scholarly journals Philosophy of Science A Personal Peek into the Future

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 230-240
Author(s):  
Steven French ◽  
Michela Massimi
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
The Future

What is a scientific instrument, now?

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liba Taub
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Smithsonian Institution ◽  
Scientific Instrument ◽  
Scientific Instruments ◽  
Classic Article ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of

Abstract In 1990, Deborah Jean Warner, a curator at the Smithsonian Institution, published her now-classic article ‘What is a scientific instrument, when did it become one, and why?’. These questions were prompted by practical curatorial considerations: what was she supposed to collect for her museum? Today, we are still considering questions of what we collect for the future, why, and how. These questions have elicited some new and perhaps surprising answers since the publication of Warner’s article, sometimes – but not only – as a reflection of changing technologies and laboratory practices, and also as a result of changes in those disciplines that study science, including history of science and philosophy of science. In focusing attention on meanings associated with scientific instrument collections, and thinking about what objects are identified as scientific instruments, I consider how definitions of instruments influence what is collected and preserved.

scholarly journals Editor's Introduction

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Curtis Forbes
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
The Future ◽  
Technical Details ◽  
Realism Debate

The debate over scientific realism, simply put, is a debate over what we can and should believe about reality once we've critically assessed all the available arguments and empirical evidence. Thinking earnestly about the merits of scientific realism as a philosophical thesis requires navigating contentious historiographical issues, being familiar with the technical details of various scientific theories, and addressing disparate philosophical problems spanning aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and beyond. This issue of Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science aims to make participating in the scientific realism debate easier for both newcomers and veterans, collecting over twenty invited and peer-reviewed papers under the title "The Future of the Scientific Realism Debate: Contemporary Issues Concerning Scientific Realism."

Confirmation

Philosophy ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Dallmann ◽  
Franz Huber
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Observational Data ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Problem Of Induction ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
Other Information ◽  
Degree Of Confirmation

The term confirmation is used in epistemology and the philosophy of science whenever observational data and other information that is taken for granted speak in favor of or support scientific theories and everyday hypotheses. Historically, confirmation has been closely related to the problem of induction, the question of what to believe regarding the future given information that is restricted to the past and present. One relation between confirmation and induction is that the conclusion H of an inductively strong argument with premise E is confirmed by E. If inductive strength comes in degrees and the inductive strength of the argument with premise E and conclusion H is equal to r, then the degree of confirmation of H by E is likewise said to be equal to r.

Toward a philosophical history of psychology: An alternative path for the future

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saulo de Freitas Araujo
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Future Development ◽  
Alternative Model ◽  
History Of Psychology ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of ◽  
Dominant Tendency

Recent transformations in the history of science and the philosophy of science have led historians of psychology to raise questions about the future development of their historiography. Although there is a dominant tendency among them to view their discipline as related to the social turn in the history of science, there is no consensus over how to approach the history of psychology methodologically. The aim of this article is to address the issue of the future of the historiography of psychology by proposing an alternative but complementary path for the field, which I call a philosophical history of psychology. In order to achieve this goal, I will first present and discuss the emergence of the social turn in the history of psychology, showing some of its problems. I will then introduce the contemporary debate about the integration of the history of science and the philosophy of science as an alternative model for the history of psychology. Finally, I will propose general guidelines for a philosophical history of psychology, discussing some of its possible advantages and limitations.

scholarly journals Practical Methodological Reform Needs Good Theory

2021 ◽  
pp. 174569162097747
Author(s):  
Will M. Gervais
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Scientific Discovery ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Good Theory ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Face ◽  
Scientific Networks ◽  
Interdisciplinary Theory ◽  
Reform Needs

In the face of unreplicable results, statistical anomalies, and outright fraud, introspection and changes in the psychological sciences have taken root. Vibrant reform and metascience movements have emerged. These are exciting developments and may point toward practical improvements in the future. Yet there is nothing so practical as good theory. This article outlines aspects of reform and metascience in psychology that are ripe for an injection of theory, including a lot of excellent and overlooked theoretical work from different disciplines. I review established frameworks that model the process of scientific discovery, the types of scientific networks that we ought to aspire to, and the processes by which problematic norms and institutions might evolve, focusing especially on modeling from the philosophy of science and cultural evolution. We have unwittingly evolved a toxic scientific ecosystem; existing interdisciplinary theory may help us intelligently design a better one.

scholarly journals Practical Methodological Reform Needs Good Theory

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Will M Gervais
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Scientific Discovery ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Good Theory ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Face ◽  
Scientific Networks ◽  
Interdisciplinary Theory ◽  
Reform Needs

In the face of unreplicable results, statistical anomalies, and outright fraud, introspection and changes in the psychological sciences have taken root. Vibrant reform and meta-science movements have emerged. These are exciting developments, and may point towards practical improvements in the future. Yet there is nothing so practical as good theory. This paper outlines aspects of reform and meta-science in psychology that are ripe for an injection of theory, including a lot of excellent and overlooked theoretical work from different disciplines. I review established frameworks that model the process of scientific discovery, the types of scientific networks that we ought to aspire to, and the processes by which problematic norms and institutions might evolve, focusing especially on modeling from the philosophy of science and cultural evolution. We have unwittingly evolved a toxic scientific ecosystem; existing interdisciplinary theory may help us intelligently design a better one. Unpaywalled print at https://psyarxiv.com/jcs6e/

The future of philosophy of science: armchair philosophers need not apply

Metascience ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-164
Author(s):  
Martin Curd
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
The Future
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