Interim Storage Technology of Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste in Germany

Author(s):  
H. Geiser ◽  
J. Schro¨der

The idea of using casks for interim storage of spent fuel arose at GNS after a very controversial political discussion in 1978, when total passive safety features (including aircraft crash conditions) were required for an above ground spent fuel storage facility. In the meantime, GNS has loaded more than 1000 casks at 25 different storage sites in Germany. GNS cask technology is used in 13 countries. Spent fuel assemblies of PWR, BWR, VVER, RBMK, MTR and THTR as well as vitrified high level waste containers are stored in full metal casks of the CASTOR® type. Also MOX fuel of PWR and BWR has been stored. More than two decades of storage have shown that the basic requirements (safe confinement, criticality safety, sufficient shielding and appropriate heat transfer) have been fulfilled in any case — during normal operation and in case of severe accidents, including aircraft crash. There is no indication of problems arising in the future. Of course, the experience of more than 20 years has resulted in improvements of the cask design. The CASTOR® casks have been thoroughly investigated by many experiments. There have been approx. 50 full and half scale drop tests and a significant number of fire tests, simulations of aircraft crash, investigations with anti tank weapons, and an explosion of a railway tank with liquid gas neighbouring a loaded CASTOR® cask. According to customer and site specific demands, different types of storage facilities are realized in Germany. Firstly, there are facilities for long-term storage, such as large ventilated central storage buildings away from reactor or ventilated storage buildings at the reactor site, ventilated underground tunnels or concrete platforms outside a building. Secondly, there are facilities for temporary storage, where casks have been positioned in horizontal orientation under a ventilated shielding cover outside a building.

Author(s):  
Jacques Schittekat ◽  
Geert Volckaert ◽  
Michel De Valkeneer

Abstract Since mid nineties, the Belgian Government has granted funding to Belgatom and SCK•CEN to initiate collaborations with four Eastern European countries in the field of nuclear waste disposal safety. The covered matters are essentially the disposal of nuclear waste and the interim storage of spent fuel. This was a good opportunity for Belgatom and SCK•CEN to share their extensive expertise in the fields of geological disposal, site selection, performance assessment and spent fuel interim storage. In the Czech Republic, the mission deals with assistance in the bidding process for an interim dry spent fuel storage facility for fuel originating from the Dukovany site. The matters covered in the Slovak Republic are the interim storage of spent fuel and the disposal of high level waste. In Hungary, the co-operation addresses spent fuel management, low-level and high-level waste management. In Slovenia the co-operation included provision of expertise concerning LILW management and collaboration in the field of geological disposal. The co-operation is since 2001 extended to Russia, focusing on low-level waste management.


10.6036/10156 ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-358
Author(s):  
Pablo Fernández Arias ◽  
DIEGO VERGARA RODRIGUEZ

Centralized Temporary Storage Facility (CTS) is an industrial facility designed to store spent fuel (SF) and high level radioactive waste (HLW) generated at Spanish nuclear power plants (NPP) in a single location. At the end of 2011, the Spanish Government approved the installation of the CTS in the municipality of Villar de Cañas in Cuenca. This approval was the outcome of a long process of technical studies and political decisions that were always surrounded by great social rejection. After years of confrontations between the different political levels, with hardly any progress in its construction, this infrastructure of national importance seems to have been definitively postponed. The present research analyzes the management strategy of SF and HLW in Spain, as well as the alternative strategies proposed, taking into account the current schedule foreseen for the closure of the Spanish NPPs. In view of the results obtained, it is difficult to affirm that the CTS will be available in 2028, with the possibility that its implementation may be delayed to 2032, or even that it may never happen, making it necessary to adopt an alternative strategy for the management of GC and ARAR in Spain. Among the different alternatives, the permanence of the current Individualized Temporary Stores (ITS) as a long-term storage strategy stands out, and even the possibility of building several distributed temporary storage facilities (DTS) in which to store the SF and HLW from several Spanish NPP. Keywords: nuclear waste, storage, nuclear power plants.


Author(s):  
Sidik Permana ◽  
Mitsutoshi Suzuki

The embodied challenges for introducing closed fuel cycle are utilizing advanced fuel reprocessing and fabrication facilities as well as nuclear nonproliferation aspect. Optimization target of advanced reactor design should be maintained properly to obtain high performance of safety, fuel breeding and reducing some long-lived and high level radioactivity of spent fuel by closed fuel cycle options. In this paper, the contribution of loading trans-uranium to the core performance, fuel production, and reduction of minor actinide in high level waste (HLW) have been investigated during reactor operation of large fast breeder reactor (FBR). Excess reactivity can be reduced by loading some minor actinide in the core which affect to the increase of fuel breeding capability, however, some small reduction values of breeding capability are obtained when minor actinides are loaded in the blanket regions. As a total composition, MA compositions are reduced by increasing operation time. Relatively smaller reduction value was obtained at end of operation by blanket regions (9%) than core regions (15%). In addition, adopting closed cycle of MA obtains better intrinsic aspect of nuclear nonproliferation based on the increase of even mass plutonium in the isotopic plutonium composition.


1986 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. M. Oversby

AbstractPerformance assessment calculations are required for high level waste repositories for a period of 10,000 years under NRC and EPA regulations. In addition, the Siting Guidelines (IOCFR960) require a comparison of sites following site characterization and prior to final site selection to be made over a 100,000 year period. In order to perform the required calculations, a detailed knowledge of the physical and chemical processes that affect waste form performance will be needed for each site. While bounding calculations might be sufficient to show compliance with the requirements of IOCFR60 and 40CFRI91, the site comparison for 100,000 years will need to be based on expected performance under site specific conditions. The only case where detailed knowledge of waste form characteristics in the repository would not be needed would be where radionuclide travel times to the accessible environment can be shown to exceed 100,000 years. This paper will review the factors that affect the release of radionuclides from spemt fuel under repository conditions, summarize our present state of knowledge, and suggest areas where more work is needed in order to support the performance assessment calculations.


