ASME Code Needs for Very High Temperature Generation IV Reactors

Author(s):  
William J. O’Donnell ◽  
Donald S. Griffin

Subsection NH “Components in Elevated Temperature Service” of Section III was originally developed to provide structural design criteria and limits for elevated-temperature design of Liquid-Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) systems and some gas-cooled systems. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) reviewed the design limits and procedures in the process of reviewing the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) for a construction permit in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and identified issues that needed resolution. In the years since then, the NRC, DOE and various contractors have evaluated the applicability of the ASME Code and Code Cases to high-temperature reactor designs such as the VHTGRs, and identified issues that need to be resolved to provide a regulatory basis for licensing. Since the 1980s, the ASME Code has made numerous improvements in elevated-temperature structural integrity technology. These advances have been incorporated into Section II, Section VIII, Code Cases, and particularly Subsection NH of Section III of the Code. The current need for designs for very high temperature and for Gen IV systems requires the extension of operating temperatures from about 1400°F (760°C) to about 1742°F (950°C) where creep effects limit structural integrity, safe allowable operating conditions, and design life. This paper (1)identifies the structural integrity issues in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, including Section II, Section VIII, Section III, Subsection NH (Class 1 Components in Elevated Temperature Service) and Code Cases that must be resolved in order to support licensing of Generation IV Nuclear Reactors, particularly Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors (VHTRs); (2) describes how the Code addresses these issues; and (3) identifies the needs for additional criteria to cover unresolved structural integrity concerns for very-high-temperature service.

Author(s):  
William J. O’Donnell ◽  
Amy B. Hull ◽  
Shah Malik

Since the 1980s, the ASME Code has made numerous improvements in elevated-temperature structural integrity technology. These advances have been incorporated into Section II, Section VIII, Code Cases, and particularly Subsection NH of Section III of the Code, “Components in Elevated Temperature Service.” The current need for designs for very high temperature and for Gen IV systems requires the extension of operating temperatures from about 1400°F (760°C) to about 1742°F (950°C) where creep effects limit structural integrity, safe allowable operating conditions, and design life. Materials that are more creep and corrosive resistant are needed for these higher operating temperatures. Material models are required for cyclic design analyses. Allowable strains, creep fatigue and creep rupture interaction evaluation methods are needed to provide assurance of structural integrity for such very high temperature applications. Current ASME Section III design criteria for lower operating temperature reactors are intended to prevent through-wall cracking and leaking and corresponding criteria are needed for high temperature reactors. Subsection NH of Section III was originally developed to provide structural design criteria and limits for elevated-temperature design of Liquid-Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) systems and some gas-cooled systems. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) reviewed the design limits and procedures in the process of reviewing the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) for a construction permit in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and identified issues that needed resolution. In the years since then, the NRC, DOE and various contractors have evaluated the applicability of the ASME Code and Code Cases to high-temperature reactor designs such as the VHTGRs, and identified issues that need to be resolved to provide a regulatory basis for licensing. The design lifetime of Gen IV Reactors is expected to be 60 years. Additional materials including Alloy 617 and Hastelloy X need to be fully characterized. Environmental degradation effects, especially impure helium and those noted herein, need to be adequately considered. Since cyclic finite element creep analyses will be used to quantify creep rupture, creep fatigue, creep ratcheting and strain accumulations, creep behavior models and constitutive relations are needed for cyclic creep loading. Such strain- and time-hardening models must account for the interaction between the time-independent and time-dependent material response. This paper describes the evolving structural integrity evaluation approach for high temperature reactors. Evaluation methods are discussed, including simplified analysis methods, detailed analyses of localized areas, and validation needs. Regulatory issues including weldment cracking, notch weakening, creep fatigue/creep rupture damage interactions, and materials property representations for cyclic creep behavior are also covered.


