Confluent Modeling of Heterogeneous Safety and Operational Instrumentation and Control Systems

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mithil Parekh ◽  
Yuan Gao ◽  
Mariana Jockenhoevel-Barttfeld ◽  
Karl Waedt
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Heterogeneous Systems ◽  
Legacy Systems ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Product Families ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
Specialized Equipment ◽  
Commercial Off The Shelf

Abstract Individual systems or groups of systems related to the safety and operational instrumentation & control (I&C), and electrical systems are gradually replaced in existing nuclear power plants (NPPs) as part of modernization projects. Modernizations are usually scheduled over multiple years. Different automation platform generations and safety-related product families are deployed to progressively replace legacy systems. Typically, each of the new I&C platforms and products have their own set of engineering tools. One challenge for the modernization of installed systems is the safety and security approval of these heterogeneous systems by regulatory bodies. An NPP consists of systems manufactured by different vendors, which target different application domains, like category A according to IEC 61226 for a reactor protection system, category C for some control room data processing systems or nonclassified for auxiliary systems. Thus, replacing a legacy system by introducing a new one might bring in unknown risks, especially when the new system has more complex interfaces, e.g., when replacing an analog system by a digital system. Moreover, considering the time and budget limitations, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software are also involved in modernization projects. In contrast to specialized equipment, vulnerabilities for COTS are widespread. On the other hand, existing security measures/mitigations are also required to reflect the system's changes, e.g., mitigations for known vulnerabilities of COTS systems. In order to make an overall and integrated safety analysis after a system change in the frame of a modernization project, it is necessary to jointly consider these I&C systems targeting different application domains, in addition to the physical aggregates, like sensors, pumps, and valves that interact with the physical processes. The restrictive deployment of wireless technologies may also be modeled and analyzed. While wireless is not deployed by legacy systems, it is being covered by new nuclear IEC standards, as some utilities intend to simplify selected I&C maintenance procedures that involve temporary data collection. The key modeling concepts consider new developments in the critical infrastructure and industrial automation domain. With the integrated modeling approach, different disciplines can be addressed, like probabilistic and deterministic safety analyses, security assessments, need for testing and specialized trainings.

Confluent Modeling of Heterogeneous Safety and Operational I&C Systems

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mithil Parekh ◽  
Yuan Gao ◽  
Mariana Jockenhoevel-Barttfeld ◽  
Karl Waedt
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Heterogeneous Systems ◽  
Legacy Systems ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Product Families ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
Specialized Equipment ◽  
Commercial Off The Shelf

Individual systems or groups of systems related to the safety and operational I&C, and Electrical Systems (ES) are gradually replaced in existing Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) as part of modernization projects. Modernizations are usually scheduled over multiple years. Different automation platform generations and safety-related product families are deployed to progressively replace legacy systems. Typically, each of the new I&C platforms and products have their own set of engineering tools. One challenge for the modernization of installed systems is the safety and security approval of these heterogeneous systems by regulatory bodies. A NPP consists of systems manufactured by different vendors which target different application domains, like Category A according to IEC 61226 for a Reactor Protection System, Category C for some Control Room Data Processing Systems or non-classified for auxiliary systems. Thus, replacing a legacy system by introducing a new one might bring in unknown risks, especially when the new system has more complex interfaces, e.g. when replacing an analog system by a digital system. Moreover, considering the time and budget limitations, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software are also involved in modernization projects. In contrast to specialized equipment, vulnerabilities for COTS are widespread. On the other hand, existing security measures/mitigations are also required to reflect the system’s changes, e.g. mitigations for known vulnerabilities of COTS systems. In order to make an overall and integrated safety analysis after a system change in the frame of a modernization project, it is necessary to jointly consider these I&C systems targeting different application domains, in addition to the physical aggregates, like sensors, pumps and valves that interact with the physical processes. The restrictive deployment of wireless technologies may also be modeled and analyzed. While wireless is not deployed by legacy systems, it is being covered by new nuclear IEC standards, as some utilities intend to simplify selected I&C maintenance procedures that involve temporary data collection. The key modeling concepts consider new developments in the critical infrastructure and industrial automation domain. With the integrated modeling approach, different disciplines can be addressed, like probabilistic and deterministic safety analyses, security assessments, need for testing and specialized trainings.

