What You See Is Not Always What You Get: Bargaining before an Audience under Multiparty Government

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (4) ◽  
pp. 1138-1154 ◽  
Author(s):  
LANNY W. MARTIN ◽  
GEORG VANBERG
Keyword(s):  
Original Data ◽  
Portfolio Allocation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Relative Success ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Party Elites ◽  
Simple Heuristics ◽  
Do So

AbstractParty elites in coalition governments are acutely aware that the deals they strike will be critically evaluated by their supporters, and that they risk losing support if they are perceived as ineffective negotiators. This has a powerful influence on the bargains parties strike. Because most supporters are unaware of the complex aspects of bargains and instead rely on simple heuristics to evaluate their most visible features, parties have incentives to meet supporter expectations primarily on easily observable outcomes. To do so, they make trade-offs on less observable outcomes. This implies that the more visible features of a bargain typically do not accurately reflect the relative success of parties in coalition negotiations. We evaluate our argument using original data on the office rewards and policy risks of portfolio allocation in 16 parliamentary democracies. Our findings support our argument, and they have important implications for the nature of representation under multiparty government.

Ministerial Autonomy or Ministerial Accommodation? Contested Bases of Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAUL V. WARWICK
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Portfolio Allocation ◽  
Initial Test ◽  
Simulation Experiments ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Significant Survival ◽  
West European

In this article the ability of Laver and Shepsle's portfolio allocation (PA) theory to account for the survival records of coalition governments in twelve West European parliamentary democracies is examined. The initial test consists of determining whether governments that are in PA equilibrium survive longer than other governments. Simulation experiments are then used to estimate the robustness of these equilibria in order to assess whether robust equilibria have significant survival-enhancing properties. The foil in this investigation is the ideological diversity approach, which sees ministerial accommodation, not ministerial autonomy, as the key to decision making in coalition governments. The evidence favours the latter perspective.

Legislative Review and Party Differentiation in Coalition Governments

2018 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 242-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID FORTUNATO
Keyword(s):  
Original Data ◽  
External Support ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Seeking Behavior ◽  
Legislative Review

Multiparty governance requires compromise and this compromise can lead to electoral losses. I argue that coalition members are motivated to differentiate themselves from their cabinet partners to mitigate potential electoral losses resulting from voters perceiving them as not rigorously pursuing their core policy positions or not possessing strong policy stands. I test this argument with original data on the scrutiny of over 2,200 government bills gathered from three parliamentary democracies incorporating information on voter perceptions of partisan ideology and parties’ policy preferences as derived from their manifestos. I find that coalition partners that are perceived as more similar will amend one another’s legislative proposals more vigorously in an effort to differentiate in the eyes of the electorate—to protect their brand—and therefore provide evidence for “pure” vote-seeking behavior in the legislative review process. Furthermore, these original data provide answers to several open questions regarding the policy motivations of cabinet parties in legislative review and the role of committee chairs and external support parties on policy outcomes.

scholarly journals Professional activists? Party activism among political staffers in parliamentary democracies

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110273
Author(s):  
Pieter Moens
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
High Intensity ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Strong Commitment ◽  
Staff Recruitment

Although the position of the party on the ground has been weakened by cartelization, grassroots activists remain an important recruitment pool for political professionals. Based on unique survey data collected among the staff of 14 Belgian and Dutch parties (N = 1009), this article offers an in-depth analysis of party activism among this under-researched population. Introducing a new supply and demand framework, I argue that staff recruitment is shaped by candidate preferences (supply) and party preferences (demand). The findings demonstrate that most political staffers are high-intensity activists with a strong commitment to their party. Moreover, the theoretical model accurately predicts that non-activists are more common among policy and communication experts, ministerial staff, and those working for ideologically moderate parties. These findings show that paid staffers do not necessarily widen the gap between parties and activists. They also raise normative questions about internal congruence within parties in coalition governments.

The Motivations of Anonymous Whistle-Blowers: The Case of Federal Employees

1988 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 281-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcia P. Miceli ◽  
Bonnie L. Roach ◽  
Janet P. Near
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Bystander Intervention ◽  
Federal Employees ◽  
Whistle Blowing ◽  
Decision Points ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Unidentified Source ◽  
Organizational Wrongdoing ◽  
Do So

The “Deep Throat” case during Watergate — in which a well-placed unidentified source called attention to governmental wrongdoing — exemplifies the complexities created by anonymous whistle-blowing. What anonymous whistle-blowers may lose in credibility they gain in protection from reprisal. The trade-offs facing the potential whistle-blower who decides to remain unidentified are examined empirically using survey data from 8500 federal employees. Propositions derived from a model of bystander intervention (Latané & Darley, 1970) are investigated, with consideration of three decision points: whether the observer of organizational wrongdoing should blow the whistle, whether the whistle-blower should act anonymously, and whether the whistle-blower should report the wrong-doing through internal channels or to someone outside the organization. The results suggest a compounding of the last two decisions: in fact, the choice of channels represents one of four distinct strategies. Whistle-blowers may be anonymous or identified with either external or internal channels, but the conditions under which they do so vary dramatically. The whistle-blower who, like “Deep Throat,” chooses to use an anonymous external channel faces a series of interrelated and complex decisions.

