The Long-Term Storage of Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel: Safety and Policy Considerations

Author(s):  
J. Rowat ◽  
P. Metcalf

Storage is a necessary step in the overall management of radioactive waste. In recent years, due to the unavailability of disposal facilities, storage facilities intended originally as temporary, have had their lifetimes extended and consideration has been given, in some countries, to the use of long term storage (LTS) as a management option. In 2003, the IAEA published a position paper titled “The Long Term Storage of Radioactive Waste: Safety and Sustainability”. The position paper, which written for a non-specialist audience, focused on seven key factors for safety and sustainability of LTS, namely: safety, maintenance/institutional control, retrieval, security, costs, community attitudes and retention of information. The Agency is preparing a follow-up report to the position paper that elaborates in a more technical manner upon the issues raised in the position paper and issues important for implementation of LTS. It also provides some discussion of the reasons for implementing a LTS option and contrasts LTS with aspects of other management options. The present paper provides an overview of the draft follow-up report.

Author(s):  
John Rowat

Storage and disposal of radioactive waste are complementary rather than competing activities, and both are required for the safe management of wastes. Storage has been carried out safely within the past few decades, and there is a high degree of confidence that it can be continued safely for limited periods of time. However, as the amounts of radioactive waste in surface storage have increased, concern has grown over the sustainability of storage in the long term and the associated safety and security implications. In response to these concerns, the IAEA has prepared a position paper [1] that is intended for general readership. This presentation will provide a summary of the position paper, and a discussion of some safety issues for further consideration. A key theme is the contrast of the safety and sustainability implications of long term storage with those of early disposal. A number of factors are examined from different points of view, factors such as safety and security, need of maintenance, institutional control and information transfer, community attitudes and availability of funding. The timing and duration of the process of moving from storage to disposal, which are influenced by factors such as the long timeframes required to implement disposal and changing public attitudes, will also be discussed. The position paper focuses on the storage of three main types of waste: high level waste from the reprocessing of nuclear fuel, spent nuclear fuel that is regarded as waste and long-lived intermediate level radioactive waste. Long term storage of mining and milling waste, and other large volumes of waste from processes involving the use of naturally occurring radioactive materials are not discussed. Specialist meetings were held last year by the IAEA on the sustainability and safety of long-term storage to establish and discuss the issues where a broad consensus exists, and to investigate areas where issues remain unresolved. Within the technical community, it is widely agreed that perpetual storage is not considered to be either feasible or acceptable because of the impossibility of assuring active control over the time periods for which these wastes remain potentially hazardous. For high-level and long-lived radioactive waste, the consensus of the waste management experts is that disposal in deep underground engineered facilities — geological disposal — is the best option that is currently available, or likely to be available in the foreseeable future.


Author(s):  
Bjo̸rn Borgaas ◽  
Ingar Amundsen ◽  
Ole Reistadt

This paper describes the cooperation and inspection arrangements for verifying the dismantlement of non-strategic Russian submarines, including waste handling, in accordance with the provisions given in the bilateral agreement between the Governments of Russia and Norway and the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety. The main concerns during the project implementation are nuclear safety, the individual safety of workers and the safe and secure handling of radioactive and toxic wastes. Based on data provided by the shipyard on individual exposure, one dismantlement project results in average in an effective dose for shipyard workers between 1,1 and 1,9 mSv, depending on the scope of the work for each worker. The main conclusion is that the present handling of solid radioactive waste is not optimal as such waste now is being put into the reactor compartments without the possibility for adequate control, including the retrieval for repacking or transfer to adequate storage facilities, after the reactor compartments have been placed in the long term storage facility in Saida Bay. Today there is no repository in Northwest-Russia for defence-related radioactive waste.


Author(s):  
Konstantin N. Koulikov ◽  
Rinat A. Nizamutdinov ◽  
Andrey N. Abramov ◽  
Anatoly I. Tsubanikov

Having about 200 tons of solid radioactive waste aboard, the Volodarskiy Floating Technical Base (FTB) is a potential radiation pollution source for the Murmansk region and Kola Bay, as her long-term berthing negatively affects the hull structures. Thereby, Atomflot collaborated with ANO Aspect-Konversia and JSC NIPTB Onega within the frameworks of Federal Special-purpose Program “Assurance of Nuclear and Radiation Safety for 2008 and for the period up to 2015” and developed the Volodarskiy FTB dismantling concept. In 2008 in the course of development of the Volodarskiy FTB dismantling concept the following works were carried out: 1) vessel condition survey, including SRW radiological analysis; 2) feasibility study of the Volodarskiy FTB dismantling alternatives. In this regard the following alternatives were analyzed: – formation of the package assembly in the form of vessel’s undivided hull for durable storage in the Saida long-term storage facility (LTSF); - formation of individual SRW package assemblies for durable storage in the Saida LTSF; - comprehensive recycling of all solid radioactive waste by disposal in protective containers. 3) selection and approval of the dismantling alternative. The alternative of formation of individual SRW package assemblies for durable storage in the Saida LTSF was selected by the Rosatom State Corporation. In this case the works will be performed on a step-by-step basis at the Atomflot enterprise and SRE Nerpa. The conceptual dismantling technology was developed for the selected Volodarskiy FTB dismantling option. The proceedings contain description of options, analysis procedure and proposal for further study of mentioned challenge.


