The biased nature of philosophical beliefs in the light of peer disagreement

The epistemology of disagreement examines the question of how an agent ought to respond to awareness of epistemic peer disagreement about one of her beliefs. The literature on this topic, ironically enough, represents widespread disagreement about how we should respond to disagreement. I argue for the sceptical conclusion that the existence of widespread disagreement throughout the history of philosophy, and right up until the present day indicates that philosophers are highly unreliable at arriving at the truth. If truth convergence indicates progress in a field, then there is little progress in philosophy. This sceptical conclusion, however, need not make us give up philosophizing: That we should currently be sceptical of our philosophical beliefs is a contingent fact. We are an intellectually immature species and given the existence of the deep future we have some reason to think that there will be truth-convergence in philosophy in the future.

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Religious Disagreement, Religious Experience, and the Evil God Hypothesis

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion ◽

10.24204/ejpr.v0i0.2827 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Kirk Lougheed

Keyword(s):

Religious Experience ◽

Religious Beliefs ◽

Religious Believer ◽

Religious Experiences ◽

Peer Disagreement ◽

Epistemic Peer ◽

Religious Disagreement

Conciliationism is the view that says when an agent who believes P becomes aware of an epistemic peer who believes not-P, that she encounters a (partial) defeater for her belief that P. Strong versions of conciliationism pose a sceptical threat to many, if not most, religious beliefs since religion is rife with peer disagreement. Elsewhere (Removed) I argue that one way for a religious believer to avoid sceptical challenges posed by strong conciliationism is by appealing to the evidential import of religious experience. Not only can religious experience be used to establish a relevant evidential asymmetry between disagreeing parties, but reliable reports of such experiences also start to put pressure on the religious sceptic to conciliate toward her religious opponent. Recently, however, Asha Lancaster-Thomas poses a highly innovative challenge to the evidential import of religious experience. Namely, she argues that an evil God is just as likely to explain negative religious experiences as a good God is able to explain positive religious experiences. In light of this, religious believers need to explain why a good God exists instead of an evil God. I respond to Lancaster-Thomas by suggesting that, at least within the context of religious experience, (i) that the evil God hypothesis is only a challenge to certain versions of theism; and (ii) that the existence of an evil God and good God are compossible.

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The Problem of Unwelcome Epistemic Company

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2020.32 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 1-13

Author(s):

Joshua Blanchard

Keyword(s):

Peer Disagreement ◽

Normative Status

Abstract Many of us are unmoved when it is objected that some morally or intellectually suspect source agrees with our belief. While we may tend to find this kind of guilt by epistemic association unproblematic, I argue that this tendency is a mistake. We sometimes face what I call the problem of unwelcome epistemic company. This is the problem of encountering agreement about the content of your belief from a source whose faults give you reason to worry about the belief's truth, normative status, etiology, or implications. On the basis of an array of cases, I elaborate four distinct kinds of problems that unwelcome epistemic company poses. Two of these are distinctly epistemic, and two are moral. I canvass possible responses, ranging from stubbornness to an epistemic prudishness that avoids unwelcome company at all costs. Finally, I offer preliminary lessons of the problem and distinguish it from the problem of peer disagreement.

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Epistemic self-esteem of philosophers in the face of philosophical disagreement

Human Affairs ◽

10.1515/humaff-2020-0029 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 30 (3) ◽

pp. 328-342

Author(s):

László Bernáth ◽

János Tőzsér

Keyword(s):