Design Trade-Offs Under Power Asymmetry: COPs and Flexibility Clauses

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Jean-Frédéric Morin ◽  
Benjamin Tremblay-Auger ◽  
Claire Peacock
Keyword(s):  
Design Feature ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Environmental Agreements ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Power Asymmetry ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Environmental Agreement ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Insurance Mechanism ◽  
Important Design

Abstract Negotiating parties to an environmental agreement can manage uncertainty by including flexibility clauses, such as escape and withdrawal clauses. This article investigates a type of uncertainty so far overlooked by the literature: the uncertainty generated by the creation of a Conference of the Parties (COP) in a context of sharp power asymmetry. When negotiating an agreement, it is difficult for powerful states to make a credible commitment to weaker states, whereby they will not abuse their power to influence future COP decision-making. Flexibility clauses provide a solution to this credibility issue. They act as an insurance mechanism in case a powerful state hijacks the COP. Thus we expect that the creation of a collective body interacts with the degree of power asymmetry to make flexibility clauses more likely in environmental agreements. To test this argument, we draw on an original data set of several specific clauses in 2,090 environmental agreements, signed between 1945 and 2018. The results support our hypothesis and suggest that flexibility clauses are an important design feature of adaptive environmental agreements.

To Sue or Not to Sue: How Afghan Merchants Strategically Choose to Use or Avoid Courts

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-244
Author(s):  
Haroun RAHIMI
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Original Data ◽  
Formal Property ◽  
Business Climate ◽  
Complex Picture ◽  
The Common ◽  
Do So

AbstractThis article explores how and why Afghan merchants choose to use courts or informal dispute resolution methods. It goes beyond the common corruption and inefficiency arguments, which maintain that Afghans do not use courts because they are corrupt and inefficient. It leverages rich, original data on variation of dispute resolution practices across provinces and types of disputes to gain insights into Afghan merchants’ dispute resolution decisions. In so doing, I reveal a more complex picture of commercial dispute resolution in Afghanistan. In this article, I demonstrate that Afghan merchants do choose courts when courts enforce the parties’ expectations and courts’ judgments are necessary and effective. Moreover, while Afghan merchants do prefer informal dispute resolution methods, they do so because informal methods hold important advantages over courts in the context of Afghanistan where the formal property rights system is a failure, and the business climate is highly volatile.

scholarly journals Persuasion: The Art of Changing Worldviews

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 996-1031 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Galperti
Keyword(s):  
World View ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Bayesian Framework ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Disconfirming Evidence ◽  
Do So

Persuaders often face the task of changing their listeners’ world-view, which may involve conveying evidence that disconfirms that view. It has been shown, however, that people are often reluctant to change their worldviews. These aspects of persuasion cannot be captured in the standard Bayesian framework. The paper identifies the constraints, opportunities, and trade-offs of persuading people to change worldview. It finds necessary and sufficient conditions under which it is optimal for persuaders to do so. It also shows when and how they conceal disconfirming evidence and take advantage of their listener’s existing worldview. (JEL D82, D83, D91)

Economic Principles for Medicare Reform

2019 ◽  
Vol 686 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-92
Author(s):  
Amitabh Chandra ◽  
Craig Garthwaite
Keyword(s):  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Medicare Advantage ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Economic Framework ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Medicare Program ◽  
Commercial Market ◽  
New Treatments ◽  
Do So

In this article, we develop an economic framework for Medicare reform that highlights trade-offs that reform proposals should grapple with, but often ignore. Central to our argument is a tension in administratively set prices, which may improve short-term efficiency but do so at the expense of dynamic efficiency (slowing innovations in new treatments). The smaller the Medicare program is relative to the commercial market, the less important this is; but in a world where there are no market prices or the private sector is very small, the task of setting prices that are dynamically correct becomes more complex. Reforming Medicare should focus on greater incentives to increase competition between Medicare Advantage plans, which necessitates a role for government in ensuring competition; premium support; less use of regulated prices; and less appetite for countless “pay for performance” schemes. We apply this framework to evaluate Medicare for All proposals.

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