An Update on RAMPAC.COM: The Department of Energy’s Website for Information on Radioactive Material Packaging

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Primeau
Keyword(s):  
Safety Evaluation ◽  
Competent Authority ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Department Of Transportation ◽  
Regulatory Guidance ◽  
Shipping Containers ◽  
Scanned Images ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Source Of Information

The Department of Energy’s RAMPAC (Radioactive Material Packaging) website is an all-in-one source of information on shipping containers for radioactive materials. Inaugurated at www.rampac.com in 1997, it has as a major feature a searchable database of packagings certified by DOE or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for domestic shipments, or by the Department of Transportation for international shipments, or by the Department of Transportation for international shipments. Scanned images of all current DOE and NRC Certificates of Compliance and DOT Certificates of Competent Authority are available for viewing or printing. Recent additions to the website include the Safety Evaluation Reports for DOE-certified packagings, a Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Completeness Checklist, expanded regulatory guidance information, and a list of current DOT exemptions with DOE as the grantee.

Operational Readiness of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container for Fissile Materials

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Kenneth E. Sanders
Keyword(s):  
Competent Authority ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Fissile Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Other Information ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Regulatory Commission

The U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M containers had been the workhorse bulk Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) shipping containers for the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) and many other shippers for over 20 years. This DOT specification container was terminated for shipment of radioactive material on September 30, 2008. The anticipation of this action prompted DOE to develop and implement the ES-3100 shipping container as a replacement for the 6M. The ES-3100 was first licensed in April 2006. Since then, the license has been revised nine times. The ES-3100 was operationally ready for use at several sites by September 2007, and is now in being used on a regular basis for materials that had been shipped in the DOT 6M. The ES-3100 has also been certified for air transport, in support of foreign research reactor fuel supply and international nonproliferation efforts. This container has a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and a Competent Authority Certificate from the DOT. The utility of the ES-3100 continues to grow. The ES-3100 CoC allows many forms of fissile material to be shipped, and continues to be amended to authorize additional contents for a variety of shippers. This paper will identify the currently certified contents for the ES-3100 and the planned certificate amendments to expand the content basis, as well as the approach to add new contents to the CoC. The path to becoming a user of the ES-3100 will be outlined. Operational requirements for this container, handling tools and non-standard operating tools needed for the use of this container will be covered. Readiness requirements, maintenance issues, training, and lessons learned will also be discussed. This paper will provide the information necessary for organizations to obtain ES-3100 containers, the special tools, adequate training, and any other information that would be helpful for a site to be able to use this fissile, radioactive material shipping container system.

scholarly journals Radioactive Material Transportation Considerations With Respect to DOE 3013 Storage Containers

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. J. Hensel ◽  
T. T. Wu ◽  
B. R. Seward
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Storage Conditions ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Department Of Transportation ◽  
Type B ◽  
Long Term Storage ◽  
Leak Tightness ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Regulatory Commission

This paper evaluates sealed hardware that meets the requirements of DOE-STD-3013, “Criteria for Preparing and packaging Plutonium Metals and Oxides for Long-Term Storage” [1] with respect to radioactive material (Type B quantity) transportation requirements. The Standard provides criteria for packaging of the plutonium materials for storage periods of at least 50 years. The standard requires the hardware to maintain integrity under both normal storage conditions and under anticipated handling conditions. To accomplish this, the standard requires that the plutonium be loaded in a minimum of two nested stainless steel sealed containers that are both tested for leak-tightness per ANSI N14.5. As such the 3013 hardware is robust. While the 3013 STD may provide appropriate storage criteria, it is not intended to provide criteria for transporting the material under the requirements of the Department of Transportation (DOT). In this evaluation, it is assumed that the activity of plutonium exceeds A1 and/or A2 curies as defined in DOT 49 CFR 173.431 and therefore must be shipped as a Type B package meeting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements of 10 CFR 71. The evaluation considers Type B shipment of plutonium in the 3013 hardware within a certified package for such contents.

A Successful Remediation Project

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Max Scott
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Management Plan ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Aircraft Manufacturing ◽  
Molten Magnesium ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
A Site

As part of a program to visit formerly licensed sites to determine if they meet current uncontrolled release conditions, a United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) inspection was conducted in the fall of 1993 at a site that had possessed a radioactive material license from about 1955 to 1970. While the license was in force, the plant processed magnesium scrap containing up to 4 percent thorium. The source of the scrap is believed to be the aircraft manufacturing industry. The scrap was placed in furnaces and heated to the melting point of magnesium, and the molten magnesium was drawn off, leaving the thorium with the residue (dross). Under the regulation in existence at that time, the thorium dross was buried on site in an approximate 14 acre field. In 1993 the inspector found readings up to 900uR/h. Early in 1994 an informal grid survey of most of the 14 acre site was conducted. Based on that survey, it was concluded that the thorium was widespread and extended beyond the property lines. The preliminary findings were reported to the USNRC, and in 1994 the site was designated as a Site Decommissioning Management Plan (SMPD) site. A remediation team was formed which included the following disciplines: remediation health physics, geology, hydrology, engineering, law, public relations, and project management. This remediation team planned, participated in selecting vendors, and provided project over site for all activities from site characterization through the final status survey. In 2006 the site was released for uncontrolled access. A chronology of activities with lessons learned will be presented.