Author(s):  
Pat L. Strauch ◽  
Warren H. Bamford ◽  
Sushil K. Daftuar

New procedures and acceptance criteria for the evaluation of degradation, including through-wall flaws, in moderate energy Class 2 and 3 vessels and tanks have been prepared for implementation within Section XI of the ASME Code. The provisions are contained in a proposed Code Case and are focused on the structural integrity margin of the vessel or tank against gross failure. The assessment of the degraded condition is based on the flaw evaluation procedures already established in ASME Section XI. Additional provisions for periodic inspection and leakage monitoring are included to assure that analysis assumptions are conservative for the operating conditions. The precedent for permitting operation with degraded components was established in United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letter 90-05 and Code Case N-513-1 for piping, as well as several NRC-accepted plant-specific relief requests associated with leaking tanks. The technical basis for the procedures is presented, and the objectives and scope of its application are explained. The basis for the analytical procedures follows from evaluation rules contained in ASME Section XI, Appendix A. Other issues regarding consequences of leakage, growth of degradation, and augmented inspections and surveillance are also addressed, as well as reference crack growth curves for stress corrosion cracking for conditions appropriate for application of these procedures.


Author(s):  
William J. O’Donnell ◽  
Amy B. Hull ◽  
Shah Malik

In 2006, ASME and DOE signed a cooperative agreement to update and expand appropriate materials, construction and design codes for application in future Generation IV nuclear reactor systems that operate at elevated temperatures. The second task in this ASME/DOE Gen-IV Materials Project was to identify issues relevant to ASME Section III, Subsection NH, and related Code Cases that must be resolved for licensing purposes for VHTGRs (Very High Temperature Gas Reactor concepts such as those of PBMR, Areva, and GA); and to identify the material models, design criteria, and analysis methods that need to be added to the ASME Code to cover the unresolved safety issues. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) issues which were raised in 1983 in conjunction with the licensing of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) provide the best early indication of regulatory licensing issues for high temperature reactors. The approach to resolve the 25 identified elevated temperature structural integrity licensing issues was never implemented because Congress halted the construction of CRBR. This 1983 list provided the most definitive description of NRC elevated temperature structural integrity concerns. This paper presents both the results of the study by O’Donnell and Griffin [1] and a preliminary analysis by NRC staff of the earlier identified elevated temperature structural integrity issues that attempts to provide updated information for several of the next generation reactor types under consideration.


2000 ◽  
Vol 122 (3) ◽  
pp. 234-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen F. Hedden

This article will describe the development of Section XI from a pamphlet-sized document to the lengthy and complex set of requirements, interpretations, and Code Cases that it has become by the year 2000. Section XI began as a set of rules for inservice inspection of the primary pressure boundary system of nuclear power plants. It has evolved to include other aspects of maintaining the structural integrity of safety class pressure boundaries. These include procedures for component repair/replacement activities, analysis of revised and new plant operating conditions, and specialized provisions for nondestructive examination of components and piping. It has also increased in scope to cover other Section III construction: Class 2, Class 3 and containment structures. First, to provide a context for the discussions to follow, the differences in administration and enforcement between Section XI and the other Code Sections will be explained, including its dependence on the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The importance of interpretations and Code Cases then will be discussed. The development of general requirements and requirements for each class of structure will be traced. The movement of Section XI toward a new philosophy, risk-informed inspection, will also be discussed. Finally, an annotated bibliography of papers describing the philosophy and technical basis behind Section XI will be provided. [S0094-9930(00)01703-0]


Author(s):  
T. L. Dickson ◽  
M. T. EricksonKirk

The current regulations, as set forth by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), to insure that light-water nuclear reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) maintain their structural integrity when subjected to planned startup (heat-up) and shutdown (cool-down) transients are specified in Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, which incorporates by reference Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME Code. In 1999, the USNRC initiated the interdisciplinary Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Re-evaluation Project to determine if a technical basis could be established to support a relaxation in the current PTS regulations. The PTS re-evaluation project included the development and application of an updated risk-based computational methodology that incorporates several advancements applicable to modeling the physics of vessel fracture due to thermal hydraulic transients imposed on the RPV inner surface. The results of the PTS re-evaluation project demonstrated that there is a sound technical basis to support a relaxation of the current PTS regulations. The results of the PTS re-evaluation are currently under review by the USNRC. Based on the promising results of the PTS re-evaluation, the USNRC has recently applied the updated computational methodology to fracture evaluations of RPVs subjected to planned cool-down transients, associated with reactor shutdown, derived in accordance with ASME Section XI – Appendix G. The objective of these analyses is to determine if a sound technical basis can be established to provide a relaxation to the current regulations for the derivation of bounding cool-down transients as specified in Appendix G to Section XI of the ASME Code. This paper provides a brief overview of these analyses, results, and the implications of the results.


