TN™ 81: A Challenging Design

Author(s):  
Yves Chanzy ◽  
Camille Otton

With increasing burn-up, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel yields higher quantities of radionuclides, with a powerful source term and high heat output. Improvement in the vitrification process and environmentally sound thinking have been drivers to reduce the number of transports of vitrified residues (High Level Waste) to interim storage facilities in their owner’s country: this results in higher concentrations of nuclides in the stable glass matrix. The challenge was to create, with almost the same allowable mass and dimensions, a transport/storage casks able to transport glass canisters with this new specifications. Improving the environmental performance of the glass canisters would be of no avail without the corresponding means of transport and storage. This is why COGEMA LOGISTICS introduced the TN™ 81 concept; a dual purpose cask able to handle the most demanding canisters from reprocessing: 56 kW instead of 41 kW, and to shield with efficiency greater gamma and neutron sources, which regulations have been made more stringent regarding the neutron quality factor. The paper will comment the choices made, the drop test campaigns run specifically, and report on the loading of the first TN 81 for KernKraftwerk Go¨sgen (KKG), Switzerland.

Author(s):  
Toshiari Saegusa ◽  
Makoto Hirose ◽  
Norikazu Irie ◽  
Masashi Shimizu

The first Japanese spent fuel interim storage facility away from a reactor site is about to be commissioned in Mutsu City, Aomori Prefecture. In designing, licensing and construction of the Dual Purpose Casks (DPCs, for transport and storage) for this facility, codes and standards established by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) and by the Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers (JSME) have been applied. The AESJ established the first standard for DPCs as “Standard for Safety Design and Inspection of Metal Casks for Spent Fuel Interim Storage Facilities” in 2002 (later revised in 2010). The standard provides the design requirements to maintain the basic safety functions of DPCs, namely containment, heat removal, shielding, criticality prevention and the structural integrity of the cask itself and of the spent fuel cladding during transport and storage. Inspection methods and criteria to ensure maintenance of the basic safety functions and structural integrity over every stage of operations involving DPCs including pre-shipment after storage are prescribed as well. The structural integrity criteria for major DPC components refer to the rules provided by the JSME. JSME completed the structural design and construction code (the Code) for DPCs as “Rules on Transport/Storage Packagings for Spent Nuclear Fuel” in 2001 (later revised in 2007). Currently, the scope of the rules cover the Containment Vessel, Basket, Trunnions and Intermediate Shell as major components of DPCs. Rules for these components are based on those for components of nuclear power plants (NPP) with similar safety functions, but special considerations based on their shapes, loading types and required functions are added. The Code has differences from that for NPP components with considerations to DPC characteristics; - The primary stress and the secondary stress generated in Containment Vessels shall be evaluated under Service Conditions A to D (from ASME Sec III, Div.1). - Stress generated in the seal region lid bolts of Containment Vessels shall not exceed yield strength under Service Conditions A to D in order to maintain the containment function. - Fatigue analysis on Baskets is not required, and Trunnions can be designed only for Service Conditions A and B with special stress limits consistent with conventional assessment methods for transport packages. - Stress limits for earthquakes during storage are specified. - Ductile cast iron with special fracture toughness requirements can be used as a material for Containment Vessels. DPC specific considerations in standards and rules will be focused on in this paper. Additionally, comparison with the ASME Code will be discussed.


Author(s):  
Udo Sach ◽  
Goswin Schreck ◽  
Max Ritter ◽  
Jean-Pierre Wenger

Abstract At present, Switzerland has no final repository for radioactive wastes. Very early, the Swiss nuclear power plant operators were aware of the necessity to expand interim storage capacity for spent fuel elements and operational wastes. Already in 1991, Nordostschweizerische Kraftwerke AG (NOK) therefore started building a reactor-site interim storage facility (ZWIBEZ) at its Beznau power plant site. Moreover, as early as in 1990, “ZWILAG Zwischenlager Würenlingen AG”, a company established by the nuclear power plant operators had initiated the licensing procedure for a central interim storage facility in Switzerland. This central interim storage facility is designed for the storage of all categories of radioactive wastes and includes a conditioning facility for low-level and medium-level waste. Eleven years later, in July 2001, the first transport and storage cask loaded with irradiated fuel elements was stored in this facility. For both of the stores the concept of dry interim storage in suitable storage casks in a storage hall was chosen for the storage of irradiated fuel elements and vitrified high-level wastes from reprocessing. Cooling is established through natural circulation. Leaktightness of the casks is continuously monitored by means of a cask monitoring system. The other wastes arising from nuclear power plant operation and reprocessing are stored in a ventilated storage hall which provides shielding and — depending on the radioactive inventory — protection against external impact. The conditioned radioactive wastes, packaged in drums, are placed into open storage containers with identical base and having the same sling points as ISO containers. These containers are stacked up in free-standing stacks up to a height of 16 m. The storage concept varies, depending on the radioactive inventory; for the ZWIBEZ reactor-site interim store, a storage hall for low-level waste has been built without partition walls, whereas the store for the medium and high-level waste in the central interim store ZWILAG has been designed with partition walls dividing the hall into several storage shafts which are closed by shielding slabs. By including a hot cell into the ZWILAG facility, the purpose of this facility has been expanded beyond interim storage of radioactive waste to cover also the visual inspection of fuel elements and vitrified waste canisters as well as the reloading of fuel elements and canisters from smaller transport casks into combined transport and storage casks. Furthermore, the hot cell enables inspection and/or repair work to be performed in the cask lid area of loaded transport and storage casks, the replacement of the lid seals of storage casks and the conditioning of medium-level waste.