2003 ◽  
Vol 807 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Wersin ◽  
Lawrence H. Johnson ◽  
Bernhard Schwyn

ABSTRACTRedox conditions were assessed for a spent fuel and high-level waste (SF/HLW) and an intermediate-level waste (ILW) repository. For both cases our analysis indicates permanently reducing conditions after a relatively short oxic period. The canister-bentonite near field in the HLW case displays a high redox buffering capacity because of expected high activity of dissolved and surface-bound Fe(II). This is contrary to the cementitious near field in the ILW case where concentrations of dissolved reduced species are low and redox reactions occur primarily via solid phase transformation processes.For the bentonite-canister near field, redox potentials of about -100 to -300 mV (SHE) are estimated, which is supported by recent kinetic data on U, Tc and Se interaction with reduced iron systems. For the cementitious near field, redox potentials of about -200 to -800 mV are estimated, which reflects the large uncertainties related to this alkaline environment.


Author(s):  
Richard E. Andrews

Abstract Sweden has chosen to manage spent fuel rods by direct encapsulation and storage in a deep level repository. Two welding processes are being investigated for the sealing of copper vessels that form the outer barrier of the disposal canisters. TWI Ltd in the UK has developed Reduced Pressure Electron Beam Welding and Friction Stir Welding for 50mm thick copper. This paper describes some of the investigations and compares the techniques. Over the past 3 years a full-size canister welding machine has been designed and built. Specialised tools have been developed for the welding of thick sections in copper with very encouraging results.


1997 ◽  
Vol 506 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. M. Oversby

ABSTRACTThe conditions that are needed to achieve criticality in a high level waste repository for spent nuclear reactor fuel are reviewed. The effect of initial enrichment of the fuel, burnup, and of mixed oxide fuels on the conditions for criticality are discussed. The situations that produced criticality at Oklo, Gabon, 2000 million years ago are summarized. A model based on the Oklo conditions is presented for estimating the amount of fissile material that must be assembled to create a critical mass in typical granitic rocks. Mechanisms for movement of uranium and plutonium to achieve a critical configuration are discussed and compared to the conditions that are likely to occur in a repository in granite. The sequences of events needed to produce a critical assemblage are shown to be in conflict with the conditions expected in the repository and, in some cases, to require internally inconsistent assumptions to produce the postulated sequence of events. No credible scenario for achieving criticality in a high level waste repository has been found.


Author(s):  
Jenny Morris ◽  
Stephen Wickham ◽  
Phil Richardson ◽  
Colin Rhodes ◽  
Mike Newland

The UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) is responsible for safe and secure management of spent nuclear fuel. Magnox spent fuel is held at some Magnox reactor sites and at Sellafield where it is reprocessed using a number of facilities. It is intended that all Magnox fuel will be reprocessed, as described in the published Magnox Operating Plan (MOP) [1]. In the event, however, that a failure occurs within the reprocessing plant, the NDA has initiated a programme of activities to explore alternative contingency options for the management of wetted Magnox spent fuel. Magnox fuel comprises metallic uranium bar clad in a magnesium alloy, both of which corrode if exposed to oxygen or water. Consequently, contingency options are required to consider how best to manage the issues associated with the reactivity of the metals. Questions of whether Magnox spent fuel needs to be dried, how it might be conditioned, how it might be packaged, and held in temporary storage until a disposal facility becomes available, all require attention. A review of potential contingency options for Magnox fuel was conducted by Galson Sciences Ltd, UKAEA and the NDA. During storage in the presence of water, the corrosion of Magnox fuel produces hydrogen (H2) gas, which requires careful management. When uranium reacts with hydrogen in a reducing environment, the formation of uranium hydride (UH3) may occur, which under some circumstances can be pyrophoric, and might create hazards which may affect subsequent retrieval and/or repackaging (e.g. for disposal). Other factors that may affect the choice of a viable contingency option include criticality safety, environmental impacts, security and Safeguards and economic considerations. At post-irradiation examination (PIE) facilities in the UK, Magnox spent fuel is dried as a result of storage in air at ambient temperatures. Early French UNGG (Uranium Naturel Graphite Gaz) fuel was retrieved from pond storage at Cadarache, dried using a hot gas drying technique, oxidised and packaged in sealed canisters and placed in interim storage at the CASCAD (CASemate CADarache) facility. In the US, spent fuels including the Zircaloy clad Hanford N-Reactor fuels were cold vacuum dried and Idaho legacy aluminium clad metallic uranium fuels were hot vacuum dried; the dried fuel was then packaged in sealed and vented canisters (at Hanford and Idaho, respectively) for interim storage. With regard to conditioning and packaging, several different approaches have been reviewed, including encapsulation in cementitious grout or polymer, high-temperature vitrification or ceramicisation, and solution in acid or alkali solution followed by cementation or vitrification (without reprocessing). All of these approaches require further research in order to be evaluated and developed further for application to formerly wetted Magnox fuel. A variety of containers have been developed for the transport, storage and/or disposal of spent fuel in radioactive waste management programmes worldwide. Wetted Magnox spent fuel could be packaged in a container, with reservations about the potential formation of UH3 in a sealed environment where reducing conditions may develop. The applicability of different combinations of drying, conditioning and packaging techniques to the preparation of Magnox spent fuel for long-term storage and eventual disposal are discussed.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document