THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT AND THE POLITICAL DISADVANTAGE THEORY

2008 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 555-578
Author(s):  
A. K. Kuersten
2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Badger

On Monday, March 12, Georgia's senior senator, Walter George, rose in the Senate to read a manifesto blasting the Supreme Court. The Manifesto condemned the “unwarranted decision” of the Court in Brown as a “clear abuse of judicial power” in which the Court “with no legal basis for such action, undertook to exercise their naked judicial power and substituted their personal political and social ideas for the established law of the land.” The signers pledged themselves “to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation.” It was signed by nineteen of the twenty-two southern senators, by every member of the congressional delegations from Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, by all but one of the representatives from Florida, all but one from Tennessee, all but three from North Carolina, and half of the Texas delegation.


Author(s):  
William L. Barney

Rebels in the Making narrates and interprets secession in the fifteen slave states in 1860–1861. It is a political history informed by the socioeconomic structures of the South and the varying forms they took across the region. It explains how a small minority of Southern radicals exploited the hopes and fears of Southern whites over slavery after Lincoln’s election in November of 1860 to create and lead a revolutionary movement with broad support, especially in the Lower South. It reveals a divided South in which the commitment to secession was tied directly to the extent of slave ownership and the political influence of local planters. White fears over the future of slavery were at the center of the crisis, and the refusal of Republicans to sanction the expansion of slavery doomed efforts to reach a sectional compromise. In January 1861, six states in the Lower South joined South Carolina in leaving the Union, and delegates from the seceded states organized a Confederate government in February. Lincoln’s call for troops to uphold the Union after the Confederacy fired on Fort Sumter in April 1861 finally pushed the reluctant states of the Upper South to secede in defense of slavery and white supremacy.


Author(s):  
Will Guzmán

This chapter recounts how Nixon helped lay the foundation for Black voting rights in the South as the central plaintiff in two landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases: Nixon v. Herndon (1927) and Nixon v. Condon (1932), and the little-discussed case of Nixon v. McCann (1934), Nixon's third attempt to dismantle the all-white Democratic primary. Nixon, along with the NAACP, helped set legal precedent that ultimately led to the dismantling of all-white primaries throughout the entire South. The political and social climate at the local, state, and national levels during the 1920s, as well as the 1923 Texas law that barred African Americans from voting in the Democratic primaries, compelled Nixon and the NAACP to take action. As these changes were brewing in the South, many—such as the Ku Klux Klan—would come to see them as a threat.


Author(s):  
J. Harvie Wilkinson

Southern school desegregation after Brown progressed through four successive stages. The first might be termed absolute defiance, lasting from 1955 until the collapse of Virginia’s massive resistance in 1959. The second was token compliance, stretching from 1959 until passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. With that act, a third phase of modest integration began with the efforts of southern school officials to avoid fund cutoffs by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The 1968 Supreme Court decision of Green v. County School Board commenced a fourth phase of massive integration during which the South became the most integrated section of the country. Yet even as the fourth phase developed, a fifth—that of resegregation— was emerging in some southern localities. Breaks in history, of course, are never so neat as their chroniclers might wish. During the defiant stage, for example, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Florida practiced token compliance. And during much of the token compliance stage, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina practiced total defiance. The different phases thus express only regional momentum as a whole and not the progress, or lack thereof, of a particular state. Even as a gauge of regional momentum, moreover, these phases are imperfect, given wide differences in temperament between the Deep and Upper South. These differences, particularly at first, were important. “In terms of immediate progress toward desegregation in the South,” noted Numan Bartley, “there was precious little to choose between the complex machinations of upper South states and the bellicose interposition of Virginia and the Deep South. But in terms of the future of the Brown decision, the difference was considerable. States of the upper South, with the exception of Virginia, accepted the validity of the Supreme Court decree and aimed to evade its consequences; Deep South states refused to accede any legitimacy to the decision.” Prior to the Kennedy presidency, this division “helped to keep alive the principle of Brown v. Board of Education in the South.” From 1955 to 1968 the Supreme Court remained largely inactive in school desegregation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 471-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Wertheimer ◽  
Jessica Bradshaw ◽  
Allyson Cobb ◽  
Harper Addison ◽  
E. Dudley Colhoun ◽  
...  

