A Study on Maintenance Rule Application in VVER NPP

Author(s):  
Ma Chao ◽  
Deng Wei ◽  
An Jin

Maintenance effectiveness is important for the safety and power production of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Maintenance Rule (10CFR50.65, MR) became effective in 1996, and it is mandatory for all the US plants to use Maintenance Rule in their daily maintenance activities. With the development and wide usage of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) technique in China, China regulator and utilities are trying to adopt MR in maintenance activities. Brief study on application of MR in some VVER-typed China nuclear plant is carried out and some main results are shown. All the application process and results will be useful for later official application of MR in China.

Author(s):  
J. G. Merkle ◽  
K. K. Yoon ◽  
W. A. VanDerSluys ◽  
W. Server

ASME Code Cases N-629/N-631, published in 1999, provided an important new approach to allow material specific, measured fracture toughness curves for ferritic steels in the code applications. This has enabled some of the nuclear power plants whose reactor pressure vessel materials reached a certain threshold level based on overly conservative rules to use an alternative RTNDT to justify continued operation of their plants. These code cases have been approved by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and these have been proposed to be codified in Appendix A and Appendix G of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. This paper summarizes the basis of this approach for the record.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrija Volkanovski ◽  
Antonio Ballesteros Avila ◽  
Miguel Peinador Veira

This paper presents the results of the statistical analysis of the loss of offsite power events (LOOP) registered in four reviewed databases. The reviewed databases include the IRSN (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire) SAPIDE database and the GRS (Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH) VERA database reviewed over the period from 1992 to 2011. The US NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) Licensee Event Reports (LERs) database and the IAEA International Reporting System (IRS) database were screened for relevant events registered over the period from 1990 to 2013. The number of LOOP events in each year in the analysed period and mode of operation are assessed during the screening. The LOOP frequencies obtained for the French and German nuclear power plants (NPPs) during critical operation are of the same order of magnitude with the plant related events as a dominant contributor. A frequency of one LOOP event per shutdown year is obtained for German NPPs in shutdown mode of operation. For the US NPPs, the obtained LOOP frequency for critical and shutdown mode is comparable to the one assessed in NUREG/CR-6890. Decreasing trend is obtained for the LOOP events registered in three databases (IRSN, GRS, and NRC).


Author(s):  
Thomas S. LaGuardia

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established criteria for acceptable residual radioactivity related to decommissioning nuclear power plants in the US [1]. A level of 25 mRem per year to the maximum exposed individual by site-specific pathways analysis, with ALARA is acceptable to the NRC. Systems and structures containing very low levels of radioactivity that meet this criteria are deemed acceptable to abandon in place as part of the decommissioning process and termination of the license. Upon license termination by the NRC, the owner may then demolish and remove remaining structures. In practice, site-specific criteria imposed by local state mandates, company management decisions, real estate value, and long-term liability potential have driven nuclear plant licensees to adopt an alternative disposition for these materials. Although the reasons are different at each site, the NRC’s criteria of 25 mRem per year are not the controlling factor. This paper will describe the regulatory process for termination of the license, and the other factors that drive the decision to remove radioactive and non-radioactive material for decommissioning. Several case histories are presented to illustrate that the NRC’s criteria for license termination are not the only consideration.


2000 ◽  
Vol 122 (3) ◽  
pp. 234-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen F. Hedden

This article will describe the development of Section XI from a pamphlet-sized document to the lengthy and complex set of requirements, interpretations, and Code Cases that it has become by the year 2000. Section XI began as a set of rules for inservice inspection of the primary pressure boundary system of nuclear power plants. It has evolved to include other aspects of maintaining the structural integrity of safety class pressure boundaries. These include procedures for component repair/replacement activities, analysis of revised and new plant operating conditions, and specialized provisions for nondestructive examination of components and piping. It has also increased in scope to cover other Section III construction: Class 2, Class 3 and containment structures. First, to provide a context for the discussions to follow, the differences in administration and enforcement between Section XI and the other Code Sections will be explained, including its dependence on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The importance of interpretations and Code Cases then will be discussed. The development of general requirements and requirements for each class of structure will be traced. The movement of Section XI toward a new philosophy, risk-informed inspection, will also be discussed. Finally, an annotated bibliography of papers describing the philosophy and technical basis behind Section XI will be provided. [S0094-9930(00)01703-0]


Author(s):  
Taunia Wilde ◽  
Shannan Baker ◽  
Gary M. Sandquist

The design, construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning and decontamination of nuclear infrastructure particularly nuclear power plants licensed in the US by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or operated by the US Department of Energy (DOE) or the US Department of Defense (DOD) must be executed under a rigorous and documented quality assurance program that provides adequate quality control and oversight. Those codes, standards, and orders regulate, document and prescribe the essentials for quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) that frequently impact nuclear facilities operated in the US are reviewed and compared.