Licensing of the ES-3100 Type B Shipping Container: Replacement of the DOT 6M Container

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Dean R. Tousley ◽  
James C. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
State Of The Art ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Nuclear Security ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
The U.S

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is shipping bulk quantities of fissile materials for disposition purposes, primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU), over the next 15 to 20 years. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification 6M container has been the workhorse for NNSA and many other shippers of radioactive material. However, the 6M does not conform to the safety requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 71[1]) and, for that reason, is being phased out for use in the secure transportation system of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in early 2006. BWXT Y-12 is currently developing the replacement for the DOT 6M container for NNSA and other users. The new package is based on state-of-the-art, proven, and patented technologies that have been successfully applied in the design of other packages. The new package will have a 50% greater capacity for HEU than the 6M, and it will be easier to use with a state-of-the-art closure system on the containment vessel. This new package is extremely important to the future of fissile, radioactive material transportation. An application for license was submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in February 2005. This paper reviews the license submittal, the licensing process, and the proposed contents of this new state-of-the-art shipping container.

Justification for Elevated Hydrogen Limits in Risk-Based Radioactive Waste Packages

2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Transportation Safety ◽  
Elevated Concentration ◽  
Type B ◽  
Hanford Site ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Concentration Limits ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has provided set guidance that hydrogen concentrations in radioactive material packages be limited to 5 vol% unless the package is designed to withstand a bounding hydrogen deflagration or detonation. The NRC guidance further specifies that the expected shipping time for a package be limited to one-half the time to reach 5 vol% hydrogen. This guidance has presented logistical problems for transport of retrieved legacy waste packages on the Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site that frequently contain greater than 5 vol% hydrogen due to their age and the lack of venting requirements at the time they were generated. Such packages do not meet the performance-based criteria for Type B packaging, and are considered risk-based packages. Duratek Technical Services (Duratek) has researched the true risk of hydrogen deflagration and detonation with closed packages, and has developed technical justification for elevated concentration limits of up to 15 vol% hydrogen in risk-based packages when transport is limited to the confines of the Hanford Site. Duratek has presented elevated hydrogen limit justification to the DOE Richland Operations Office and is awaiting approval for incorporation into the Hanford Site Transportation Safety Document. This paper details the technical justification methodology for the elevated hydrogen limits.

Field Experience With Code Case N-659: Ultrasonic Examination in Lieu of Radiography

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas O. Henry
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Material Transport ◽  
Ultrasonic Examination ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Asme Code ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Sample Set

Code Case N-659 Revision 0 was approved in 2002 to allow ultrasonic examination (UT) an alternative to radiography (RT) for nuclear power plant components and transport containers under Section III of the ASME Code. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not approved N-659 and its subsequent revisions (currently N-659-2) for general use, but they have been used on a case-by-case basis mainly where logistic problems or component configuration have prevented the use of radiography. Like the parallel Code Case 2235 for non-nuclear applications under Section I and Section VIII, Code Case N-659 requires automated, computerized ultrasonic systems and capability demonstration on a flawed sample as a prerequisite for using UT in lieu of RT. Automated ultrasonic examination can be significantly more expensive than radiography, so a cost-benefit evaluation is a key factor in the decision to use the Code Case. In addition, the flaw sample set has recently become an issue and a topic of negotiation with the NRC for application of the Case. A flaw sample set for a recent radioactive material transport cask fabrication project was successfully negotiated with the NRC. The Code Case N-659 approach has been used effectively to overcome barriers to Code required radiography. Examples are examination of welds in an assembled heat exchanger and in a radioactive material transport cask assembly where internal shielding prevented radiography of the weld. Future development of Code Case N-659 will address sample set considerations and application-specific Code Cases, such as for storage and transport containers, will be developed where NRC concerns have been fully addressed and regulatory approval can be obtained on a generic basis.

The Department of Energy Replacement for the 110-Gallon Specification 6M Shipping Container for Radioactive Contents

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Arbital ◽  
Paul T. Mann
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Department Of Transportation ◽  
Safety Requirements ◽  
Shipping Container ◽  
Regulatory Testing ◽  
Hypothetical Accident ◽  
Accident Conditions ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Energy Replacement

The Department of Energy (DOE) has been shipping university reactor fuels and other fissile materials in the 110-gallon Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M container for over 20 years. The DOT 6M container has been the workhorse for many DOE programs. However, packages designed and used according to the Specification 6M (U. S. Code of Federal Regulations, 49 CFR 178.354; 2003) do not conform to the latest package safety requirements in 10 CFR 71, especially performance under hypothetical accident conditions. For that reason, the 6M specification containers are being terminated by the DOT. Packages designed to the 6M specification will no longer be allowed for in-commerce shipments after October 1, 2008. To meet on-going transportation needs, DOE evaluated several different concepts for replacing the 110-gallon 6M. After this evaluation, DOE selected the Y-12 National Security Complex for the project. The new Y-12 container, designated the ES-4100 shipping container, will have a capacity of four times the current 6M and will be certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The ES-4100 project began in September 2006 and prototypes of the new container are now being fabricated. Details on the design features and the upcoming regulatory testing of this new container are discussed in this paper.

