The South Confronts the Court: The Southern Manifesto of 1956

2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Badger

On Monday, March 12, Georgia's senior senator, Walter George, rose in the Senate to read a manifesto blasting the Supreme Court. The Manifesto condemned the “unwarranted decision” of the Court in Brown as a “clear abuse of judicial power” in which the Court “with no legal basis for such action, undertook to exercise their naked judicial power and substituted their personal political and social ideas for the established law of the land.” The signers pledged themselves “to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation.” It was signed by nineteen of the twenty-two southern senators, by every member of the congressional delegations from Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, by all but one of the representatives from Florida, all but one from Tennessee, all but three from North Carolina, and half of the Texas delegation.

Author(s):  
J. Harvie Wilkinson

Southern school desegregation after Brown progressed through four successive stages. The first might be termed absolute defiance, lasting from 1955 until the collapse of Virginia’s massive resistance in 1959. The second was token compliance, stretching from 1959 until passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. With that act, a third phase of modest integration began with the efforts of southern school officials to avoid fund cutoffs by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The 1968 Supreme Court decision of Green v. County School Board commenced a fourth phase of massive integration during which the South became the most integrated section of the country. Yet even as the fourth phase developed, a fifth—that of resegregation— was emerging in some southern localities. Breaks in history, of course, are never so neat as their chroniclers might wish. During the defiant stage, for example, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Florida practiced token compliance. And during much of the token compliance stage, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina practiced total defiance. The different phases thus express only regional momentum as a whole and not the progress, or lack thereof, of a particular state. Even as a gauge of regional momentum, moreover, these phases are imperfect, given wide differences in temperament between the Deep and Upper South. These differences, particularly at first, were important. “In terms of immediate progress toward desegregation in the South,” noted Numan Bartley, “there was precious little to choose between the complex machinations of upper South states and the bellicose interposition of Virginia and the Deep South. But in terms of the future of the Brown decision, the difference was considerable. States of the upper South, with the exception of Virginia, accepted the validity of the Supreme Court decree and aimed to evade its consequences; Deep South states refused to accede any legitimacy to the decision.” Prior to the Kennedy presidency, this division “helped to keep alive the principle of Brown v. Board of Education in the South.” From 1955 to 1968 the Supreme Court remained largely inactive in school desegregation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-81
Author(s):  
Lorraine Marie A. Simonis

Abstract Since Donald Trump’s election as President of the United States, the sanctuary movement has gained prominence as a form of resistance to federal immigration policy. Sanctuary cities and states have attempted to frustrate the Trump administration’s immigration agenda by refusing to cooperate with Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE’s) efforts to remove aliens illegally residing in the United States. Academics, pundits and politicians have compared this resistance and non-cooperation to “nullification,” a doctrine typically associated with the South Carolina Nullification Crisis of the 1830s and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. This article rejects comparisons between the sanctuary movement and nullification as false equivalencies and explains why the sanctuary movement is not a form of modern nullification. Rather, it suggests the movement is better understood as being similar to “interposition”—a doctrine related to, but distinct from, nullification. In doing so, this paper will clarify the meaning of nullification and interposition by analyzing the developments of these doctrines. Part 1 of this article discusses the historical, theoretical and practical aspects of South Carolina-style nullification, and compares these to that of the sanctuary movement. Part 2 explores the development of nullification and interposition more broadly, with a particular focus on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. Finally, Part 3 directly compares the sanctuary movement, nullification and interposition, and it connects the movement to the “anti-commandeering” doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in the 1990s.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-85
Author(s):  
Alasman Mpesau

In the General Election and Regional Head Election Law, the Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) has the authority supervisory to each Election stages, it is the center for law enforcement activities of the Election (Sentra Gakkumdu) to criminal acts and carrying out the judicial functions for investigating, examining, and decided on administrative disputes of General Election and Regional Head Election.  With the Bawaslu’s authority then placed as a super-body institution in the ranks of the Election Management Body, due to its essential role in building a clean and credible electoral system, it also has potential for abuse of power within it. In Law no. 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power has defined state institutions that have the authority to administrate judicial functions. These are the Supreme Court and Judicial Bodies that under its lines of general court, Religious Courts, Military Courts, Administrative Court (PTUN) and the Constitutional Court. The research method is normative juridical, that focuses on the analysis of the laws and regulations on General Election, Regional Head Elections and the Law on Judicial Power. The analytical tool is descriptive analysis, by describing the main issues, an analysis is carried out that was supported by case-approach related to the research. The study concludes that Bawaslu in carrying out judicial functions in its position as a semi-judicial institution has not a hierarchical relationship to the Supreme Court (MA) and the Constitutional Court (MK); however, what does exist is functional relationship.


