scholarly journals Does inappropriate behavior hurt or stink? The interplay between neural representations of somatic experiences and moral decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (42) ◽  
pp. eaat4390
Author(s):  
G. Sharvit ◽  
E. Lin ◽  
P. Vuilleumier ◽  
C. Corradi-Dell’Acqua
Keyword(s):  
Neural Activity ◽  
Ethical Dilemmas ◽  
Posterior Cingulate Cortex ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Neural Representations ◽  
Moral Decisions ◽  
Sensory Qualities ◽  
Somatic Experiences

Embodied models suggest that moral judgments are strongly intertwined with first-hand somatic experiences, with some pointing to disgust, and others arguing for a role of pain/harm. Both disgust and pain are unpleasant, arousing experiences, with strong relevance for survival, but with distinctive sensory qualities and neural channels. Hence, it is unclear whether moral cognition interacts with sensory-specific properties of one somatic experience or with supramodal dimensions common to both. Across two experiments, participants evaluated ethical dilemmas and subsequently were exposed to disgusting (olfactory) or painful (thermal) stimulations of matched unpleasantness. We found that moral scenarios enhanced physiological and neural activity to subsequent disgust (but not pain), as further supported by an independently validated whole-brain signature of olfaction. This effect was mediated by activity in the posterior cingulate cortex triggered by dilemma judgments. Our results thus speak in favor of an association between moral cognition and sensory-specific properties of disgust.

scholarly journals Exploring the role of expectations and stimulus relevance on stimulus-specific neural representations and conscious report

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik L Meijs ◽  
Pim Mostert ◽  
Heleen A Slagter ◽  
Floris P de Lange ◽  
Simon van Gaal
Keyword(s):  
Attentional Blink ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Neural Representations ◽  
Dependent Signal ◽  
Task Irrelevant

Abstract Subjective experience can be influenced by top-down factors, such as expectations and stimulus relevance. Recently, it has been shown that expectations can enhance the likelihood that a stimulus is consciously reported, but the neural mechanisms supporting this enhancement are still unclear. We manipulated stimulus expectations within the attentional blink (AB) paradigm using letters and combined visual psychophysics with magnetoencephalographic (MEG) recordings to investigate whether prior expectations may enhance conscious access by sharpening stimulus-specific neural representations. We further explored how stimulus-specific neural activity patterns are affected by the factors expectation, stimulus relevance and conscious report. First, we show that valid expectations about the identity of an upcoming stimulus increase the likelihood that it is consciously reported. Second, using a series of multivariate decoding analyses, we show that the identity of letters presented in and out of the AB can be reliably decoded from MEG data. Third, we show that early sensory stimulus-specific neural representations are similar for reported and missed target letters in the AB task (active report required) and an oddball task in which the letter was clearly presented but its identity was task-irrelevant. However, later sustained and stable stimulus-specific representations were uniquely observed when target letters were consciously reported (decision-dependent signal). Fourth, we show that global pre-stimulus neural activity biased perceptual decisions for a ‘seen’ response. Fifth and last, no evidence was obtained for the sharpening of sensory representations by top-down expectations. We discuss these findings in light of emerging models of perception and conscious report highlighting the role of expectations and stimulus relevance.

scholarly journals Ecological Representations

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina Golonka ◽  
Andrew D Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Nervous System ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Error Detection ◽  
Cognitive Theory ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Behavioral Repertoire ◽  
Intentional Behavior ◽  
Neural Representations ◽  
Potential Basis

AbstractMainstream cognitive science and neuroscience both rely heavily on the notion of representation in order to explain the full range of our behavioral repertoire. The relevant feature of representation is its ability todesignate(stand in for) spatially or temporally distant properties, When we organize our behavior with respect to mental or neural representations, we are (in principle) organizing our behavior with respect to the property it designates. While representational theories are a potentially a powerful foundation for a good cognitive theory, problems such as grounding and system-detectable error remain unsolved. For these and other reasons, ecological explanations reject the need for representations and do not treat the nervous system as doing any mediating work. However, this has left us without a straight-forward vocabulary to engage with so-called ‘representation-hungry’ problems or the role of the nervous system in cognition.In an effort to develop such a vocabulary, here we show that James J Gibson’s ecological information functions to designate the ecologically-scaled dynamical world to an organism. We then show that this designation analysis of information leads to an ecological conceptualization of the neural activity caused by information, which in turn we argue can together support intentional behavior with respect to spatially and temporally distal properties. Problems such as grounding and error detection are solved via law-based specification. This analysis extends the ecological framework into the realm of ‘representation-hungry’ problems, making it as powerful a potential basis for theories of behavior as traditional cognitive approaches. The resulting analysis does, according to some definitions, allow information and the neural activity to be conceptualized as representations; however, the key work is done by information and the analysis remains true to Gibson’s ecological ontology.

