Relevant Historical Aviation Accidents

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack N. Sanders-Reed
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isaac Munene

Abstract. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) methodology was applied to accident reports from three African countries: Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa. In all, 55 of 72 finalized reports for accidents occurring between 2000 and 2014 were analyzed. In most of the accidents, one or more human factors contributed to the accident. Skill-based errors (56.4%), the physical environment (36.4%), and violations (20%) were the most common causal factors in the accidents. Decision errors comprised 18.2%, while perceptual errors and crew resource management accounted for 10.9%. The results were consistent with previous industry observations: Over 70% of aviation accidents have human factor causes. Adverse weather was seen to be a common secondary casual factor. Changes in flight training and risk management methods may alleviate the high number of accidents in Africa.


Author(s):  
O. M. Reva ◽  
V. V. Kamyshin ◽  
S. P. Borsuk ◽  
V. A. Shulhin ◽  
A. V. Nevynitsyn

The negative and persistent impact of the human factor on the statistics of aviation accidents and serious incidents makes proactive studies of the attitude of “front line” aviation operators (air traffic controllers, flight crewmembers) to dangerous actions or professional conditions as a key component of the current paradigm of ICAO safety concept. This “attitude” is determined through the indicators of the influence of the human factor on decision-making, which also include the systems of preferences of air traffic controllers on the indicators and characteristics of professional activity, illustrating both the individual perception of potential risks and dangers, and the peculiarities of generalized group thinking that have developed in a particular society. Preference systems are an ordered (ranked) series of n = 21 errors: from the most dangerous to the least dangerous and characterize only the danger preference of one error over another. The degree of this preference is determined only by the difference in the ranks of the errors and does not answer the question of how much time one error is more dangerous in relation to another. The differential method for identifying the comparative danger of errors, as well as the multistep technology for identifying and filtering out marginal opinions were applied. From the initial sample of m = 37 professional air traffic controllers, two subgroups mB=20 and mG=7 people were identified with statisti-cally significant at a high level of significance within the group consistency of opinions a = 1%. Nonpara-metric optimization of the corresponding group preference systems resulted in Kemeny’s medians, in which the related (middle) ranks were missing. Based on these medians, weighted coefficients of error hazards were determined by the mathematical prioritization method. It is substantiated that with the ac-cepted accuracy of calculations, the results obtained at the second iteration of this method are more ac-ceptable. The values of the error hazard coefficients, together with their ranks established in the preference systems, allow a more complete quantitative and qualitative analysis of the attitude of both individual air traffic controllers and their professional groups to hazardous actions or conditions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 55-60
Author(s):  
I.M. Zhdanko ◽  
◽  
A.A. Blaguinin ◽  
S.D. Chistov ◽  
S.P. Lyashedko ◽  
...  

BMJ ◽  
1925 ◽  
Vol 2 (3386) ◽  
pp. 979-980
Author(s):  
S. Tibbles
Keyword(s):  

Aviation ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Trifonov-Bogdanov ◽  
Leonid Vinogradov ◽  
Vladimir Shestakov

During an operational process, activity is implemented through an ordered sequence of certain actions united by a common motive. Actions can be simple or complex. Simple actions cannot be split into elements having independent objectives. Complex actions can be presented in the form of a set of simple actions. If the logical organisation of this set is open, a complex action can be described as an algorithm consisting of simple actions. That means various kinds of operational activities develop from the same simple and typical actions, but in various sequences. Therefore, human error is always generated by a more elementary error of action. Thus, errors of action are the primary parameter that is universal for any kind of activity of an aviation specialist and can serve as a measure for estimating the negative influence of the human factor (HF) on flight safety. Aviation personnel are various groups of experts having various specialisations and working in various areas of civil aviation. It is obvious that their influence on conditions is also unequal and is defined by their degree of interaction with the performance of flights. In this article, the results of an analysis of air incidents will be presented.


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