An Analysis of the Influence of Competitive and Institutional Pressures on Corporate Sponsorship Decisions

1999 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Berrett ◽  
Trevor Slack

Sport sponsorship is frequently described as a strategic activity, and thus, it is influenced by both competitive and institutional forces. Using a sample of 28 Canadian companies, this study explores the influence of competitive and institutional pressures on those individuals who make decisions about their company's sport sponsorship initiatives. The results show that the sponsorship activities of rival companies were influential in a company's sponsorship choices. This was particularly the case in highly concentrated industries. We also show some evidence of a first-mover advantage in sponsorship decision-making but found preemptive strategies to yield little competitive advantage. In addition to these pressures from the competitive environment, institutional pressures from companies in the same geographic area, in the form of mimetic activity, in the form of involvement in social networks, and through the occupational training of the decision makers—all played a role in the choices made about what activities to sponsor.

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-162
Author(s):  
Jiri Dvorak ◽  
Ilona Razova

Abstract This article investigates the applicability of blue ocean strategy in regard to low-cost airlines in the civil airline industry. To do so, the commercial offers of selected airlines were compared to validate any attempts to apply the blue ocean strategy concept. This is followed by examining the time limitation of the concept in a competitive environment and is illustrated by the changes in the industry for the past 30 years and a comparison of offers from similar companies. The third issue is the evaluation of the further contribution of blue ocean strategy when it is recognized as time-limited. The importance of first-mover advantage, which could be based on the ability to capture an economy of scale and advantageously shape the market, is also discussed.


Author(s):  
CHRISTINA M. KINANE

Scholarship on separation of powers assumes executives are constrained by legislative approval when placing agents in top policy-making positions. But presidents frequently fill vacancies in agency leadership with unconfirmed, temporary officials or leave them empty entirely. I develop a novel dataset of vacancies across 15 executive departments from 1977 to 2016 and reevaluate the conventional perspective that appointment power operates only through formal channels. I argue that presidents’ nomination strategies include leaving positions empty and making interim appointments, and this choice reflects presidents’ priorities and the character of vacant positions. The evidence indicates that interim appointees are more likely when positions have a substantial capacity to act on presidential expansion priorities and suggest that presidents can capitalize on their first-mover advantage to evade Senate confirmation. The results further suggest that separation of powers models may need to consider how deliberate inaction and sidestepping of formal powers influence political control and policy-making strategies.


Author(s):  
Nabil Al-Najjar ◽  
Ichiro Aoyagi ◽  
Guy Goldstein ◽  
Ted Korupp ◽  
Bin Liu ◽  
...  

Boeing and Airbus are contemplating entry into very-large-aircraft (VLA) markets. Both firms are convinced the market cannot support two players due to the extremely high R&D costs and the limited (and highly uncertain) state of demand. The key strategic issue is the uncertainty surrounding Boeing's development cost: to what extent would Boeing's experience with the 747 help it reduce the R&D cost of a new VLA prototype? The main point is that Boeing's strategic moves signal its private information, and that this eliminates any first-mover advantage Boeing might have had in this market.To introduce some of the strategic issues arising in natural monopoly industries in which the winner takes all, and focus on the issues of credible preemption and signaling.


2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (5) ◽  
pp. 2548-2564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose Apesteguia ◽  
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta

Emotions can have important effects on performance and socioeconomic outcomes. We study a natural experiment where two teams of professionals compete in a tournament taking turns in a sequence. As the sequential order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Hence, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning. Yet, we find a systematic first-mover advantage. Further, professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects and, when given the chance, they rationally react by systematically taking advantage of these effects. (JEL C93, D03, D82, L83)


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashish Arora ◽  
Sharon Belenzon ◽  
Bernardo Dionisi

Author(s):  
Scott James ◽  
Lucia Quaglia

As in the case of bank capital, elected officials were quick to respond to voter concerns by substantially expanding regulators’ powers over bank recovery and resolution. In response, regulators developed stringent new rules on loss-absorbing capacity (LAC) and ‘living wills’ for banks. However, the financial industry on the whole did not seek to resist the changes. Nonetheless, UK regulators sought to act as pace-setters in this area at the international and EU levels to manage the cross-border externalities generated by bank failures. They were therefore able to exert significant influence in the formulation of new international standards on resolution and LAC, and over the EU’s new Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. This was achieved by leveraging their substantial regulatory expertise, alliance-building (with the US), and ‘first-mover advantage’.


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