Toward a Big Data-Based Approach: A Review on Degradation Models for Prognosis of Critical Infrastructure

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guru Prakash ◽  
Xian-Xun Yuan ◽  
Budhaditya Hazra ◽  
Daijiro Mizutani
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Degradation Mechanism ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Small Data ◽  
Practical Applications ◽  
Degradation Modeling ◽  
Degradation Models

Abstract Safety and reliability of large critical infrastructure such as long-span bridges, high-rise buildings, nuclear power plants, high-voltage transmission towers, rotating machinery, and so on, are important for a modern society. Research on reliability and safety analysis started with a “small data” problem dealing with relative scarce lifetime or failure data. Later, degradation modeling that uses performance deterioration, or, condition data collected from in-service inspections or online health monitoring became an important tool for reliability prediction and maintenance planning of highly reliable engineering systems. Over the past decades, a large number of degradation models have been developed to characterize and quantify the underlying degradation mechanism using direct and indirect measurements. Recent advancements in artificial intelligence, remote sensing, big data analytics, and Internet of things are making far-reaching impacts on almost every aspect of our lives. The effect of these changes on the degradation modeling, prognosis, and safety management is interesting questions to explore. This paper presents a comprehensive, forward-looking review of the various degradation models and their practical applications to damage prognosis and management of critical infrastructure. The degradation models are classified into four categories: physics-based, knowledge-based, data-driven, and hybrid approaches.

scholarly journals Human factor in emergency occurrence at NPP during the pandemic COVID-19: new potential risks and recommendations to minimize them

2021 ◽  
Vol 280 ◽  
pp. 09013
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Popov ◽  
Anna Iatsyshyn ◽  
Norbert Molitor ◽  
Andrii Iatsyshyn ◽  
Yevhen Romanenko ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Psychological Support ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
Potential Risks

COVID-19 pandemic is an emergency that spread across the planet. It threatens lives and health of the population, with many dead and injured. Also, during pandemic there was (and continues to be) a violation of normal living conditions, significant material damage to economies of different countries. Quarantine restrictions affected social, educational, cultural and spiritual spheres of society. There is an urgent threat to operation of critical infrastructure as the pandemic led to large numbers of hospitalized or self-isolated people and being treated at home. At present, the operation of critical infrastructure, and in particular nuclear power plants, is strategically important for the proper functioning of any country. Also, the research describes causes of emergencies at nuclear power plants and identifies another factor - the mass disease of NPP personnel or their relatives on COVID-19. It is determined that timely detection and appropriate work to restore mental health during the pandemic is no less important area of work along with providing medical care to population. Stress associated with uncertainty, threat to health, can have negative consequences for well-being and mental health of workers. Depression, emotional exhaustion, anxiety, irritability, suicidal thoughts, etc. can also be consequences. Socio-psychological support especially for critical infrastructure workers is important to promote mental health during COVID-19 pandemic. Recommendations for socio-psychological support of NPP personnel were developed. Specialized mobile applications are described as convenient and economical way for primary psychological care.

Engineered Security Measures of Nuclear Power Plants

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. J. Moody
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Human Error ◽  
Mechanical Damage ◽  
Thermal Hydraulics ◽  
Plant Design ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Safety Features

Even in the absence of depraved terrorist threats, nuclear plants have been designed to respond safely to postulated accidents. Redundant safety features are built into plants to trigger safe shutdown and containment of possible accidents. The defined accidents range from minor leakage and operator errors to a complete loss of coolant from the reactor. Post-accident scenarios are postulated by experts in reactor and containment thermal-hydraulics, and all other sciences embraced by nuclear power plant design. The probability of failure is determined for all engineered safety systems. Then analytical and experimental programs are employed to predict the long term post-accident thermal-hydraulic state of a plant and its effect on the environment. The postulated accidents and safety system responses include effects resulting from mechanical damage and component malfunctions, such as pipe ruptures and the failure of pumps and valves. The initiating causes can be material failure, human error, and environmental effects from earthquakes, floods, and other severe acts of nature. It is prudent to build on an already established safety and accident technology to include the effects of external, planned attacks on a nuclear plant. This process includes “matching wits” with the minds of those who plot evil, and reinforcing protective security barriers where potential vulnerabilities are detected. Hard questions to ask and answer are, “What are the greatest potential security threats to a nuclear power plant? What possible human activity could make them happen? How can they be prevented?” Reactor and containment thermal-hydraulics contributes significantly to answering these questions.