On January 24, 1913, the trustees of the Dalcho School, a segregated, all-white public school in Dillon County, South Carolina, summarily dismissed Dudley, Eugene, and Herbert Kirby, ages ten, twelve, and fourteen, respectively. According to testimony offered in a subsequent hearing, the boys had “always properly behaved,” were “good pupils,” and “never …exercise[d] any bad influence in school.” Moreover, the boys’ overwhelmingly white ancestry, in the words of the South Carolina Supreme Court, technically “entitled [them] to be classified as white,” according to state law. Nevertheless, because local whites believed that the Kirbys were “not of pure Caucasian blood,” and that therefore their removal was in the segregated school's best interest, the court, in Tucker v. Blease (1914), upheld their expulsion.


1975 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Waterhouse

Historians have undertaken a number of specific investigations concerning the social, economic and geographic backgrounds, as well as their motives for emigrating, of those men and women who emigrated from England to Massachusetts, Virginia and Barbados during the course of the seventeenth century. While they have discussed the origins of the South Carolina charter, described the social and political status of the eight proprietors, dissected the Fundamental Constitutions, and examined the means by which the successful settlement of 1670 was organized, historians have neglected to explore the social backgrounds of those men who emigrated directly from England to South Carolina during the colony's initial decades of settlement. In contrast, not only the political but also the social and economic backgrounds of the Barbadian planters who colonized South Carolina have been the subject of a number of historical studies.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Eckenwiler

The Law is a grim, unsmiling thing, Not Justice, though. Justice is witty and whimsical and kind and caring.Rohinton Misuy, A Fine Balance;When the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the conviction and twelve-year sentence of Regina McKnight, it affirmed that state 's commitment to bring the full force of the law to the punishment of pregnant women who use drugs. Prosecutors linked the delivery of Ms.McKnight 's stillborn baby to her use of cocaine, and argued successfully for a finding of homicide by child abuse. The McKnight judgment follows the South Carolina Supreme Court decision in the case of Cornelia Whitner. Whitner was sentenced to prison for illegal drug use during pregnancy on the grounds that the viable fetus is a child under the state s criminal child endangerment statute.On the basis of constitutional concerns such as due process and privacy, worries that criminal prosecutions may thwart public policy goals such as keeping families together and promoting the health of women and children, and findings that legislatures did not intend to include the fetus in the scope of drug laws or child abuse and neglect laws, criminal prosecution has been resisted in most jurisdictions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-81
Author(s):  
Lorraine Marie A. Simonis

Abstract Since Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States, the sanctuary movement has gained prominence as a form of resistance to federal immigration policy. Sanctuary cities and states have attempted to frustrate the Trump administration’s immigration agenda by refusing to cooperate with Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE’s) efforts to remove aliens illegally residing in the United States. Academics, pundits and politicians have compared this resistance and non-cooperation to “nullification,” a doctrine typically associated with the South Carolina Nullification Crisis of the 1830s and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. This article rejects comparisons between the sanctuary movement and nullification as false equivalencies and explains why the sanctuary movement is not a form of modern nullification. Rather, it suggests the movement is better understood as being similar to “interposition”—a doctrine related to, but distinct from, nullification. In doing so, this paper will clarify the meaning of nullification and interposition by analyzing the developments of these doctrines. Part 1 of this article discusses the historical, theoretical and practical aspects of South Carolina-style nullification, and compares these to that of the sanctuary movement. Part 2 explores the development of nullification and interposition more broadly, with a particular focus on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. Finally, Part 3 directly compares the sanctuary movement, nullification and interposition, and it connects the movement to the “anti-commandeering” doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in the 1990s.


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