Toward a philosophical history of psychology: An alternative path for the future

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saulo de Freitas Araujo

Recent transformations in the history of science and the philosophy of science have led historians of psychology to raise questions about the future development of their historiography. Although there is a dominant tendency among them to view their discipline as related to the social turn in the history of science, there is no consensus over how to approach the history of psychology methodologically. The aim of this article is to address the issue of the future of the historiography of psychology by proposing an alternative but complementary path for the field, which I call a philosophical history of psychology. In order to achieve this goal, I will first present and discuss the emergence of the social turn in the history of psychology, showing some of its problems. I will then introduce the contemporary debate about the integration of the history of science and the philosophy of science as an alternative model for the history of psychology. Finally, I will propose general guidelines for a philosophical history of psychology, discussing some of its possible advantages and limitations.

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liba Taub

Abstract In 1990, Deborah Jean Warner, a curator at the Smithsonian Institution, published her now-classic article ‘What is a scientific instrument, when did it become one, and why?’. These questions were prompted by practical curatorial considerations: what was she supposed to collect for her museum? Today, we are still considering questions of what we collect for the future, why, and how. These questions have elicited some new and perhaps surprising answers since the publication of Warner’s article, sometimes – but not only – as a reflection of changing technologies and laboratory practices, and also as a result of changes in those disciplines that study science, including history of science and philosophy of science. In focusing attention on meanings associated with scientific instrument collections, and thinking about what objects are identified as scientific instruments, I consider how definitions of instruments influence what is collected and preserved.


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 108-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian C. Brock

Araujo begins by criticising what he calls the “social turn” in the history of psychology. He singles out the work of Kurt Danziger for special criticism in this regard. He then outlines the emergence of an allegedly new field called “History and Philosophy of Science” (HPS) and calls for a different approach which he labels a “philosophical” history of psychology. Here I examine his criticism of Danziger’s work and suggest that it is unjustified. I also point out that there is nothing new about the field of HPS and nothing original about the idea of relating history and philosophy of psychology. I conclude by suggesting that, although Araujo’s criticism is unjustified, it can give some insight into where his alternative path for the future will lead. It is an attempt to excise the sociology of knowledge from historical discourse and to return to a more traditional history of ideas.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 229-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo Klappenbach ◽  
Ana Maria Jacó-Vilela

2007 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-420
Author(s):  
Magda Ritoókné Ádám ◽  
Olivér Nagybányai Nagy ◽  
Csaba Pléh ◽  
Attila Keresztes

VárinéSzilágyiIbolya: Építészprofilok, akik a 70-es, 80-as években indultak(Ritoókné Ádám Magda)      407RacsmányMihály(szerk.): Afejlődés zavarai és vizsgálómódszerei(Nagybányai Nagy Olivér)     409Új irányzatok és a bejárt út a pszichológiatörténet-írásban (Mandler, G.: Interesting times. An encounter with the 20th century; Hergenhahn, B. N.: An introduction to the history of psychology; Schultz, D. P.,Schultz, S. E.: A history of modern psychology; Greenwood, J. D.: The disappearance of the social in American social psychology;Bem, S.,LoorendeJong, H.: Theoretical issues in psychology. An introduction; Sternberg, R. J. (ed.)Unity in psychology: Possibility or pipedream?;Dalton, D. C.,Evans, R. B. (eds): __


2009 ◽  
Vol 217 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theo Herrmann

One cannot predict the future of the sciences or that of psychology. The question “What’s next?” gives reason to think about which principles to which psychology has developed. In analyzing the historical development of psychology, one should differentiate between basic psychological research, psychological technology, and the structure of institutions. Historical changes of psychology occur slowly and continuously. These continuous changes are obviously a foil for short-term changes that we can refer to as discontinuities. The complex pattern of continuities and discontinuities is based on very different conditions. External and internal causes of the changes in the history of psychology are discussed.


Author(s):  
Philip Enros

An effort to establish programs of study in the history of science took place at the University of Toronto in the 1960s. Initial discussions began in 1963. Four years later, the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology was created. By the end of 1969 the Institute was enrolling students in new MA and PhD programs. This activity involved the interaction of the newly emerging discipline of the history of science, the practices of the University, and the perspectives of Toronto’s faculty. The story of its origins adds to our understanding of how the discipline of the history of science was institutionalized in the 1960s, as well as how new programs were formed at that time at the University of Toronto.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. McAllister

Abstract This article offers a critical review of past attempts and possible methods to test philosophical models of science against evidence from history of science. Drawing on methodological debates in social science, I distinguish between quantitative and qualitative approaches. I show that both have their uses in history and philosophy of science, but that many writers in this domain have misunderstood and misapplied these approaches, and especially the method of case studies. To test scientific realism, for example, quantitative methods are more effective than case studies. I suggest that greater methodological clarity would enable the project of integrated history and philosophy of science to make renewed progress.


2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-242
Author(s):  
JAMES POSKETT

AbstractWhat is the history of science? How has it changed over the course of the twentieth century? And what does the future hold for the discipline? This ‘Retrospect’ provides an introduction to the historiography of science as it developed in the Anglophone world. It begins with the foundation of the Cambridge History of Science Committee in the 1940s and ends with the growth of cultural history in the 2000s. At the broadest level, it emphasizes the need to consider the close relationship between history and the history of science. All too often the historiography of science is treated separately from history at large. But as this essay shows, these seemingly distinct fields often developed in relation to one another. This essay also reveals the ways in which Cold War politics shaped the history of science as a discipline. It then concludes by considering the future, suggesting that the history of science and the history of political thought would benefit from greater engagement with one another.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-188
Author(s):  
Andrey Vaganov

Collecting as a social, psychological and even physiological phenomenon has not been devoted to much serious research. Those that exist focus on the phenomenology of collections. The phenomenon of collecting and collecting remains largely unexplored. The topic of “collectors-scientists” is, in general, a blank spot in the study of science and the social history of science. Nevertheless, there is quite legitimately a special concept - “research collection”. For example, the collection of collections for Goethe was one of the ways of his scientific work. As a result of this work, Goethe became an expert in the field of knowledge, the objects of which he collected. This kind of rapprochement between science and collecting seems to be an interdependent process. Not only collecting in the highest phase of its development is being melted into a scientific occupation, but also an occupation in science has all the features inherent in project collecting. The article makes an attempt to establish some ontological patterns inherent in this process, to outline the paths to the natural science study of the phenomenon of scientists-collectors.


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