Severe Transportation Accidents: Impacts of Severe Fires on Radioactive Material Transportation

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Darrell S. Dunn
Keyword(s):  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Fire Investigation ◽  
Radioactive Materials ◽  
The Us ◽  
Material Transportation ◽  
Safe Transport ◽  
Regulatory Commission ◽  
Loss Of Strength

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred in Oakland, California in what is commonly known as the “MacArthur Maze” section of Interstate 580 (I-580). The accident involved a tractor trailer carrying gasoline that impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire burned for over 2 hours and led to the collapse of the overpass due to the loss of strength in the structural steel that supported the overpass. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) studied this accident to examine any potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of radioactive materials, including spent nuclear fuel. This paper will discuss the details of the NRC’s MacArthur Maze fire investigation.

scholarly journals Overview of NRC NUREG-1482, Revision 2, Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plants: Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves, and Inservice Examination and Testing of Dynamic Restrains (Snubbers) at Nuclear Power Plants

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gurjendra S. Bedi
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Power Plants ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Regulatory Guidance ◽  
American Society ◽  
Regulatory Commission

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued Revision 2 to NUREG-1482, “Guidelines for Inservice Testing at Nuclear Power Plant,” to assist the nuclear power plant licensees in establishing a basic understanding of the regulatory basis for pump and valve inservice testing (IST) programs and dynamic restraints (snubbers) inservice examination and testing programs. Since the Revision 1 issuance of NUREG-1482, certain tests and measurements required by earlier editions and addenda of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code) have been clarified, updated, revised or eliminated. The revision to NUREG-1482 incorporates and addresses those changes, and includes the IST programs guidelines related to new reactors. The revised guidance incorporates lessons learned and experience gained since the last issue. This paper provides an overview of the contents of the NUREG-1482 and those changes and discusses how they affect NRC guidance on implementing pump and valve inservice testing (IST) programs. For the first time, this revision added dynamic restraint (snubber) inservice examination and testing program guidelines along with pump and valve IST programs. This paper highlights important changes to NUREG-1482, but is not intended to provide a complete record of all changes to the document. The NRC intends to continue to develop and improve its guidance on IST methods through active participation in the ASME OM Code consensus process, interactions with various technical organizations, user groups, and through periodic updates of NRC-published guidance and issuance of generic communications as the need arises. Revision 2 to NUREG-1482 incorporates regulatory guidance applicable to the 2004 Edition including 2005 and 2006 Addenda to the ASME OM Code. Revision 0 and Revision 1 to NUREG-1482 are still valid and may continue to be used by those licensees who have not been required to update their IST program to the 2004 Edition including the 2005 and 2006 Addenda (or later Edition) of the ASME OM Code. The guidance provided in many sections herein may be used for requesting relief from or alternatives to ASME OM Code requirements. However, licensees may also request relief or authorization of an alternative that is not in conformance with the guidance. In evaluating such requested relief or alternatives, the NRC uses the guidelines/recommendations of the NUREG, where applicable. The guidelines and recommendations provided in this NUREG and its Appendix A do not supersede the regulatory requirements specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 10 CFR 50.55a, “Codes and standards”. Further, this NUREG does not authorize the use of alternatives to, grant relief from, the ASME OM Code requirements for inservice testing of pumps and valves, or inservice examination and testing of dynamic restraints (snubbers), incorporated by reference in 10 CFR 50.55a. Paper published with permission.

Potential Effects of Recent Road Transportation Accidents on Radioactive Material Shipments

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Bajwa ◽  
Earl P. Easton ◽  
Darrell S. Dunn ◽  
Robert E. Shewmaker
Keyword(s):  
Spent Nuclear Fuel ◽  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ◽  
The United States ◽  
Radioactive Material ◽  
Road Transportation ◽  
Concrete Walls ◽  
The Us ◽  
A Chain ◽  
Safe Transport ◽  
Regulatory Commission

In 2007, two severe transportation accidents, involving primarily long-haul tractor trailers, occurred in the State of California. In the first, which occurred in Oakland in the “MacArthur Maze” section of Interstate 580, a tractor trailer carrying gasoline impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire, which burned for over 2 hours, led to the collapse of the overpass onto the remains of the tractor trailer, due to the loss of strength in the steel exposed to the fire. The second incident was a chain-reaction accident involving several tractor trailers in the I-5 “Newhall Pass” truck bypass tunnel in Santa Clarita. This accident also involved an intense fire that damaged the tunnel and required the closing of the tunnel for repairs to the concrete walls. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is studying both these accidents to examine any potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of radioactive materials and spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper will provide a summary of that effort.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document