Author(s):  
Ronald C. Lippy

The nuclear industry is preparing for the licensing and construction of new nuclear power plants in the United States. Several new designs have been developed and approved, including the “traditional” reactor designs, the passive safe shutdown designs and the small modular reactors (SMRs). The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) provides specific Codes used to perform preservice inspection/testing and inservice inspection/testing for many of the components used in the new reactor designs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews information provided by applicants related to inservice testing (IST) programs for Design Certifications and Combined Licenses (COLs) under Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 52) (Reference 1). The 2012 Edition of the ASME OM Code defines a post-2000 plant as a nuclear power plant that was issued (or will be issued) its construction permit, or combined license for construction and operation, by the applicable regulatory authority on or following January 1, 2000. The New Reactors OM Code (NROMC) Task Group (TG) of the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (NROMC TG) is assigned the task of ensuring that the preservice testing (PST) and IST provisions in the ASME OM Code to address pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints (snubbers) in post-2000 nuclear power plants are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the components will operate as needed when called upon. Currently, the NROMC TG is preparing proposed guidance for the treatment of active pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints with high safety significance in non-safety systems in passive post-2000 reactors including SMRs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jinghan Zhang ◽  
Jun Zhao ◽  
Jiejuan Tong

Nuclear safety goal is the basic standard for limiting the operational risks of nuclear power plants. The statistics of societal risks are the basis for nuclear safety goals. Core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) are typical probabilistic safety goals that are used in the regulation of water-cooled reactors currently. In fact, Chinese current probabilistic safety goals refer to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and they are not based on Chinese societal risks. And the CDF and LERF proposed for water reactor are not suitable for high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR), because the design of HTGR is very different from that of water reactor. And current nuclear safety goals are established for single reactor rather than unit or site. Therefore, in this paper, the development of the safety goal of NRC was investigated firstly; then, the societal risks in China were investigated in order to establish the correlation between the probabilistic safety goal of multimodule HTGR and Chinese societal risks. In the end, some other matters about multireactor site were discussed in detail.


Author(s):  
Terry L. Dickson ◽  
Shah N. Malik ◽  
Mark T. Kirk ◽  
Deborah A. Jackson

The current federal regulations to ensure that nuclear reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) maintain their structural integrity when subjected to transients such as pressurized thermal shock (PTS) events were derived from computational models that were developed in the early to mid 1980s. Since that time, there have been advancements in relevant technologies associated with the physics of PTS events that impact RPV integrity assessment. Preliminary studies performed in 1999 suggested that application of the improved technology could reduce the conservatism in the current regulations while continuing to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety. A relaxation of PTS regulations could have profound implications for plant license extension considerations. Based on the above, in 1999, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) initiated a comprehensive project, with the nuclear power industry as a participant, to re-evaluate the current PTS regulations within the framework established by modern probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques. During the last three years, improved computational models have evolved through interactions between experts in the relevant disciplines of thermal hydraulics, PRA, human reliability analysis (HRA), materials embrittlement effects on fracture toughness (crack initiation and arrest), fracture mechanics methodology, and fabrication-induced flaw characterization. These experts were from the NRC staff, their contractors, and representatives from the nuclear industry. These improved models have now been implemented into the FAVOR (Fracture Analysis of Vessels: Oak Ridge) computer code, which is an applications tool for performing risk-informed structural integrity evaluations of embrittled RPVs subjected to transient thermal-hydraulic loading conditions. The baseline version of FAVOR (version 1.0) was released in October 2001. The updated risk-informed computational methodology in the FAVOR code is currently being applied to selected domestic commercial pressurized water reactors to evaluate the adequacy of the current regulations and to determine whether a technical basis can be established to support a relaxation of the current regulations. This paper provides a status report on the application of the updated computational methodology to a commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR) and discusses the results and interpretation of those results. It is anticipated that this re-evaluation effort will be completed in 2002.


