Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Merits and Perils of Territorial AccommodationBrancatiD. (2009) Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through Decentralization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.HartzellC. A. and HoddieM. (2007) Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.ChoudhryS. (ed.) (2008) Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Wolff
2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 410-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Keels ◽  
J Michael Greig

In this article, we argue that because governments fear that accepting mediation and reaching agreements with opponents may signal weakness to other potential challengers, civil war governments tend to resist mediation as a means of demonstrating their resolve. Building on current theories of reputation in civil war, we argue that the threat of future challenges from other groups is likely to be particularly acute in states with multiple ethnic groups, especially states with high levels of ethnic exclusion. We therefore expect that civil wars in these states will be less likely to see mediation and to produce agreements when they do. By examining all instances of mediation in intrastate conflict from 1990 to 2008, we test this argument empirically and find that mediation is more likely to emerge in civil wars where there are a large number of ethnic groups, but is less likely to occur when many of those ethnic groups are excluded from the political process. Once mediation is underway, however, it is less likely to yield a negotiated settlement when there are a large number of ethnic groups, but more likely to end in a negotiated settlement when many of the ethnic groups are excluded from the political process.


2020 ◽  
pp. 073889422094412
Author(s):  
Giuditta Fontana ◽  
Argyro Kartsonaki ◽  
Natascha S Neudorfer ◽  
Dawn Walsh ◽  
Stefan Wolff ◽  
...  

This paper introduces the new dataset of Political Agreements in Internal Conflicts (PAIC) and presents its first application. PAIC captures the institutional provisions in political agreements concluded between 1989 and 2016. It provides information on 91 variables, along five dimensions: power sharing, transitional justice, cultural institutions, territorial self-governance and international assistance. First, the paper presents the data collection and coding procedures. Then it replicates Hartzell’s and Hoddie’s (2007, Crafting Peace, The Pennsylvania State University Press) seminal study on the relationship between power sharing and negotiated agreements, showing the long-term importance of a previously overlooked realm: commissions.


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