽  
pp. 135406882090442
Author(s):  
Zachary Greene ◽  
Nathan Henceroth ◽  
Christian B Jensen
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Government ◽  
Parliamentary Election ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Cost

This article highlights the electoral effects of holding salient portfolios within a coalition government. For voters, holding ministries can be seen as a symbol of a party’s success within the coalition. As a voting heuristic, parties not controlling the portfolios on issues important to their platforms signal their failure to achieve these goals. Following this perspective, we hypothesize that the difference between coalition parties that hold salient portfolios and those that do not partially predicts the extent of the electoral cost of coalition participation. Using a data set that covers 11 European parliamentary democracies between 1966 and 2002, we show that for junior coalition partners there is an electoral reward for holding their most salient portfolio. There is also an electoral benefit for a junior partner to hold a larger number of portfolios if they do not control their most salient portfolio. Conversely, holding their most salient portfolio and a larger number of additional ministries results in greater electoral losses in the subsequent parliamentary election. These results indicate that parties’ success at negotiating for their policy priorities in coalition governments holds consequences for their future electoral success.

The Dynamics of Public Support for Coalition Governments

1995 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 350-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Institutional Context ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Economic Problems ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Party Support ◽  
The Relationship

This article investigates the relationship between economic conditions and party support for coalition parties in Denmark and the Netherlands. The article argues that the simple reward-punishment model cannot fully account for changes in citizens' support for parties, given variable economic performance. Using aggregate public support data for political parties, the article shows that citizens differentiate between coalition partners depending on the parties' issue priorities. Instead of blaming or rewarding all coalition parties in a uniform fashion, citizens shift support from one coalition party to another, depending on the perceived competence of a party to deal with particular economic problems. The article finds that the structure of responsibility in parliamentary democracies ruled by coalition governments is more complex than is often assumed. Therefore, it is argued that students of economics and public opinion should pay particular attention to the institutional context in which citizens make choices.

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