2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-257
Author(s):  
V. V. Chumak

The role and place of higher specialized courts in the judicial system of Ukraine have been studied and determined. The author has studied such main categories as “judicial system of Ukraine”, “judiciary”, “judicial system” and “judicial power”. The judicial system of Ukraine has been established. The normative and legal base of functioning of highest specialized courts of Ukraine has been characterized. The author has provided own definition of the categories “judicial system of Ukraine” and “judicial power of Ukraine”. The author has offered to understand the category of “judicial system of Ukraine” as the totality of all hierarchically structured elements of the system (courts), which are endowed with exclusive competence to administer justice, built on the principles of territoriality and specialization, are defined by law and united by general principles of their organization and activity. In turn, the concept of “judicial power of Ukraine” is defined as the activity of courts (judicial system) to administer justice and to perform their professional duties within the limits and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine in accordance with international and legal documents. It has been determined that highest specialized courts in the judicial system of Ukraine are the Supreme Court on Intellectual Property Issues and the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court. It has been concluded that highest specialized courts in the judicial system of Ukraine play an important role in the holistic mechanism of the entire judicial system, since they are endowed with exclusive competence to consider and decide cases on the merits of certain categories, and their activities are determined at the level of a separate regulatory act, which determines their legal status, and hence their place in the judicial system of Ukraine.


2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (04) ◽  
pp. 854-884 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri

This article offers a theoretical discussion about courts in “hybrid regimes” that evolve from formerly democratic countries. The evolution toward authoritarianism typically allows governments more latitude to reduce judicial independence and judicial power. Yet, several reasons, including legitimacy costs, a tradition of using courts for judicial adjudication and social control, and even the use of courts for quenching dissent may discourage rulers from shutting down the judicial contestation arena and encourage them instead to appeal to less overbearing measures. This usually leads to a decline of the judiciary's proclivity to challenge the government, especially in salient cases. To illustrate these dynamics, I discuss the rise and fall of judicial power in Venezuela under Chávez's rule, focusing on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. Formerly the most powerful institution in the country's history, the Chamber briefly emerged as an influential actor at the beginning of the regime, but a comprehensive intervention of the judiciary in 2004 further politicized the court and effectively reduced its policy-making role.


Author(s):  
O. Kravchuk ◽  
I. Ostashchuk

The oath of a judge as an oath of office and as an element of judicial symbolism is considered in the article. The oath of a judge belongs to the categories of oaths of office, taken by an official upon taking office. At the same time, it belongs to the judicial oaths used in the justice process and is an element of judicial symbols. The oath of a judge as an oath of office symbolizes the endowment of a judge as an official by the state (judicial) power, the moment of his acquisition of powers (it is the inauguration ceremony), and the duty of a judge as an official to perform his duties properly. The oath of a judge as a judicial symbol represents a public and solemn obligation of the judge to exercise a fair trial in all its manifestations, including: independence and impartiality of the court, adversarial proceedings, equality of arms, and the rule of law. The judge takes the oath in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of senior officials (in Ukraine – in the presence of the President of Ukraine). It is an important ritual – a symbol of giving a person judicial power. The oath itself is a symbolic action of conscious choice of responsible and impartial observance of the law in the professional functions of realization of the rule of law for the good of all people. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that gathering a large number of people in one room can be problematic, so the oath ceremony was held even outdoors. It is stated that holding a ceremony in one of the judicial bodies, for example, in the premises of the Supreme Court or (subject to quarantine restrictions) in the territory of the Supreme Court may symbolize the independence of the judiciary and each judge from other branches of power. The peculiarity of the oath of a judge in Ukraine is its one-time nature. It should be taken only by a person first appointed to the position of a judge. In case of an appointment or transfer to another court, the judge shall not take the oath again. In this aspect, the oath of a judge is similar to the oath of a civil servant, which is taken only by persons recruited for the first time.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-174
Author(s):  
Paul Nkoane

The jurisdiction of the South African Constitutional Court has been extended for the court to administer ‘matters of general public importance’ in addition to administering constitutional matters. There is no South African court that accepted appeals on the grounds that the matter raised an arguable point of law of general public importance. This novelty in the South African law requires an inspection of other jurisdictions to determine which matters the Constitutional Court should accept for appeals. In this respect, the article inspects the Supreme Court of the United States case docket to determine the kinds of cases the court accepts for appeals.


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