scholarly journals What Is a Social Group in the Eyes of the Law? Knowledge Work in Refugee-Status Determination

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (04) ◽  
pp. 1257-1278 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Robert Owens

This article explores the settling and unsettling of legal concepts in relation to refugee-status determination. To gain admission to the United States, asylum seekers are required to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of one of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Accordingly, many political asylum claims turn on the interpretation of “particular social group.” This article examines case law disputes in the federal courts of appeals over the meaning of that phrase and describes how statutory interpretation by judges has contributed to the persistence of such disputes over several decades since the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act. My analysis reveals the tensions between different forms of rationality at play in judicial statutory interpretation and applies the concept of legal settling to a new empirical domain.

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 660-682
Author(s):  
Katherine Luongo

Abstract:Over the last two decades, witchcraft violence has emerged steadily as a “push factor” for African asylum seekers who argue that being accused of witchcraft or targeted with witchcraft renders them members of a “particular social group” (PSG), subject to persecution and eligible for refugee protection under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. This article examines the refugee status determination (RSD) processes through which immigration regimes in Canada and Australia have adjudicated allegations about witchcraft violence made by asylum seekers from across Anglophone Africa. It critiques the utility of expanding PSG along cultural lines without a commensurate expansion in adjudicators’ knowledge.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Azadeh Dastyari ◽  
Daniel Ghezelbash

Abstract Austria and Italy have recently proposed that processing the protection claims of asylum seekers attempting to cross the Mediterranean should take place aboard government vessels at sea. Shipboard processing of asylum claims is not a novel idea. The policy has been used for many years by the governments of the United States and Australia. This article examines the relevant international law, as well as State practice and domestic jurisprudence in the United States and Australia, to explore whether shipboard processing complies with international refugee and human rights law. It concludes that, while it may be theoretically possible for shipboard processing to comply with international law, there are significant practical impediments to carrying out shipboard processing in a manner that is compliant with the international obligations of States. Current practices in the United States and Australia fall short of what is required. Nor is there any indication that the Austrian/Italian proposal would contain the required safeguards. It is argued that this is by design. The appeal of shipboard processing for governments is that it allows them to dispense with the safeguards that asylum seekers would be entitled to if processed on land. Best practice is for all persons interdicted or rescued at sea to be transferred to a location on land where they have access to effective status determination procedures and are protected from refoulement and unlawful detention.


2020 ◽  
pp. 655
Author(s):  
Lauren Schusterman

Expedited removal allows low-level immigration officers to summarily order the deportation of certain noncitizens, frequently with little to no judicial oversight. Noncitizens with legitimate asylum claims should not find themselves in expedited removal. When picked up by immigration authorities, they should be referred for a credible fear interview and then for more thorough proceedings. Although there is clear congressional intent that asylum seekers not be subjected to expedited removal, mounting evidence suggests that expedited removal fails to identify bona fide asylum seekers. Consequently, many of them are sent back to persecution. Such decisions have weighty consequences, but they have remained largely immune from judicial review. This is in part due to a provision of expedited removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), that prevents the federal courts from hearing habeas petitions that challenge the decisions made in expedited removal. Circuit courts are split on whether this provision violates the Suspension Clause based on diverging interpretations of when noncitizens become entitled to habeas rights. This Note argues that, based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Suspension Clause and the historical purpose of habeas review, noncitizens who are physically in the territorial United States are entitled to habeas rights. As a result, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) is unconstitutional. Asylum seekers in the United States are entitled to habeas review of their expedited removal determinations unless Congress enacts an adequate substitute for this review.


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 432-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Gyollai ◽  
Anthony Amatrudo

In the summer of 2015 Hungary constructed a 175 km long barbed-wire fence at its southern border with Serbia. New criminal offences and asylum procedures were introduced that limited access to refugee status determination and ignored agreed EU asylum policy, deterring and de facto preventing asylum seekers from entering Hungarian territory. This paper provides an analysis of these new measures, which criminalized asylum seekers, and the subsequent Hungarian policy in relation to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights – arguing that the Hungarian authorities excessively abused their discretion in implementing these new policies of immigration and border control.


2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-122
Author(s):  
Kristen E. Eichensehr

When a foreign country's law is relevant to a case in U.S. federal court and the foreign country files an official statement about the meaning of its law, how should U.S. courts treat the foreign government's representations? In Animal Science Products, Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceuticals Co., the Supreme Court of the United States held that “[a] federal court should accord respectful consideration to a foreign government's submission, but is not bound to accord conclusive effect to the foreign government's statements.” In so doing, the Supreme Court settled a disagreement between the courts of appeals and reversed an opinion of the Second Circuit that had given conclusive effect to the Chinese government's representations about its domestic law. Animal Science Products provides important guidance to federal courts faced with increasingly frequent filings by foreign governments, but it leaves unresolved significant questions about deference to foreign sovereign amici and preserves existing debates about the nature of “respectful consideration.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 101-102
Author(s):  
Kate Jastram

