Why Not Retribution? The Particularized Imagination and Justice for Pregnant Addicts

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Eckenwiler
Keyword(s):  
Child Abuse ◽  
South Carolina ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Criminal Prosecution ◽  
The South ◽  
Drug Laws ◽  
The Law ◽  
Women Who Use Drugs

The Law is a grim, unsmiling thing, Not Justice, though. Justice is witty and whimsical and kind and caring.Rohinton Misuy, A Fine Balance;When the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the conviction and twelve-year sentence of Regina McKnight, it affirmed that state 's commitment to bring the full force of the law to the punishment of pregnant women who use drugs. Prosecutors linked the delivery of Ms.McKnight 's stillborn baby to her use of cocaine, and argued successfully for a finding of homicide by child abuse. The McKnight judgment follows the South Carolina Supreme Court decision in the case of Cornelia Whitner. Whitner was sentenced to prison for illegal drug use during pregnancy on the grounds that the viable fetus is a child under the state s criminal child endangerment statute.On the basis of constitutional concerns such as due process and privacy, worries that criminal prosecutions may thwart public policy goals such as keeping families together and promoting the health of women and children, and findings that legislatures did not intend to include the fetus in the scope of drug laws or child abuse and neglect laws, criminal prosecution has been resisted in most jurisdictions.

“The law recognizes racial instinct”: Tucker v. Blease and the Black–White Paradigm in the Jim Crow South

2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 471-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Wertheimer ◽  
Jessica Bradshaw ◽  
Allyson Cobb ◽  
Harper Addison ◽  
E. Dudley Colhoun ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
Public School ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Jim Crow ◽  
State Law ◽  
The South ◽  
Best Interest ◽  
The Law ◽  
Jim Crow South

On January 24, 1913, the trustees of the Dalcho School, a segregated, all-white public school in Dillon County, South Carolina, summarily dismissed Dudley, Eugene, and Herbert Kirby, ages ten, twelve, and fourteen, respectively. According to testimony offered in a subsequent hearing, the boys had “always properly behaved,” were “good pupils,” and “never …exercise[d] any bad influence in school.” Moreover, the boys’ overwhelmingly white ancestry, in the words of the South Carolina Supreme Court, technically “entitled [them] to be classified as white,” according to state law. Nevertheless, because local whites believed that the Kirbys were “not of pure Caucasian blood,” and that therefore their removal was in the segregated school's best interest, the court, in Tucker v. Blease (1914), upheld their expulsion.

The South Confronts the Court: The Southern Manifesto of 1956

2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Badger
Keyword(s):  
North Carolina ◽  
South Carolina ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
The South ◽  
The Supreme Court

On Monday, March 12, Georgia's senior senator, Walter George, rose in the Senate to read a manifesto blasting the Supreme Court. The Manifesto condemned the “unwarranted decision” of the Court in Brown as a “clear abuse of judicial power” in which the Court “with no legal basis for such action, undertook to exercise their naked judicial power and substituted their personal political and social ideas for the established law of the land.” The signers pledged themselves “to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the Constitution and to prevent the use of force in its implementation.” It was signed by nineteen of the twenty-two southern senators, by every member of the congressional delegations from Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, by all but one of the representatives from Florida, all but one from Tennessee, all but three from North Carolina, and half of the Texas delegation.

scholarly journals KILKA UWAG DOTYCZĄCYCH POWOŁYWANIA CZŁONKÓW ZARZĄDU SPÓŁEK KAPITAŁOWYCH

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Gawrysiak-Zabłocka
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Legal Capacity ◽  
Practical Application ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Company Directors ◽  
The Law ◽  
Polish Code

SOME REMARKS ON THE APPOINTMENT OF COMPANY DIRECTORSSummaryThe article discusses selected issues concerning the appointment of company directors. In the first part the focus is on the practical application of Art. 18 of the Polish Code of Commercial Companies (Kodeks spółek handlowych, KSH), which provides that only natural persons having full legal capacity and not convicted for crimes or offences mentioned in that provision can be members of a company’s board of managers. In the light of the inconsistent rulings handed down by the Polish Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) it is not clear whether the registering court, which has information available from the National Criminal Register (Krajowy Rejestr Skazanych), may refuse to enter a resolution which has been passed at a shareholders’ meeting but is in breach of the law. In my opinion, the first premise in the ruling handed down by seven Supreme Court judges on 18 September 2013 (case III CZP 13/13) is flawed. Not only does it contradict the Supreme Court decision of 24 July 2013 (case III CNP 1/13), but also its consequences can hardly be reconciled with the consequences of the second premise. In the second part of the study I use the provision on the composition of a brokerage board to show that specific regulations may prove ineffective if they only give cursory attention to an issue, with no reference to what is stipulated by the KSH.

scholarly journals Judges' Legal Considerations (Ratio Decidendi) and Jurisdical Implications on the Criminal Acts of Continuous Corruption (Study of Supreme Court Decision No. 866 K/Pid. Sus/2016)

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 113
Author(s):  
Antonius Tigor W ◽  
Rehnalemken Ginting
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Criminal Prosecution ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
Question Mark ◽  
Analysis Technique ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Ratio Decidendi ◽  
Materials Used ◽  
Law Degree