Author(s):  
Stéphane Gossé ◽  
Thierry Alpettaz ◽  
Sylvie Chatain ◽  
Christine Guéneau

The alloys Haynes 230 and Inconel 617 are potential candidates for the intermediate heat exchangers (IHXs) of (very) high temperature reactors ((V)-HTRs). The behavior under corrosion of these alloys by the (V)-HTR coolant (impure helium) is an important selection criterion because it defines the service life of these components. At high temperature, the Haynes 230 is likely to develop a chromium oxide on the surface. This layer protects from the exchanges with the surrounding medium and thus confers certain passivity on metal. At very high temperature, the initial microstructure made up of austenitic grains and coarse intra- and intergranular M6C carbide grains rich in W will evolve. The M6C carbides remain and some M23C6 richer in Cr appear. Then, carbon can reduce the protective oxide layer. The alloy loses its protective coating and can corrode quickly. Experimental investigations were performed on these nickel based alloys under an impure helium flow (Rouillard, F., 2007, “Mécanismes de formation et de destruction de la couche d’oxyde sur un alliage chrominoformeur en milieu HTR,” Ph.D. thesis, Ecole des Mines de Saint-Etienne, France). To predict the surface reactivity of chromium under impure helium, it is necessary to determine its chemical activity in a temperature range close to the operating conditions of the heat exchangers (T≈1273 K). For that, high temperature mass spectrometry measurements coupled to multiple effusion Knudsen cells are carried out on several samples: Haynes 230, Inconel 617, and model alloys 1178, 1181, and 1201. This coupling makes it possible for the thermodynamic equilibrium to be obtained between the vapor phase and the condensed phase of the sample. The measurement of the chromium ionic intensity (I) of the molecular beam resulting from a cell containing an alloy provides the values of partial pressure according to the temperature. This value is compared with that of the pure substance (Cr) at the same temperature. These calculations provide thermodynamic data characteristic of the chromium behavior in these alloys. These activity results call into question those previously measured by Hilpert and Ali-Khan (1978, “Mass Spectrometric Studies of Alloys Proposed for High-Temperature Reactor Systems: I. Alloy IN-643,” J. Nucl. Mater., 78, pp. 265–271; 1979, “Mass Spectrometric Studies of Alloys Proposed for High-Temperature Reactor Systems: II. Inconel Alloy 617 and Nimomic Alloy PE 13,” J. Nucl. Mater., 80, pp. 126–131), largely used in the literature.


Author(s):  
Douglas O. Henry

Code Case N-659 Revision 0 was approved in 2002 to allow ultrasonic examination (UT) an alternative to radiography (RT) for nuclear power plant components and transport containers under Section III of the ASME Code. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not approved N-659 and its subsequent revisions (currently N-659-2) for general use, but they have been used on a case-by-case basis mainly where logistic problems or component configuration have prevented the use of radiography. Like the parallel Code Case 2235 for non-nuclear applications under Section I and Section VIII, Code Case N-659 requires automated, computerized ultrasonic systems and capability demonstration on a flawed sample as a prerequisite for using UT in lieu of RT. Automated ultrasonic examination can be significantly more expensive than radiography, so a cost-benefit evaluation is a key factor in the decision to use the Code Case. In addition, the flaw sample set has recently become an issue and a topic of negotiation with the NRC for application of the Case. A flaw sample set for a recent radioactive material transport cask fabrication project was successfully negotiated with the NRC. The Code Case N-659 approach has been used effectively to overcome barriers to Code required radiography. Examples are examination of welds in an assembled heat exchanger and in a radioactive material transport cask assembly where internal shielding prevented radiography of the weld. Future development of Code Case N-659 will address sample set considerations and application-specific Code Cases, such as for storage and transport containers, will be developed where NRC concerns have been fully addressed and regulatory approval can be obtained on a generic basis.


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