scholarly journals Hello, is that me you are looking for? A re-examination of the role of the DMN in off-task thought

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Murphy ◽  
Giulia Poerio ◽  
Mladen Sormaz ◽  
Hao-Ting Wang ◽  
Deniz Vatansever ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Neural Activity ◽  
Posterior Cingulate Cortex ◽  
Social Content ◽  
Self And Other ◽  
Personal Content ◽  
Laboratory Experiences ◽  
Task Experience ◽  
Laboratory Task ◽  
Trait Adjective

AbstractNeural activity within the default mode network (DMN) is widely assumed to relate to processing during off-task states, however it remains unclear whether this association emerges from a shared role in self or social cognition. In the current study, we examine the possibility that the role of the DMN in ongoing thought emerges from contributions to specific features of off-task experience such as self-relevant or social content. A group of participants described their experiences while performing a laboratory task over a period of days. In a different session, neural activity was measured while participants performed self/other judgements. Despite the prominence of social and personal content in off-task reports, there was no association with neural activity during off-task trait adjective judgements. Instead, during both self and other judgements we found recruitment of caudal posterior cingulate cortex - a core DMN hub - was above baseline for individuals whose laboratory experiences were characterised as detailed. These data provide little support for a role of the DMN in self or other content in the off-task state and instead suggest a role in how on-going thought is represented.

Morality

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronnie Janoff-Bulman ◽  
Nate C. Carnes
Keyword(s):  
Individual Behavior ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Moral Decisions ◽  
Rational Thought ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Individual

In regulating people’s individual behavior in the interests of the group, morality permits group members to reap considerable benefits, but sometimes at the expense of nonmembers. Thus, morality involves an inherent tension between hypo-egoicism at the level of the individual and hyper-egoicism at the group level. This chapter describes and contrasts the hypo-egoic and hyper-egoic aspects of morality, their varied manifestations, and their development. The model of moral motives provides an expanded view of morality by describing the role of proscriptive and prescriptive morality in regulating self-interested behavior at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and group level. An examination of the hypo-egoic features of morality argues for a global morality that blurs distinctions between ingroup and outgroup, thereby promoting greater impartiality. Such a global morality requires people to forego their natural egoicism and intuitive moral judgments in favor of increased reliance on rational thought in making moral decisions about outgroup members.

Commentaries and Rejoinder on

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Gong ◽  
Douglas L. Medin ◽  
Tal Eyal ◽  
Nira Liberman ◽  
Yaacov Trope ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Psychological Distance ◽  
Temporal Distance ◽  
Moral Cognition ◽  
Cultural Systems ◽  
Moral Condemnation ◽  
Construal Levels

In the hope to resolve the two sets of opposing results concerning the effects of psychological distance and construal levels on moral judgment, Žeželj and Jokić (2014) conducted a series of four direct replications, which yielded divergent patterns of results. In our commentary, we first revisit the consistent findings that lower-level construals induced by How/Why manipulation lead to harsher moral condemnation than higher-level construals. We then speculate on the puzzling patterns of results regarding the role of temporal distance in shaping moral judgment. And we conclude by discussing the complexity of morality and propose that it may be important to incorporate cultural systems into the study of moral cognition.

Is Empathy Required for Making Moral Judgments?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Deigh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Psychopathic Personality ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Psychological Profile ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Additional Support

This essay is a study of the nature of moral judgment. Its main thesis is that moral judgment is a type of judgment defined by its content and not its psychological profile. The essay arrives at this thesis through a critical examination of Hume’s sentimentalism and the role of empathy in its account of moral judgment. The main objection to Hume’s account is its exclusion of people whom one can describe as making moral judgments though they have no motivation to act on them. Consideration of such people, particularly those with a psychopathic personality, argues for a distinction between different types of moral judgment in keeping with the essay’s main thesis. Additional support for the main thesis is then drawn from Piaget’s theory of moral judgment in children.

scholarly journals Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (17) ◽  
pp. 4688-4693 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Clark Barrett ◽  
Alexander Bolyanatz ◽  
Alyssa N. Crittenden ◽  
Daniel M. T. Fessler ◽  
Simon Fitzpatrick ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Narrow Range ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Cultural Variation ◽  
Moral Assessment ◽  
Mitigating Circumstances

Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Although these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which intent and mitigating circumstances influence moral judgments. Although participants in all societies took such factors into account to some degree, they did so to very different extents, varying in both the types of considerations taken into account and the types of violations to which such considerations were applied. The particular patterns of assessment characteristic of large-scale industrialized societies may thus reflect relatively recently culturally evolved norms rather than inherent features of human moral judgment.

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