scholarly journals Relationship-Specific Investments, Family Chaos, and Cohabitation Dissolution Following a Nonmarital Birth

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 586-601 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire M. Kamp Dush
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brenda Koester ◽  
Barbara H. Fiese ◽  
Craig Gundersen ◽  
Meghan Fisher

2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Baldenius ◽  
Beatrice Michaeli

ABSTRACT We demonstrate a novel link between relationship-specific investments and risk in a setting where division managers operate under moral hazard and collaborate on joint projects. Specific investments increase efficiency at the margin. This expands the scale of operations and thereby adds to the compensation risk borne by the managers. Accounting for this investment/risk link overturns key findings from prior incomplete contracting studies. We find that if the investing manager has full bargaining power vis-à-vis the other manager, he will underinvest relative to the benchmark of contractible investments; with equal bargaining power, however, he may overinvest. The reason is that the investing manager internalizes only his own share of the investment-induced risk premium (we label this a “risk transfer”), whereas the principal internalizes both managers' incremental risk premia. We show that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) reduces the managers' incentives to invest in relationship-specific assets. The optimal PPS, thus, trades off investment and effort incentives.


2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Pfeiffer

Abstract In the literature, the information structure of the hold-up problem is typically assumed to be exogenous. In this paper, we introduce an additional stage at which the head office may grant individual divisions access to an information system before they undertake their specific investments. Although more information ceteris paribus enhances each divisions’ profits, more information can reduce divisions’ investments and destroy synergies for the other division that would have been generated by the investments. If this negative effect dominates, then information can be harmful for the entire company. Hence, information control can be a subtle force to deal with the hold-up problem to a certain extent. In this paper we analyze those conditions under which information is either harmful or beneficial for central management.


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 147-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara H. Fiese ◽  
Craig Gundersen ◽  
Brenda Koester ◽  
Blake Jones

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nils M. Høgevold ◽  
Gøran Svensson ◽  
Mercy Mpinganjira

PurposeSeen from the seller's point of view, this study examines economic and non-economic satisfaction as distinct conceptual variables, and tests how the constructs relate to each other and to the business transactional cost variables of formalisation, specific investments and dependence.Design/methodology/approachData was collected from 213 key informants from Norwegian companies involved in business-to-business marketing. Structural equation modelling was used to test the posited hypotheses.FindingsThe findings show that sellers' economic satisfaction exerts a positive influence on non-economic satisfaction and on formalisation, while its posited influence on specific investments was not found to be significant. Formalisation was, however, not significantly influenced by seller non-economic satisfaction. Specific investment was positively influenced by seller non-economic satisfaction. The influence of formalisation on specific investments and dependence was significant. Specific investments were also found to be positively influenced by dependence.Research limitations/implicationsThe study reveals the importance of assessing both economic and non-economic satisfaction in trying to understand sellers' behaviour in business-to-business markets.Practical implicationsThe findings show the need for managers to ensure economic satisfaction, as its affects non-economic satisfaction.Originality/valueThis study contributes to a better understanding of satisfaction in business-to-business exchange relationships and its relationship with transactional cost constructs based on a seller's perspective.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document