2019 ◽  
Vol 98 ◽  
pp. 10005
Author(s):  
Marek Pękala ◽  
Paul Wersin ◽  
Veerle Cloet ◽  
Nikitas Diomidis

Radioactive waste is planned to be disposed in a deep geological repository in the Opalinus Clay (OPA) rock formation in Switzerland. Cu coating of the steel disposal canister is considered as potential a measure to ensure complete waste containment of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and vitrified high-level waste (HLW) or a period of 100,000 years. Sulphide is a potential corroding agent to Cu under reducing redox conditions. Background dissolved sulphide concentrations in pristine OPA are low, likely controlled by equilibrium with pyrite. At such concentrations, sulphide-assisted corrosion of Cu would be negligible. However, the possibility exists that sulphate reducing bacteria (SRB) might thrive at discrete locations of the repository’s near-field. The activity of SRB might then lead to significantly higher dissolved sulphide concentrations. The objective of this work is to employ reactive transport calculations to evaluate sulphide fluxes in the near-field of the SF/HLW repository in the OPA. Cu canister corrosion due to sulphide fluxes is also simplistically evaluated.


Author(s):  
Richard E. Andrews

Abstract Sweden has chosen to manage spent fuel rods by direct encapsulation and storage in a deep level repository. Two welding processes are being investigated for the sealing of copper vessels that form the outer barrier of the disposal canisters. TWI Ltd in the UK has developed Reduced Pressure Electron Beam Welding and Friction Stir Welding for 50mm thick copper. This paper describes some of the investigations and compares the techniques. Over the past 3 years a full-size canister welding machine has been designed and built. Specialised tools have been developed for the welding of thick sections in copper with very encouraging results.


Author(s):  
H. Geiser ◽  
J. Schro¨der

The idea of using casks for interim storage of spent fuel arose at GNS after a very controversial political discussion in 1978, when total passive safety features (including aircraft crash conditions) were required for an above ground spent fuel storage facility. In the meantime, GNS has loaded more than 1000 casks at 25 different storage sites in Germany. GNS cask technology is used in 13 countries. Spent fuel assemblies of PWR, BWR, VVER, RBMK, MTR and THTR as well as vitrified high level waste containers are stored in full metal casks of the CASTOR® type. Also MOX fuel of PWR and BWR has been stored. More than two decades of storage have shown that the basic requirements (safe confinement, criticality safety, sufficient shielding and appropriate heat transfer) have been fulfilled in any case — during normal operation and in case of severe accidents, including aircraft crash. There is no indication of problems arising in the future. Of course, the experience of more than 20 years has resulted in improvements of the cask design. The CASTOR® casks have been thoroughly investigated by many experiments. There have been approx. 50 full and half scale drop tests and a significant number of fire tests, simulations of aircraft crash, investigations with anti tank weapons, and an explosion of a railway tank with liquid gas neighbouring a loaded CASTOR® cask. According to customer and site specific demands, different types of storage facilities are realized in Germany. Firstly, there are facilities for long-term storage, such as large ventilated central storage buildings away from reactor or ventilated storage buildings at the reactor site, ventilated underground tunnels or concrete platforms outside a building. Secondly, there are facilities for temporary storage, where casks have been positioned in horizontal orientation under a ventilated shielding cover outside a building.


2014 ◽  
Vol 94 ◽  
pp. 103-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yue Zhou Wei ◽  
Shun Yan Ning ◽  
Qi Long Wang ◽  
Zi Chen ◽  
Yan Wu ◽  
...  

The long-term radiotoxicity of high level liquid waste (HLLW) generated in spent nuclear fuel reprocessing is governed by the content of several long-lived minor actinides (MA) and some specific fission product nuclides. To efficiently separate MA (Am, Cm) and some FPs such as Cs and Sr from the HLLW, we have been studying an advanced aqueous partitioning process, which uses selective adsorption as separation method. In this work, we prepared different types of porous silica-based organic/inorganic adsorbents with fast diffusion kinetics, improved chemical stability and low pressure drop in a packed column. So they are advantageously applicable to efficient separation of the MA and specific FP elements from HLLW. Adsorption and separation behaviors of the MA and some FP elements such as Cs and Sr were studied. Small scale separation tests using simulated and genuine nuclear waste solutions were carried out and the obtained results indicate that the proposed separation method based on selective adsorption is essentially feasible.


Author(s):  
Donald Wayne Lewis

ASME Section III, Division 3, “Containments for Transportation and Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High Level Radioactive Material and Waste” currently addresses the design of transportation and storage containment shells but it has yet to address the containment internal support structure that holds the spent fuel or high level waste in place. However, the code for internal support structures, hereafter referred to by its common name “basket”, has been under development by ASME for the past 2 years. Development of the new code, to be known as Subsection WD, “Internal Support Structures” was deemed necessary because current containment system basket construction is a piecemeal approach using ASME Section III, Division 1, Subsection NF, “Supports” and/or ASME Section III, Division 1, Subsection NG, “Core Support Structures” or some other engineering method. Approvals for the various combinations are granted from the regulatory authority. The piecemeal approach tries to capture the critical elements important for a containment basket. However, Subsections NF and NG are based on nuclear power plant design which has different design goals than for a spent fuel or high level waste containment. The issuance of Subsection WD will ensure standardization of future containment baskets, assist the regulatory agency in the review and approval of the baskets, and ensure that the essential criteria in the basket related to spent fuel and high level waste storage transportation and disposal is adequately addressed. The purpose of the basket is primarily to ensure that the radioactive components in the containment are supported in a way as not to create a criticality event. Current acceptance is typically based on a no yield design that the containment manufactures all say is too conservative and based on unreasonable criteria. What should the basket design be based on, how should Subsection WD address them, etc.? The purpose of this paper is to inform interested parties of the progress that has been made in development of Subsection WD, what construction provisions it will initially include and what is planned for it, and when is it scheduled to be issued.


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