Author(s):  
John O’Hara ◽  
Stephen Fleger

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) evaluates the human factors engineering (HFE) of nuclear power plant design and operations to protect public health and safety. The HFE safety reviews encompass both the design process and its products. The NRC staff performs the reviews using the detailed guidance contained in two key documents: the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711) and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). This paper will describe these two documents and the method used to develop them. As the NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of the guidance to ensure that they remain state-of-the-art design evaluation tools, we will discuss the topics being addressed in support of future updates as well.


Author(s):  
Ronald C. Lippy

The nuclear industry is preparing for the licensing and construction of new nuclear power plants in the United States. Several new designs have been developed and approved, including the “traditional” reactor designs, the passive safe shutdown designs and the small modular reactors (SMRs). The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) provides specific Codes used to perform preservice inspection/testing and inservice inspection/testing for many of the components used in the new reactor designs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews information provided by applicants related to inservice testing (IST) programs for Design Certifications and Combined Licenses (COLs) under Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 52) (Reference 1). The 2012 Edition of the ASME OM Code defines a post-2000 plant as a nuclear power plant that was issued (or will be issued) its construction permit, or combined license for construction and operation, by the applicable regulatory authority on or following January 1, 2000. The New Reactors OM Code (NROMC) Task Group (TG) of the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (NROMC TG) is assigned the task of ensuring that the preservice testing (PST) and IST provisions in the ASME OM Code to address pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints (snubbers) in post-2000 nuclear power plants are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the components will operate as needed when called upon. Currently, the NROMC TG is preparing proposed guidance for the treatment of active pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints with high safety significance in non-safety systems in passive post-2000 reactors including SMRs.


Author(s):  
Thomas G. Scarbrough

In a series of Commission papers, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) described its policy for inservice testing (IST) programs to be developed and implemented at nuclear power plants licensed under 10 CFR Part 52. This paper discusses the expectations for IST programs based on those Commission policy papers as applied in the NRC staff review of combined license (COL) applications for new reactors. For example, the design and qualification of pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints through implementation of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard QME-1-2007, “Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Plants,” as accepted in NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100 (Revision 3), “Seismic Qualification of Electrical and Active Mechanical Equipment and Functional Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,” will enable IST activities to assess the operational readiness of those components to perform their intended functions. ASME has updated the Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code) to improve the IST provisions for pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints that are incorporated by reference in the NRC regulations with applicable conditions. In addition, lessons learned from performance experience and testing of motor-operated valves (MOVs) will be implemented as part of the IST programs together with application of those lessons learned to other power-operated valves (POVs). Licensee programs for the Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS) will be implemented for components in active nonsafety-related systems that are the first line of defense in new reactors that rely on passive systems to provide reactor core and containment cooling in the event of a plant transient. This paper also discusses the overlapping testing provisions specified in ASME Standard QME-1-2007; plant-specific inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria; the applicable ASME OM Code as incorporated by reference in the NRC regulations; specific license conditions; and Initial Test Programs as described in the final safety analysis report and applicable RGs. Paper published with permission.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jinghan Zhang ◽  
Jun Zhao ◽  
Jiejuan Tong

Nuclear safety goal is the basic standard for limiting the operational risks of nuclear power plants. The statistics of societal risks are the basis for nuclear safety goals. Core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) are typical probabilistic safety goals that are used in the regulation of water-cooled reactors currently. In fact, Chinese current probabilistic safety goals refer to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and they are not based on Chinese societal risks. And the CDF and LERF proposed for water reactor are not suitable for high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR), because the design of HTGR is very different from that of water reactor. And current nuclear safety goals are established for single reactor rather than unit or site. Therefore, in this paper, the development of the safety goal of NRC was investigated firstly; then, the societal risks in China were investigated in order to establish the correlation between the probabilistic safety goal of multimodule HTGR and Chinese societal risks. In the end, some other matters about multireactor site were discussed in detail.


Author(s):  
Tomas Jimenez ◽  
Eric Houston ◽  
Nico Meyer

As most nuclear power stations in the US have surpassed their initial 40 years of operability, the industry is now challenged with maintaining safe operations and extending the operating life of structures, systems and components. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) have identified safety related buried piping systems as particularly susceptible to degradation. These systems are required to maintain the structural factors of the ASME Construction Codes under pressure and piping loads, which includes seismic wave passage. This paper focuses on evaluation approaches for metallic buried piping that can be used to demonstrate that localized thinning meets the requirements of the Construction Code. The paper then addresses a non-metallic repair option using carbon fiber reinforced polymers (CFRP) as the new pressure boundary.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document