Author(s):  
Zoran Drace ◽  
Michael I. Ojovan

The IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on cementitious materials for radioactive waste management was launched in 2007 [1, 2]. The objective of CRP was to investigate the behaviour and performance of cementitious materials used in radioactive waste management system with various purposes and included waste packages, wasteforms and backfills as well as investigation of interactions and interdependencies of these individual elements during long term storage and disposal. The specific research topics considered were: (i) cementitious materials for radioactive waste packaging: including radioactive waste immobilization into a solid waste form, (ii) waste backfilling and containers; (iii) emerging and alternative cementitious systems; (iv) physical-chemical processes occurring during the hydration and ageing of cement matrices and their influence on the cement matrix quality; (v) methods of production of cementitious materials for: immobilization into wasteform, backfills and containers; (vi) conditions envisaged in the disposal environment for packages (physical and chemical conditions, temperature variations, groundwater, radiation fields); (vii) testing and nondestructive monitoring techniques for quality assurance of cementitious materials; (viii) waste acceptance criteria for waste packages, waste forms and backfills; transport, long term storage and disposal requirements; and finally (ix) modelling or simulation of long term behaviours of cementations materials used for packaging, waste immobilization and backfilling, especially in the post-closure phase. The CRP has gathered overall 26 research organizations from 22 Member States aiming to share their research and practices on the use of cementitious materials [2]. The main research outcomes of the CRP were summarized in a summary report currently under preparation to be published by IAEA. The generic topical sections covered by report are: a) conventional cementitious systems; b) novel cementitious materials and technologies; c) testing and waste acceptance criteria; and d) modelling long term behaviour. These themes as well as all contributions of participating organizations were further developed in the individual reports to be presented in the IAEA publication. The CRP facilitated the exchange of information and research co-operation in resolving similar problems between different institutions and contributed towards improving waste management practices, their efficiency and general enhancement of safety.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugène H. J. M. Jansen ◽  
Piet K. Beekhof

In epidemiological and nutrition research, it is very important to evaluate the stability of biomarkers as function of both storage time and temperature. In this study, the stability of folate and vitamin B12in human serum samples has been tested after long-term storage at −80°C up to 13 years. Serum samples of 16 individuals were used in this study. The concentration of folate and vitamin B12has been determined att=0and at 1, 8, and 13 years after storage at −80°C. The folate concentrations in serum samples remained stable at −80°C. The concentration of vitamin B12was decreasing during the time of the study to about 50%. The correlation of the folate and also of the vitamin B12concentrations in the stored samples compared with the starting values was still good. Therefore, although the concentration of vitamin B12decreased upon storage, reliable comparative analyses can still be performed.


Author(s):  
Jan Medved ◽  
Ladislav Vargovcik

The paper deals with experience, techniques and new applied equipment durig undergoing decommissioning process of the A-1 NPP long-term pool storage and the follow-up decommissioning plan. For rad-waste disposal of the long-term pool storage (where most of the contaminants had remained following the removal of spent fuel) special equipment has been developed, designed, constructed and installed. The purpose of this equipment is the restorage, drainage and fragmentation of cartridges (used as a spent fuel case), as well as treatment of sludge (located at the pool bottom) and of the remaining liquid radwaste. The drainage equipment for cartridges is designed for discharging KCr2 solution from cartridges with spent fuel rods into the handling storage tank in the short-term storage facility and adjustment of the cartridges for railway transport, prior to the liquidation of the spent fuel rod. The equipment ensures full remote visual control of the process and exact monitoring of its technical parameters, including that of the internal nitrogen atmosphere concentration value. Cartridges without fuel and liquid filling are transferred to the equipment for their processing which includes fragmentation into smaller parts, decontamination, filling into drums with their sealed closing and measurement of radioactive dose. For the fragmentation, special shearing equipment is used which leaves the pipe fragment open for the following decontamination. For cleaning the cartridge bottom from radioactive sludge water jet system is used combined with slow speed milling used for preparing the opening for water jet nozzle. The sludge from the cartridge bottom is fixed into ceramic matrix. Nuclear Power Plant JE A-1 (since 1980 in decommissioning) is situated in the locality of Jaslovske´ Bohunice. So far the decommissioning of the Long-term storage was carried out within Stage I of A-1NPP decommissioning. This year the Stage I of decommissioning finished, and the performance of Stage II of decommissioning was started. Decommissioning of the long-term storage facility continues within Stage II of the A-1 NPP decommissioning process.


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