Self Esteem ◽

Moderate Level ◽

Significant Extent ◽

Fourth Section ◽

Philosophical Beliefs ◽

Low Level ◽

The Third ◽

Epistemic Peers ◽

The Face ◽

And Performance

AbstractOur paper consists of four parts. In the first part, we describe the challenge of the pervasive and permanent philosophical disagreement over philosophers’ epistemic self-esteem. In the second part, we investigate the attitude of philosophers who have high epistemic self-esteem even in the face of philosophical disagreement and who believe they have well-grounded philosophical knowledge. In the third section, we focus on the attitude of philosophers who maintain a moderate level of epistemic self-esteem because they do not attribute substantive philosophical knowledge to themselves but still believe that they have epistemic right to defend substantive philosophical beliefs. In the fourth section, we analyse the attitude of philosophers who have a low level of epistemic self-esteem in relation to substantive philosophical beliefs and make no attempt to defend those beliefs. We argue that when faced with philosophical disagreement philosophers either have to deny that the dissenting philosophers are their epistemic peers or have to admit that doing philosophy is less meaningful than it seemed before. In this second case, philosophical activity and performance should not contribute to the philosophers’ overall epistemic self-esteem to any significant extent.

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A ‘Life-Style Choice’ or a Philosophical Belief?: The Argument for Veganism and Vegetarianism to be a Protected Philosophical Belief and the Position in England and Wales

Liverpool Law Review ◽

10.1007/s10991-020-09273-w ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Paul McKeown ◽

Rachel Ann Dunn

Keyword(s):

Animal Welfare ◽

Life Style ◽

Employment Law ◽

England And Wales ◽

Philosophical Beliefs ◽

The Usa

AbstractThe recent judgment in Casamitjana Costa v The League Against Cruel Sports in England and Wales held that ethical veganism was a protected philosophical belief under employment law. In contrast, vegetarianism was found not to be a protected philosophical belief in Conisbee v Crossley Farms Limited and others. The authors argue that the Employment Tribunal misunderstood the notion of vegetarianism when deciding that it was a ‘life-style choice’. There are different kinds of vegans and vegetarians, each with their own way of practising the philosophy which influences how they live their life. Not all people who follow a meat-free diet should be afforded this protection, and it depends on whether their belief is one which is determined by certain factors, such as animal welfare and environmentalism, rather than for health purposes. The authors explore the arguments and analysis in the above employment cases, coming to the conclusion that the tribunals oversimplified what it means to hold values such as veganism and vegetarianism, failing to understand the differences between different classifications and sub-groups when coming to a decision. The different kinds of vegans and vegetarians and their characteristics are outlined, before determining whether this should constitute protection under employment law, protecting individuals from discrimination. The situation in the USA and Canada regarding this issue is very different, and there are parallels drawn with attempting to establish veganism or vegetarianism as a religion, and where they could benefit from the recent decision in England and Wales. Finally, this paper concludes that ethical and environmental veganism and vegetarianism should both qualify as protected philosophical beliefs, but other kinds may fall short of what is required to satisfy the requirements under law.

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The Certitude of Astrology: the Scientific Methodology of Al-Qabīsī and Abu MaShar1

Early Science and Medicine ◽

10.1163/157338202x00117 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 7 (3) ◽

pp. 198-213 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Charles Burnett

Keyword(s):

Scientific Methodology ◽

Philosophical Beliefs ◽

Specific Community ◽

Scientific Value

AbstractAbū Ma'shar (787-886) and al-Qābīsī (mid-10th century) were active astrologers and defenders of the scientific character of their discipline. They wrote works on criticisms brought forward against the discipline and challenged practitioners whom they considered as detrimental for the esteem and future fate of their science. Nevertheless, both writers can be seen as heirs to a single tradition of thought, which took its origins in Ptolemy's Tetrabiblios and developed largely independently of the religious or philosophical beliefs of a specific community. The arguments developed for proving the scientific value of astrology are interesting in their own right, and merit further study not only by historians of science but also by historians of philosophy.

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Conciliatory Views on Peer Disagreement and the Order of Evidence Acquisition

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy ◽

10.1515/krt-2021-0023 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 0 (0) ◽

Author(s):

Marc Andree Weber

Keyword(s):

Belief Revision ◽

Point Of View ◽

Imprecise Probabilities ◽

Peer Disagreement

Abstract The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities.

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