Some governments, including but not limited to the United States, are taking ever more draconian measures to prevent asylum seekers from gaining access to territory and status determination procedures. An unknown number die in the attempt to reach safety. Asylum seekers who are intercepted at sea and even those who succeed in reaching a land border may simply be turned back. If allowed to present a claim, they may face detention, family separation, criminal prosecution, and/or bars to eligibility for refugee status based on their lack of documentation, irregular entry, or other supposed legal fault, such as failure to apply for asylum in another country. In opposing policies that criminalize seeking asylum and in defending individual asylum seekers, attorneys have pointed to Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which, subject to certain limitations, prohibits states from imposing penalties on refugees on account of their illegal entry or presence.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sital Kalantry

Citizens of foreign countries are increasingly using international treaties to assert claims against Federal and state governments. As a result, U.S. courts are being asked to determine whether treaties provide litigants with individually enforceable rights. Although courts have no consistent approach to determining whether a treaty gives rise to individually enforceable rights, they often apply the textualist methodology derived from statutory interpretation. However, instead of using textual theories of statutory interpretation, I argue that courts should use intentionalist theories developed from contract interpretation in determining individually enforceable rights under treaties. Two positive arguments and one negative argument support my approach. First, the question of whether a non-party can enforce a treaty is structurally similar to the question of whether a non-party can enforce a contract, but structurally different from the issue of whether there is a private cause of action under a statute. Second, Supreme Court jurisprudence supports the view that treaties are contracts even though they have the effect of statutes. As such, it is appropriate to apply theories of contract interpretation to understanding treaties. Third, arguments used to justify using textualism for purposes of interpreting statutes are not relevant to interpreting treaties.I suggest that courts use a modified version of the "intent-to-benefit" test derived from contract law in determining whether a treaty is enforceable by a non-party. Under the modified "intent-to-benefit" test, a non-party will have individually enforceable rights and remedies under the treaty if the treaty identifies a class of individuals who are intended beneficiaries of the treaty and if such non-party is within that class of individuals. Applying this test suggests that courts should privilege the drafting history over the ratification history of a treaty in interpreting it.I apply the modified "intent-to-benefit " test to a case study-the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Supreme Court recently decided in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not provide individuals with any remedies, but refused to decide whether the treaty provides individuals with rights. Since that decision, two Federal Courts of Appeals have come to differing conclusions on the question of whether that treaty creates individually enforceable rights. Under the modified "intent-to-benefit," the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations would be found to give rise to individually enforceable rights.Published: Intent-to-Benefit: Individually Enforceable Rights in International Treaties, 44 Stanford Journal of International Law 63 (2008).


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaclyn Kelley-Widmer ◽  
Hillary Rich ◽  
Cornell Library

Every day, thousands of Central American asylum seekers, many fleeing persecution from domestic abusers and gangs, attempt to seek refuge in the United States. To receive asylum, those escaping such violence typically must show that their membership in a “particular social group” is one central reason for their persecution. In Matter of A-B-, issued in June 2018, then-Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III restricted case law establishing domestic-violence-related particular social groups and attempted to destroy the viability of such claims altogether. As we demonstrate in this Article, this far-reaching decision should not receive Chevron deference from reviewing courts because it contravenes the intent of Congress.A-B- is concerning both for its potentially calamitous effect on individuals fleeing domestic and gang violence and for the abrupt, unwarranted departure from established immigration law that it represents. As a result of A-B-, individuals, many of them women, are being subjected to both different and higher standards for certain aspects of their asylum claims and must “re-invent the wheel” of establishing that domestic violence can be a basis for asylum.Federal courts reviewing immigration decisions normally apply the Chevron two-step framework to review agency decisions: first, has Congress defined the term at issue, or is it ambiguous? Second, if the term is ambiguous, is the agency interpretation of the term reasonable and therefore deserving of deference? Both steps of Chevron require a court to begin by using statutory interpretation to examine the meaning of the term.In this Article, we provide a fresh analysis of the term “particular social group” through statutory construction, legislative history, and international context to find that there are some parameters around the term that are not ambiguous. Applying these parameters to A-B- at Chevron step one, we argue that A-B- is at odds with the meaning of particular social group because it incorrectly implies that there is a size limitation to meet the particularity requirement of a group, and because the decision raises the standard when the source of persecution is a private actor.Turning to Chevron step two, we argue that A-B- contains fundamentally unreasonable interpretations of the remaining ambiguous elements of particular social group. For example, the decision contravenes the mandate that “particular social group” be a flexible category that can adapt to evolving humanitarian concerns. It also renounces consideration of the perspective of the persecutor in defining the group. In attempting to unilaterally foreclose an entire type of particular social group as a potential basis for asylum, Attorney General Sessions contradicts congressional intent, misinterprets precedent, and oversteps the discretionary authority afforded to the agency. Therefore, reviewing courts should not give A-B- Chevron deference.


2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rorie Spill Solberg ◽  
Leonard Ray

In the past few decades, the states have gained more discretion over policy adoption and implementation. Some of this expanded discretion has resulted from federal court rulings, as the states have increasingly used these courts to achieve their policy goals. But some states are more successful in the federal courts than others. Why is this? We examine cases argued by states in the United States Courts of Appeals between 1970 and 1996 to answer this question. Contrary to research at the Supreme Court level, we find no overall trend that the states are becoming more efficacious in court over time. We also find that the differences among the states' success in court cannot be attributed simply, or even primarily, to disparities in resources. Rather, case attributes and judicial attitudes provide the best explanations for state success in the Courts of Appeals.


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