Grid Collapse Security, Stability and Vulnerability Issues: Impactful Issues Affecting Nuclear Power Plants, Chemical Plants and Natural Gas Supply Systems

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert McCreight
Keyword(s):  
Natural Gas ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Geomagnetic Storms ◽  
Risk Mitigation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Primary Energy ◽  
Chemical Plants ◽  
Cyber Attack

Abstract Vulnerability to extended power outages stemming from grid collapse triggered by terrorism, technological accident, cyber attack or geomagnetic storms is understood to mean the widest possible spectrum of immediate and downstream consequences for our nations critical infrastructure. Regrettably few realistic plans are in place for dealing with this risk especially as it pertains to three primary energy systems of strategic significance to the United States – nuclear power, chemical manufacturing and natural gas supplies. The author argues that greater sustained attention is needed to upgrade the resilience of these systems, foster greater sharing of remedies among them to offset the worst effects of grid collapse which exceeds 15 consecutive calendar days and build collective avenues of enhanced risk mitigation against such scenarios.

scholarly journals Nuclear terrorism: Assessment of the danger of Nuclear Power Plant air strikes

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (3) ◽  
pp. 39-46
Author(s):  
A. Metelkov
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Energy Use ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Nuclear Terrorism ◽  
Extreme Loads ◽  
Urgent Task ◽  
Nuclear Security

The article analyzes the problem of possible threats with the use of aircraft captured by terrorists or controlled unmanned aerial vehicles in relation to nuclear energy use facilities. In the context of preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, the urgent task is to protect nuclear facilities from deliberate attacks by civilian airliners operated by terrorists. On the basis of the materials of publications, the influence of external extreme loads acting on the design of nuclear power plants, their features during the fall of aircraft of different types is studied. As a conclusion, the author notes that improving the safety of nuclear power plants and other radiation-hazardous facilities, minimizing possible consequences from aircraft strikes are important areas in risk management and their protection from acts of nuclear terrorism by combining organizational measures to combat terrorism and nuclear security measures.

Contribution to Assessments of Impacts on the Critical Infrastructure

2014 ◽  
Vol 656 ◽  
pp. 578-587
Author(s):  
David Valis
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Fuzzy Logic ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Potential Threat

Assessing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure objects is of major concern when dealing with the process of dependability and risk management. Special attention is paid to the objects of higher interest, such as nuclear power plants. In spite of the protection of these objects, there is still a certain level of a potential threat. The aim of the paper is to describe a possible way of assessments of the consequences when attacking on an object of critical infrastructure. Several characteristics of the impacts outcomes were obtained. For this reason, as well as for modelling of adversary ́s behaviour impact, fuzzy logic tools have been used.

scholarly journals CYBER SECURITY ISSUES & CHALLENGES FACED IN HANDLING CYBERCRIMES

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pranav C
Keyword(s):  
Information Security ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Paper Briefly ◽  
Modern Life ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
The World

Abstract: With rapid computerisation of all walks of life, cyber security has become a major challenge to the mankind. Cyber security is all about security of anything in cyber realm, while information security is all about security of information regardless of the realm. Cybercrimes are perpetrated by using computers and related devices / networks by individuals with sophisticated knowledge in the field of computers. Cybercrime is an evil having its origin in the growing dependence on computers in modern life. In a day and age when everything from microwave ovens and refrigerators to nuclear power plants is being run on computers, cybercrime has assumed rather sinister implications. Cybercrime perpetrators are keeping pace with innovations in technology and are way ahead of security measures taken to curb them. With huge money involved in cybercrimes, it has become a major concern. This research paper briefly defines cyber security and deals in detail with cybercrime and five major cyber security threats currently plaguing the world.

scholarly journals Lessons from Chernobyl

2021 ◽  
pp. 106-118
Author(s):  
L.I. Lukina ◽  
◽  
D.V. Moiseev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Global Radiation ◽  
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Advisory Group ◽  
Design Features ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we analyze the causes of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on April 26, 1986.We are 35 years away from the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. However, its causes and consequences continue to excite the minds of scientists today, remain relevant for the participants in the work on the elimination of the consequences of the accident and for hundreds of thousands of people who lived in the territories exposed to radioactive contamination, for millions of victims of the consequences of the accident. The authors believe that the accident of 1986 at the 4th power unit occurred due to an extremely unlikely combination of circumstances. In the history of mankind, this accident went down as one of the largest man-made disasters that led to global radiation pollution. The accident was largely caused by the design features of the RBMK reactor, as well as gross violations of the regulations for its operation by personnel. The main causes of the accident considered in the Information on the Chernobyl accident and its Consequences, prepared for the IAEA by members of the Government Commission of Inquiry on the Causes of the Accident, as well as in the report of the International Advisory Group on Nuclear Safety INSAG-1 in 1986 are: the design features of the RBMK-1000 reactor and the actions of the personnel who made a number of mistakes and grossly violated the rules of operation of the reactor during the SOB tests. The main lesson learned from the accident and its consequences, the elimination of which continues to this day, is the need for careful attention of the safe use of scientific and technological progress in such critical infrastructure facilities as nuclear power plants.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document