This study intends to examine the legal considerations of the judges of the Supreme Court against the criminal act of corruption continued in the Supreme Court's decision number 866 K/Pid. Sus/2016. The decision stating that the convict is proven to have committed a criminal act of corruption continues, but the continued action is not stated in the consideration of the decision. The Supreme Court's decision number 866 K/Pidsus/2016 raises a big question mark regarding the legal basis for criminal prosecution for perpetrators of continuing corruption, this is because the Corruption Crime Law does not specifically regulate acts of continuing corruption. It is said to be a continuous act in a criminal act of corruption because the act is carried out continuously, both with similar crimes in corruption. Continuing action or also called Voorgezette handeling is an act (gebeuren) in which one action with another action is interrelated and becomes a single unit, the linkage must meet at least two conditions, namely the act is the embodiment of a forbidden will decision and an act that is prohibited. happen must be the same. This journal was created with the aim of being able to find out the judge's legal considerations for the criminal act of continuing corruption which was reviewed with the Ratio Decidendi Theory and the academic requirements to obtain a Master of Law degree at the Faculty of Law, Sebelas Maret University, Surakarta. The research method used by the researcher is doctrinal research with a statutory approach and a case approach. The technique of collecting legal materials used is literature study. The legal material analysis technique used is deductive data analysis.

A Class by Herself: Muller v. Oregon (1908)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy Woloch
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Turning Point ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Labor Standards ◽  
Sexual Equality ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Employment Of Women

This chapter assesses Muller v. Oregon (1908), its significance, and the law it upheld: Oregon's ten-hour law of 1903. Convicted of violating Oregon's law of 1903 that barred the employment of women in factories and laundries for more than ten hours a day, Curt Muller—the owner of a Portland laundry—challenged the constitutionality of the law, which he claimed violated his right of freedom to contract under the due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. On February 24, 1908, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Oregon law. This decision marked a momentous triumph for progressive reformers and a turning point in the movement for protective laws. At the same time, by declaring woman “in a class by herself,” the Supreme Court embedded in constitutional law an axiom of female difference. The Muller decision thus pushed public policy forward toward modern labor standards and simultaneously distanced it from sexual equality.

Desegregating the South, 1955-1970

1979 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Harvie Wilkinson
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
School Desegregation ◽  
Deep South ◽  
The South ◽  
School Officials ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Upper South ◽  
Brown Decision

Southern school desegregation after Brown progressed through four successive stages. The first might be termed absolute defiance, lasting from 1955 until the collapse of Virginia’s massive resistance in 1959. The second was token compliance, stretching from 1959 until passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. With that act, a third phase of modest integration began with the efforts of southern school officials to avoid fund cutoffs by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The 1968 Supreme Court decision of Green v. County School Board commenced a fourth phase of massive integration during which the South became the most integrated section of the country. Yet even as the fourth phase developed, a fifth—that of resegregation— was emerging in some southern localities. Breaks in history, of course, are never so neat as their chroniclers might wish. During the defiant stage, for example, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Florida practiced token compliance. And during much of the token compliance stage, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina practiced total defiance. The different phases thus express only regional momentum as a whole and not the progress, or lack thereof, of a particular state. Even as a gauge of regional momentum, moreover, these phases are imperfect, given wide differences in temperament between the Deep and Upper South. These differences, particularly at first, were important. “In terms of immediate progress toward desegregation in the South,” noted Numan Bartley, “there was precious little to choose between the complex machinations of upper South states and the bellicose interposition of Virginia and the Deep South. But in terms of the future of the Brown decision, the difference was considerable. States of the upper South, with the exception of Virginia, accepted the validity of the Supreme Court decree and aimed to evade its consequences; Deep South states refused to accede any legitimacy to the decision.” Prior to the Kennedy presidency, this division “helped to keep alive the principle of Brown v. Board of Education in the South.” From 1955 to 1968 the Supreme Court remained largely inactive in school desegregation.

Right of Appeal under Section 35 of the Arbitration Act of Kenya

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-166
Author(s):  
Vianney Sebayiga
Keyword(s):  
Literature Review ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Party Autonomy ◽  
High Court ◽  
Arbitral Award ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Court Intervention

An arbitral award is final and binding on the parties but may be set aside for failure to adhere to due process requirements. Section 35 of the Arbitration Act (Act hereafter) provides grounds for setting aside an arbitral award. It does not state whether decisions of the High Court on setting aside an arbitral award are final and thus cannot be appealed. In Nyutu Agrovet Limited v Airtel Networks Limited, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 35 to allow appeals on High Court decisions of setting aside an arbitral award. This paper analyses the Supreme Court decision and finds that it abrogated the internationally recognised arbitration principles such as party autonomy, the finality of arbitral awards and limited court intervention. Additionally, the paper discusses the implications of the decision on arbitral practice in Kenya. Using literature review and comparative jurisprudence, it advances that Section 35 does not allow appeals on decisions of the High Court. To this end, it proposes better interpretation techniques to safeguard the sanctity of arbitral awards.

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