Wage Negotiation, Employee Effort, and Firm Profit under Output-Based versus Fixed-Wage Incentive Contracts*

2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 616-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xi Jason Kuang ◽  
Donald V. Moser
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Douthit ◽  
Patrick Martin ◽  
Michelle McAllister

We examine the effect of a charitable contribution matching (CCM) program on employee effort. In CCM programs, employers commit to match employees' donations to charity. We expect CCM to activate a norm of other-regarding behavior, inducing employees to increase effort to benefit their employer. Experimental results robustly support our expectation. We find that CCM increases effort under both fixed-wage and performance-based incentive contracts. Further, our results suggest CCM is more effective at eliciting effort than alternative uses of firm capital. Specifically, CCM is more effective at eliciting effort than the firm allocating an equivalent amount of capital to either direct firm charitable giving or increased performance-based pay. Our study suggests that CCM has efficient and robust effort-elicitation benefits that increase its value as a compensation tool incremental to any initial employee selection benefits from CCM and any effort benefits from firms' direct charitable giving.


2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Lynn Hannan

This study investigates whether paying higher wages motivates employees to provide higher effort and whether firm profit moderates this relation. Consistent with gift exchange (Akerlof 1982) and reciprocity (Rabin 1993) models, my experimental results show that workers provided more effort when they were paid higher wages even though there was no ex post financial reward for doing so. Moreover, firm profit influenced the relation between wages and effort. Workers provided higher effort when firm profit decreased compared to when it increased. This suggests that the degree of reciprocity is affected by firm profit. However, workers' responded asymmetrically to firm profit, in that they behaved as if they expected to share in firm profit increases but not decreases. Although firms were fairly adept at predicting the profit-maximizing wage strategy, they apparently did not anticipate workers' reluctance to share in firm profit decreases.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret H. Christ

ABSTRACT Prior academic research finds that formal controls can cause employees to engage in dysfunctional behaviors (e.g., decreased effort, fraud, or theft). This study investigates one specific aspect of formal control that contributes to employees' negative reactions—employees' beliefs about management's intentions signaled by the control. I use two interactive experiments to examine the effects on employee effort and firm profit of: (1) employees' beliefs regarding management's intentions when implementing control (i.e., perceived intentionality), and (2) employees' preferences for reciprocity. Consistent with prior literature, I find that formal control can cause employees to exert low effort, resulting in reduced firm profit. However, I find that the adverse consequences only occur when management clearly imposes the control and, therefore, employees interpret it as a signal of distrust. Further, employees respond negatively to controls that are unambiguously imposed by managers, even when managers have entrusted them with a large amount of resources. Thus, when employees are faced with simultaneous, conflicting signals regarding managers' trust, the distrust signaled by the control crowds out employees' positive reciprocity. Alternatively, when managers' intentions for imposing control are ambiguous or clearly do not signal distrust (i.e., it is exogenously imposed), the control does not cause such negative effects. I find that all of the observed effects persist over time. In supplemental analysis, I also find that managers accurately predict that employees' response to formal control is influenced by their beliefs regarding management's intentions, and entrust fewer resources to employees when they have imposed the control than when it is imposed exogenously. The results of this study suggest that organizations should carefully consider employees' beliefs about management's intentions when implementing formal controls, because these beliefs influence employee behavior.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Lowen ◽  
M. Ryan Haley ◽  
Nancy J. Burnett
Keyword(s):  

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